Social experiments and social policy formulation: A study of the Manitoba basic annual income experiment. by Farthing, Gerald Brian
SOCIAL EXPERIMENTS AND SOCIAL POLICY FORMULATION:
A STUDY OF
THE MANITOBA BASIC ANNUAL INCOME EXPERIMENT
by
Gerald Brian Farthing
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
of the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
London School of Economics and Political Science 
University of London
August 1991
UMI Number: U048582
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U048582
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
f1+c-ScE.f
F
b°ioS
ABSTRACT
In 1973 the Government of Canada and the ten provinces agreed to 
undertake jointly a complete review of Canada's social security 
system. The review and development of policy options was scheduled to 
be completed by 1975 with the implementation of chosen options to take 
a further two or three years. A prominent and much debated policy 
option with respect to income security was a guaranteed annual income.
In 1974 the Government of Canada and the Province of Manitoba 
agreed jointly to undertake a guaranteed annual income experiment 
called the Manitoba Basic Annual Income Experiment. The primary 
research purpose of the experiment was to provide information 
respecting the labour supply response of the recipients of a system of 
guaranteed annual income payments. The experiment officially ended in 
March, 1979, but did not report on the labour supply response.
This study examines the history and fate of the Manitoba Basic 
Annual Income Experiment. Two major conclusions are drawn. The first 
conclusion is that the Government of Canada had decided shortly after 
the experiment had begun that it would not support a one-tiered 
guaranteed annual income program such as was being tested by the 
experiment. The second conclusion is that social policy research that 
requires the use of rigorous and complex social science methodology 
should be considered an important part of the normal policy-making 
process, but should be conducted by a research body that is 
independent of the initiating government(s).
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION
In the early 1970s two significant events took place in the field of 
social policy in Canada. The first event (little publicized) was a 
jointly funded, multi-million dollar social experiment called the 
Manitoba Basic Annual Income Experiment (dubbed Mincome Manitoba) 
which was designed to investigate the economic and social consequences 
of a guaranteed annual income delivered as a negative income tax 
program.1 This was the first time in Canada that the social 
experimentation method had been employed to assist in the development 
of public policy.
The second important event (much publicized) was an extraordinary 
research effort constituting a federal-provincial review of social 
security programs and policy called the Social Security Review.2 This 
was a politically directed, three-year review which set out to 
evaluate Canada's entire system of social security including financial 
and jurisdictional responsibilities. Because the primary concern of 
the Review with respect to income security was to consider the means 
whereby all Canadians - unemployed and employed - could be assured 
access to a minimum, basic income, it was expected that a guaranteed
1 Derek P.J. Hum, 'Social Security Reform during the 1970s', in 
Canadian Social Welfare Policy, ed. Jacqueline S. Ismael, (Kingston 
and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985), p. 29.
2 Ibid., p. 29.
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2annual income program of some type would be recommended. Indeed, as
Derek Hum and Wayne Simpson note: "Although the aim of the review was
to be new arrangements for sharing the costs of social programs, a 
guaranteed annual income for all Canadians was never far from centre 
stage in intergovernmental discussions".3 A joint news release issued 
by the governments of Manitoba and Canada in 1974 stated that the 
experiment was expected to make an important contribution to the 
review of social security programs.4
These two events, then, were connected in both thought and purpose
as well as in timing in that the experiment was expected to play an
important role in the policy review and formulation process.5 That an
experiment to test a guaranteed annual income approach based on the
negative income tax model should converge with the policy .review
process seemed obvious because the political and economic feasibility
of a negative income tax program depends in large part on the expected
labour supply response. In fact:
Labour supply response is ah important issue in income 
maintenance and other social policy evaluation since work 
disincentives are a powerful argument against such program 
initiatives. Time and again, suggestions to reform either 
income support or social insurance programs in Canada have 
pressed against the fear that altering benefits for those 
capable of work might prove counterproductive. At its core, 
the worry is that cash transfers would diminish work 
incentives.6
3 Derek Hum and Wayne Simpson, 'Income Maintenance, Work Effort, and 
the Canadian Mincome Experiment', Economic Council of Canada, (July 
1991), p. 3.
4 Ibid., p. 44.
5 Hum, 'Social Security Reform during the 1970s', p. 33.
6 Ibid., p. xvi.
3Hence there seemed little purpose to further policy discussion of a 
guaranteed annual income approach without first "getting the facts" 
concerning the labour supply response.7 The purpose of the Mincome 
Manitoba experiment was to provide factual and quantitative
information on this crucial and controversial question as it was not
expected that reliable estimates of the labour supply response to a 
guaranteed annual income could be generated from conventional data.8
Thus it seemed at the time as if policy concerns and research
interests had "collided favorably in a happy combination of need and 
opportunity".9 It could have been expected, therefore, that the 
experiment would make a significant contribution to the policy review 
and formulation process. This, in fact, did not happen as the
Manitoba Basic Annual Income experiment never did provide timely 
answers concerning work incentives for the Social Security Review.10
1.1 RESEARCH ISSUE
In 1977 the Executive Director of the experiment declared that 
although the history of the Mincome Manitoba experiment had been an 
unsettled and difficult one, he firmly believed that it provided 
evidence that there is an important place for rigorous scientific 
investigation in social policy development.11 In 1979 both the
7 Hum and Simpson, p. 92.
8 Ibid., p. 3.
9 D. Hum, 'Poverty, Policy and Social Experimentation in Canada: 
Background and Chronology', (Draft of a paper prepared for the 
Economic Council of Canada, 1979), p. 3.
10 Hum and Simpson, p. 4.
4Government of Canada (Canada)12 and the Province of Manitoba 
(Manitoba) declared that the Manitoba Basic Annual Income Experiment 
had been completed successfully.13
The claim that the experiment had been completed successfully and 
that it provided evidence that there is an important place for 
rigorous scientific investigation in social policy development must be 
qualified in light of two observations. First, the information 
produced by the experiment had no bearing whatsoever on the outcome of 
the review of social security policy undertaken through the Social 
Security Review. Second, the data generated by the experiment 
respecting the labour supply response to a system of guaranteed income 
payments was not analyzed until 1987 - nearly ten years after the
experiment had ended. From the point of view of the integration of 
social science research with the policy process, the experiment was a 
complete failure.
Much has been written by social scientists and others as to why 
social science research has been so little utilized in the 
policy-making process and has had such little impact on policy 
decision-making.14 The explanations can usually be classified in one
11 Executive Director, Mincome Manitoba, Statement to the
Federal-Provincial Conference on Government Research in the Field 
of Social Security, March 17, 1977.
12 Reference will be made to either the "federal government" or
"Canada" when referring to the national government depending upon 
the context and sentence structure.
13 Draft Press Release, 'Monique Begin Encourages Careful Informed
Approaches to Social Policy', February 22, 1979.
14 Nathan Caplan,, Andrea Morrison, and Russell J. Stambaugh, The Use
of Social Science Knowledge in Policy Decisions at the National
Level. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 197517 P* x.
of three ways: explanations based on differences in approach,
understanding, language, and priorities between social scientists and 
policy decision-makers; fact versus value situations wherein political 
and personal values override adequate considerations of factual 
information; and incrementalist versus rationalist approaches to 
policy formulation wherein an incrementalist approach is usually 
adopted due to the necessity of reaching a compromise. Canada, in 
fact, has been cited by a former senior public official with the 
federal government and the Province of Saskatchewan as a country 
"notable for the gulf between the theory and practice of the social 
sciences, and in particular between academicians and practitioners".15 
Indeed, in 1968 the Economic Council of Canada stated that the support 
given to research in the social sciences in Canada had been totally 
inadequate.16
The purpose of this study is to review the Manitoba Basic Annual 
Income experiment in an attempt to explain why it failed to play any 
role in the policy review and formulation process. The "policy-making 
process" is taken to suggest the organization of the behaviour of a 
number of interested parties within a certain political structure 
which gradually shapes and molds a response to a public issue from the 
definition of the issue through to the governmental response.17 The
15 A.W. Johnson, 'Canada's Social Security Review 1973-75: The 
Central Issues', Canadian Public Policy. (Autumn 1975), p. 456.
16 Economic Council of Canada, 'Fifth Annual Review', pp. 52-53.
The Economic Council of Canada was established by the federal 
government in 1963 to act as an independent advisory body with 
broad terms of reference to study, advise, and report on an 
extensive range of matters relating to Canada's medium- and 
long-term economic development.
6primary focus of this study is the role that the federal government 
played in the policy process with respect to both the Mincome Manitoba 
experiment and the Social Security Review.
Donald Smiley, however, has cautioned that those "concerned 
primarily with substantive issues often proceed in complete neglect of 
the structures and processes of public authority".18 In Canada this is 
particularly to be avoided as the federal arrangement has had an 
enduring and pervasive (if not overriding) impact on the formulation 
of public policy, especially social policy. Indeed, as Leslie Pal has 
noted, federalism "has been a subject of endless fascination for 
Canadian political scientists, since so much of Canadian policy making 
seems to involve intergovernmental bargaining."19 Attempting to 
understand the role that social science research can play in the 
policy process in Canada or, in the case of the Mincome Manitoba 
experiment, attempting to explain why it failed to plan any role 
whatsoever, must therefore take into account Canada's federal 
arrangement. This study, therefore, emphasizes the federal-provincial 
aspects of the Social Security Review and the Mincome Manitoba 
experiment.
Derek Hum has pointed out that there are many unanswered questions 
concerning the Mincome Manitoba experiment that can only be dealt with 
adequately by a full account of the experiment and its relation to the
17 Leslie A. Pal, Public Policy Analysis. (New York: Methuen 
Publications, 1987).
18 Donald V. Smiley, Canada in Question; Federalism in the Seventies. 
(Toronto; McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1972), Introduction.
19 Pal, p. 31.
Social Security Review.20 It is hoped that this account of the Mincome 
Manitoba experiment will make a contribution to the literature 
respecting social experimentation. It is also hoped that it will 
provide some insight into the relationship between social science 
research and social policy formulation in Canada.
The methodological approach is that of a case study. The objective 
of the case study is to capture the particular and unique rather than 
to determine the relationships between a number of examples.21 Hence, 
case studies do not lend themselves to generalizations and broad 
inferences respecting the object of study. Rather, the case study 
provides an intensive and detailed explanation of the phenomena under 
review which may then be used for comparative purposes in support of 
broad inferences based on a number of examples. Conclusions based on 
this one example are thus advanced in full view of the fact that they 
cannot necessarily be generalized as explanations of other similar 
situations.
The primary source of information and documentation is the 
extensive administrative files concerning the experiment which include 
planning and discussion papers, correspondence, departmental position 
papers, ministerial and cabinet briefing papers, and draft and signed 
agreements. Secondary sources include newspaper accounts and 
materials in the libraries at the London School of Economics, the 
University of Manitoba, the University of Winnipeg, and the Manitoba
20 Hum, 'Social Security Reform during the 1970s', p. 43.
21 H. Eckstein, 'Case Study and Theory in Political Science', in
Strategies of Inquiry Handbook of Political Science, eds. F.
Greenstein and N.W. Polsby, (Manila: Addison-Wesley, 1975).
Legislature. Finally, conversations were held with a limited number 
of senior administrators and officials involved with the experiment.22
1.2 THE MINCOME MANITOBA EXPERIMENT
In 1969 the Province of Manitoba expressed an interest in exploring 
the feasibility of a guaranteed annual income program. In March, 
1973, Manitoba submitted a research proposal to the Government of 
Canada (which had invited all of the provinces to submit proposals) 
requesting Canada's participation in a cost-shared guaranteed annual 
income experiment in the Province of Manitoba. Two months later the 
two governments approved the Manitoba proposal in principle. In the 
spring of 1973 detailed design work for the experiment was begun by 
federal and provincial researchers. On June 4, 1974, Canada and
Manitoba signed a formal agreement in which the design of the 
experiment, the research objectives, and the respective roles of the 
two governments were outlined.
The decision by Canada and Manitoba jointly to undertake a 
guaranteed annual income experiment came at a time when considerable 
interest and debate were being devoted to social security issues. Of 
concern to both the provinces and Canada was the level of public
22 The survey research (formal questionnaires) method has been found 
to be inappropriate at the higher levels of policy-making. Peter 
Aucoin, 'Theory and Research in the Study of Policy-making, in The 
Structure of Policy-Making in Canada, ed. G. Bruce Doern and Peter 
Aucoin, (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada, 1971), p. 30.
C.A. Moser and G. Kalton note that "interviewing is without doubt 
generally the most appropriate procedure, even though it introduces 
various sources of error and bias." C.A. Moser and G. Kalton, 
Survey Methods in Social Investigation. (New York: Basic Books,
Inc., 1972), p. 271.
expenditures on social assistance programmes, the extent to which
social assistance discouraged individuals from seeking low-wage work, 
and the plight of the "working poor" who were for the most part 
ineligible for social assistance regardless of need.23 Of particular 
concern to the provinces was the extent of federal government
involvement in the area of social policy which, from the provinces' 
the point of view, is an exclusively provincial matter under the 
constitution. Of major concern to the federal government was the
state of federal-provincial relations after the failure in 1971 of
constitutional talks to resolve the issue of jurisdiction in the area
of social policy. In response to these and other concerns, in 1973
the federal government initiated a complete review of Canada's social 
security system in which the idea of a guaranteed annual income policy
became a prominent policy option.
It was expected that there would be a close liaison maintained
between the Mincome Manitoba experiment and the Social Security
Review.24 As a joint news release by the two governments in February, 
1974, proclaimed: "The Manitoba experiment is expected to make an
important contribution to the review of Canada's social security
system launched last April by all ten provinces and the federal
23 Peter M. Butler, 'Establishments and the Work-welfare Mix', The 
Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology. (May 1980), p. 138.
24 R.S. Hikel, M.E. Laub, and B.J. Powell, 'The Development and Design 
of the Basic Annual Income Experiment in Manitoba: A Preliminary 
Report', (For presentation to the Canadian Sociological and 
Anthropological Association, August 26, 1974), p. 4. The authors 
were respectively the Director of Mincome Manitoba, Research 
Director of Mincome Manitoba, and the Director of the Experimental 
Research Unit, Policy Research and Long Range Planning Branch, 
National Health and Welfare.
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government".25 In fact, there was a strong structural relationship 
established between the experiment and the Social Security Review. 
Federal officials participating in the experiment were under the 
overall authority of the Assistant Deputy Minister, Department of 
National Health and Welfare who was also the chairman of the 
federal-provincial Working Party on Income Maintenance, the group 
responsible for joint studies of income assistance alternatives. The 
chief delegate from Manitoba to the Working Party was at the same time 
the director of the group planning the experiment in Manitoba. 
Furthermore, the Ministers of Welfare from Manitoba and Canada
responsible for the Review were also responsible for the experiment.
Funding for the experiment was based on a 75/25 cost-sharing ratio 
between Canada and Manitoba respectively, with total costs not to
exceed $17.3 million. Operational responsibility resided solely with 
Manitoba and was carried out by an agency called Mincome Manitoba 
created under the auspices of the Manitoba Department of Health and 
Social Development. Canada was to maintain an active role in the
monitoring and approving of decisions concerning the design of the
experiment and its research objectives.
The primary research objective of the experiment was to test the 
hypothesis that a guaranteed annual income, administered as a negative 
income tax program, would have an adverse impact upon the work 
behaviour of recipients. An important, but secondary, objective was 
to determine the most cost-effective means of administering such a 
guaranteed annual income program on a national basis. In addition, a
25 Hum and Simpson, p. 44.
11
number of tertiary research objectives were identified such as the 
effect of guaranteed annual income payments on marital stability and 
mobility.
Payments to participants in the experiment began during the first 
months of 1975 and ended in March, 1979, as did the collection of data 
concerning the experiment. Upon the termination of the experiment the 
data was put into storage. No analysis of the data was conducted 
regarding the labour supply response during the actual term of the 
experiment. Thereafter, in 1981, the data base was turned over to a 
specially formed research unit created at the University of Manitoba 
called the Institute for Social and Economic Research. The Institute 
was mandated "to execute a feasibility study of the data, and to 
prepare it for analysis by qualified researchers".26 In 1983 the 
Institute reported that the feasibility stage was well under way and 
that research using most of the data was now possible.27
The data produced by the experiment measuring the labour supply 
response were first analyzed in 1987.28 The analysis found that the 
main difference between the results of the Mincome Manitoba experiment 
and the income maintenance experiments conducted in the United States
26 Institute for Social and Economic Research, Mincome User Manual, 
University of Manitoba, (February 1983), p. 1.
27 Ibid., p. 1.
28 W. Simpson, D. Hum, D. Sabourin, and A. Basilevsky, 'Family Labour 
Supply Behaviour of Low-Income Families in the Manitoba Basic 
Annual Income Experiment', (Unpublished mimeo, December 1987), 
referenced in Mario Iacobacci and Mario Seccareccia, 'Full 
Employment versus Income Maintenance: Some Reflections on the 
Macroeconomic and Structural Implications of a Guaranteed Income 
Program for Canada', Studies in Political Economy. (Spring 1989), 
p. 149.
12
was that the labour responsiveness of husbands exceeded that of wives 
and single parent heads.29 It was, however, the opinion of at least 
one researcher that the data was of quite poor quality.30
In 1991 Hum and Simpson revisited the data and later in the same 
year released a study that had as its objective "to review and 
interpret the evidence concerning the effect of income transfers on 
labour supply in detail”.31 They reported that, compared to the income 
maintenance experiments conducted in the United States, the labour 
supply response from the Mincome Manitoba experiment was lower for men 
and married women and similar for single female heads of households.32 
(Caution, however, was advised with respect to such comparisons.) A 
major conclusion was that "the labour supply response to changes in 
the tax-transfer system, such as those involved in income maintenance 
programs, will be small".33
In the opinion of Hum and Simpson much more analysis of the Mincome 
Manitoba data are possible and, furthermore, "it bears repeating that 
the Mincome data set remains the most richly detailed longitudinal 
data on labour supply behaviour in Canada today".34 Moreover, they 
recommend the continued use of social experimentation for policy
29 Mario Iacobacci and Mario Seccareccia, 'Full Employment versus 
Income Maintenance: Some Reflections on the Macroeconomic and 
Structural Implications of a Guaranteed Income Program for Canada', 
Studies in Political Economy. (Spring 1989), p. 149.
30 Provided in conversation by one of the researchers.
31 Hum and Simpson, p. 4
32 Ibid., p. xiv.
33 Ibid., p. 91.
34 Ibid., p. 92.
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research because although "the cost of social experimentation is high, 
so too are the costs of repeated non-experimental research and 
ill-advised social policy decisions”.35
The remainder of this chapter will provide background information 
related to the evolution of Canada's social security system, the 
federal arrangement in Canada, and the policy and political 
environment at the time the Mincome Manitoba experiment was initiated. 
The purpose of providing this background material is to put the 
experiment and Social Security Review into the political and social 
context of the time.
1.3 SOCIAL SECURITY IN CANADA
Over the last century, through a piecemeal process, Canada has 
created a vast complex of social programs dealing with health,
education, and income security needs. Bruce Doern and Richard Phidd 
separate the meaning of the phrase "social policy" into two parts.36 
First is social welfare policy (in this study also referred to as
social security policy) which refers to income security and social
services and therefore includes ideas of redistribution, equity, and 
stability. The second part, often summarized under the phrase 
"quality of life", includes cultural policy, language policy, 
broadcasting, individual and human rights, law enforcement, and a host 
of other policy fields. The primary focus of this section is on the 
development of social welfare policy generally and income security in
35 Ibid., p. 92.
36 G. Bruce Doern and Richard W. Phidd, Canadian Public Policy.
(Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1983) pp. 360-362.
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particular.
From a narrow and solely constitutional point of view, jurisdiction 
for the provision of social welfare is the responsibility of the 
provinces.37 This constitutional allocation of responsibility is 
consistent with the idea that the national government should have the 
major and most important powers with the provincial governments being 
assigned responsibility for matters considered to be of a minor and
local nature. In strict legal terms this means that it is only the
provinces which have the constitutional right to regulate with respect 
to social welfare matters.38
The evolution of the social welfare policy in Canada (as in other 
Western countries) can be roughly divided into three periods: before
the First World War; the First World War and the inter-war period; and 
the Second World War and the years since. From 1867 to the First 
World War the provinces delegated much of the responsibility for 
welfare matters to their parishes and municipalities.39 Thus up until 
the First World War social assistance programs in Canada were largely 
shaped by the local nature of social and economic needs and interests. 
Furthermore, social welfare legislation that was enacted in Canada 
between 1867 and 1900 was largely limited to the protection of
37 David Wolfe, 'Social Policy Issues Absent in Constitutional
Debate', Perception. (A magazine published by the Canadian Council 
on Social Development.) (Nov.-Dec. 1980), p. 13.
38 Keith Banting, The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism. 
(Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987), p. 52.
39 In the 1970s only in the provinces of New Brunswick, Newfoundland, 
Prince Edward Island, and the two territories was social assistance 
fully centralized. Christopher Leman, The Collapse of Welfare 
Reform: Political Institutions. Policy and the Poor in Canada and 
the United States. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1980), p. 38.
15
neglected and delinquent children and little else.40 It is the opinion 
of some that the record of municipal and provincial efforts with 
respect to social welfare measures during this period is not a 
distinguished one.41
During the First World War and the inter-war period 
industrialization, the economic and social disruptions of the 
Depression, and internal migration from rural to urban centres recast 
the problems of social welfare from being a purely local concern to 
being regional and national in character and magnitude. Moreover, the 
financial resources of the municipalities quickly came to be 
completely unequal to the task of providing the required relief. The 
result was that both the provinces and the federal government (but 
especially the provinces) were forced to begin assuming more direct 
policy and financial responsibility.42 However, with the growing 
demand for welfare services it became increasingly difficult for 
provincial governments to meet the required expenditures out of the 
tax sources available to them. Finally, faced with the catastrophe of 
the Depression, "the provinces were virtually begging the federal 
government to take over responsibility for unemployment relief"43 as a
40 Joanne C. Turner, 'The Historical Base', in Canadian Social
Welfare, eds. Joanne C. Turner and Francis J. Turner, (Don Mills:
Collier Macmillan Canada, Inc., 1986), p. 54.
41 Brian Wharf, 'Social Welfare and the Political System', in Canadian 
Social Welfare, eds. Joanne C. Turner and Francis J. Turner, (Don 
Mills: Collier Macmillan Canada, Inc., 1986), p. 103.
42 Clarence L. Barber, 'Welfare Policy in Manitoba', (A Report to the 
Planning and Priorities Committee of the Cabinet Secretariat, 
Province of Manitoba, 1972), p. 11.
43 L.A. Kelly, 'Emerging Social Security Issues', Industrial Relations
Centre, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, (1969), p. 4.
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means of getting federal financial assistance. The result was that 
although throughout the 1920s the federal government had become 
hesitantly involved in the area of social welfare, the Depression 
ensured that its further and continuing involvement became a 
certainty.
In Canada, as elsewhere, 1941 to 1975 is conventionally identified 
as the period marking the advent of what is referred to as the welfare 
state.44 (The welfare state has been defined as a collection of 
institutions that effect transfers of income from one set of 
individuals to another set of individuals whose members are less 
fortunate by some measure of "fortune").45 As in Britain with the 
Beveridge Report,46 the structure of Canada's social security system 
can largely be credited to the efforts of one man, Lenard Marsh, who 
in 1943 presented his 'Report on Social Security' to the House of
Commons' Special Committee on Social Security. Michael Bliss 
describes the Marsh Report as a "pivotal document in the development 
of war and post-war social security programs, the equivalent in Canada 
of the Beveridge Report in Great Britain".47 In fact the Marsh Report
44 A. Moscovitch, 'The Rise and Decline of the Canadian Welfare
State', Perception. (1982), p. 26.
45 G. Daly and F. Giertz, 'Welfare Economics and Welfare Reform', 
American Economic Review. (March 1972).
46 The central concept underlying the Beveridge Report was that of a 
national minimum whereby every citizen irrespective of
circumstances, need or any means test would be entitled, as a
matter of right, to a basic income sufficient for the essentials of 
life. This goal was to be achieved through a combination of social 
insurance, private insurance, and a system of children allowances. 
Karl de Schweinitz, England's Road to Social Security. (New York: 
A.S. Barnes & Company, 1943), p. 230.
47 Michael Bliss, Preface to 'Report on Social Security in Canada', by 
Lenard Marsh, (first published in 1943), p. ix.
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heralded the commitment to a full-scale welfare state along the same 
lines as envisaged by the Beveridge Report.48 The essence of the Marsh 
Report can be found in its suggestion of a "social minimum" that was 
to be secured through the integration of children's allowances, social 
assistance, and social insurance.49
After the Second World War a number of factors including the effect 
of the Marsh Report, the adoption of Keynesian economic policies,50 
the commitment of successive federal governments to the goals of the 
welfare state, the "reform" liberalism of the Liberal Party of Canada, 
the fiscal impotence of the provinces, and problems of national unity 
(all of which will be discussed later in this chapter) compelled the 
federal government to initiate and implement a host of social security 
programs. In 1949 nine categorical programs in the health field were 
started. Federal grants to provincial universities were begun in 
1952. Joint federal-provincial programs were continued or begun to 
provide financial assistance to the elderly, disabled, blind, and’ 
those individuals who were unemployed but did not qualify for 
unemployment insurance. In 1957 a national hospital insurance plan 
was established to be administered by the provinces. Federal aid for 
vocational education was begun in 1960. In 1965 the Canada Pension 
Plan was established and in 1966 the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) both
48 William Christian and Colin Campbell, Political Parties and 
Ideology in Canada. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1990), p. 63.
49 Michele Bergeron, Social Spending in Canada. (Toronto: Canada 
Council on Social Development, 1979), p. 1.
50 Keynesian economics, in a simplified form, has had an enormous 
effect on economics and the economies of liberal democratic 
countries. Allan Budd, The Politics of Economic Planning. 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1978), p. 27.
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of which the Province of Quebec "opted out" of as a means of asserting 
its autonomy. In 1968 a national medicare scheme was established 
which was to be the last significant social welfare measure initiated 
by the federal government. In addition to these major programs there 
were hundreds of other minor agreements established in various sectors 
such as agriculture, housing, and transportation.
Most if not all of the provinces resented the fact that these 
policies were for the most part initiated, designed, and "forced" on 
the provinces through the use of conditional funding and shared-cost 
grants although the majority (especially the poorer provinces) found 
it very difficult for political and financial reasons to refuse to 
participate and pay their share of the costs. Then, in the 1960s, two 
major "forces" combined to shape Canadian social welfare policy for 
the next decade and a half.51 First there was a determined provincial 
drive to gain more control over social policy or at least limit 
federal prerogative. Second, there was the crusade against poverty 
taken up by the federal government.
The result was the consolidation of federal financial aid for 
social assistance into a single program called the Canada Assistance 
Plan. Under the CAP, the federal government contributes 50 percent of 
the cost of social assistance, welfare services, and work-activity 
programs delivered by provinces and municipalities. The principal 
financial feature of the CAP was that the federal government would 
contribute towards the costs of provincial social assistance programs 
that provided adequate assistance to persons in need regardless of the
51 Leman, p. 37.
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cause. Hence the legislation established for the first time a major 
federal role in sharing the cost of conditional aid to mother-headed 
families.52 The CAP was also considered an important innovation in 
federal-provincial relations in that it provided for significant 
flexibility and discretion on the part of the provinces with respect 
to the social assistance that would be delivered, and allowed the 
Province of Quebec to opt out of a national and important cost-shared 
program.
Leslie Bella states that in some respects the CAP was just a 
further incremental step in the development of social security in 
Canada as it "consolidated and rationalized several cost-shared 
welfare programs that had been introduced in the postwar period".53 In 
the opinion of some, however, the provision of significant provincial 
flexibility and discretion has not been entirely positive. The 1985 
Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for 
Canada, for example, suggests that the exercise of the wide discretion 
on the part of the provinces in the application of the criteria for 
eligibility for social assistance has resulted in an uneven and, for 
some groups, an inadequate system of assistance across the country.54 
In addition, the CAP has been criticized in that "social assistance 
benefits under CAP normally produce strong work-disincentives".55
52 Ibid., p. 37.
53 Leslie Bella, 'The Provincial Role in the Canadian Welfare State: 
The Influence of Provincial Social Policy Initiatives on the Design 
of the Canada Assistance Plan', Canadian Public Administration. 
(Fall 1979), p. 441.
54 Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects 
for Canada, Volume Two, Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 
1985, p. 793.
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Most analyses of the development of social welfare policy in Canada 
gives the leading role to the federal government. Bella, however, 
argues that the Canada Assistance Plan was established as a result of 
provincial pressure and initiative to which the federal government 
responded.56 The argument is that the provinces initiated the 
federal-provincial discussions that culminated in the CAP for two 
reasons.57 First, the provinces wanted to make arrangements with the 
federal government that would simplify the cost-sharing arrangements 
that had already been entered into respecting the payment of welfare 
benefits but which would also maximize provincial flexibility and 
autonomy with respect to the delivery and level of such benefits. 
Second, the provinces wanted to bring a number of existing and 
proposed social assistance programs within the ambit of cost-sharing 
arrangements in order to gain additional federal financial assistance.
From the federal government's point of view there were a number of 
advantages to working out a new and comprehensive cost-sharing 
agreement with the provinces.58 First, the CAP represented a national 
welfare program which was something that welfare administrators and 
commentators had long been advocating. Second, the CAP could be 
pointed to as evidence of a commitment at the political level by the 
federal government to a "War on Poverty" program in Canada. Third, 
during this period of increasing agitation for constitutional change 
and a questioning of the federal role in the area of welfare policy on
55 Ibid., p. 793.
56 Bella, p. 439.
57 Ibid., pp. 442-443.
56 Ibid., pp. 445-449.
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the part of the Province of Quebec, the CAP was viewed as a means of 
demonstrating federal flexibility and sensitivity to provincial 
concerns. Finally, the federal Liberal government, which was in a 
minority position at the time, was aware of the fact that the CAP 
legislation was generally supported by the New Democratic Party (NDP) 
although the NDP did demand concessions in other areas of social 
policy (specifically increased assistance to the elderly) to ensure 
their support.
Despite the intense degree of federal-provincial consultation that 
accompanied each stage - formulation, design, and implementation - the 
Province of Quebec opted out of the CAP (and several other conditional 
grant programs) "to the accompaniment of substantial fanfare about a 
'victory' for the province and a 'weakening' of federal control over 
social policy".59 In fact, however, that Quebec had opted out of the 
Plan (in return for additional taxing powers and a "balancing" cheque 
from the federal government)60 "was not crucial, as the province still 
liked the plan, met all the conditions, and submitted claims in the 
same way as any other province".61 The opting out by Quebec 
notwithstanding, the Canada Assistance Plan, with its flexibility 
respecting provincial benefit levels and method of administration, is 
viewed by some as an example of "co-operative federalism" at its 
best.62
59 Banting, pp. 11-12.
60 Leman, p. 39.
61 Bella, p. 449.
62 Rand Dyck, 'The Canada Assistance Plan: The Ultimate in Cooperative 
Federalism, Canadian Public Administration. (Winter 1976).
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The general trend, then, from 1945 to the 1960s was that 
responsibility (in the political sense at least) for social welfare 
policy moved from the municipalities to the provinces, and then to a 
shared responsibility with the federal government63 even though the 
"federal response was gradual, often grudging, and initially at least 
constitutionally cautious".64 For example, in 1939 the federal 
government met 43 percent of all social security expenditures, the 
provinces 40 percent, and the municipalities 17 percent.65 However, by 
1959 the federal government was meeting 74 percent of the total, the 
provinces 22 percent, and the municipalities only 4 percent.66 By 
1969, despite increasing health expenditures by the provinces and 
arrangements made available to the provinces to opt-out of 
federal-provincial programs, the federal share of expenditures was 
still at more than 60 percent of the total.67 As Keith Banting 
suggests, "the federal government emerged in the postwar period as the 
principal guarantor of many of the social rights that stand as a 
hallmark of the twentieth century".68
63 Kelly, 'Emerging Social Security Issues', p. 3.
64 Banting, p. 48.
65 Kelly, 'Emerging Social Security Issues', p. 3.
66 Ibid., p. 3
67 Ibid., p. 3.
68 Banting, p. 173.
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1.3.1 Income Security
The most visible part of the expansion of government in liberal 
democratic countries over the last century has been the establishment 
of a plethora of social policy measures which define the contemporary 
welfare state. (the welfare state is then often broken down into the 
two areas of income security and social services).69 The largest 
pillar in the modern welfare state, in virtually every industrial 
nation, is that of income security.70 In Canada, for example, in 
1984-85 the combination of tax expenditures (excepting the personal 
tax exemption), unemployment insurance payments, and federal and 
provincial expenditures on direct transfers added up to approximately 
$60 billion or just over 13 percent of Canada's gross national 
product.71
Of more importance from a political point of view than the actual 
expenditures involved is the fact that no other area of public policy 
has such a direct and powerful impact on individual citizens as income 
security measures since such measures constitute a direct exchange 
between citizen and state.72 To the recipients of income security the 
role of government is direct, visible and, for many, crucial. Indeed, 
in Canada, as the 1985 Royal Commission on the Economic Union and 
Development Prospects for Canada phrased it: "Government
income-security programs are a fundamental part of the social
69 Doern and Phidd, p. 361.
70 Banting, p. 2.
71 Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects
for Canada, Volume Two, p. 771.
72 Banting, p. 27.
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consensus by which Canadians live1'.73
Over the past forty years, Canada's income security system has been 
constructed in a somewhat piecemeal fashion in combination with 
sometimes unco-ordinated adjustments to the personal income tax.74 
Moreover, the Canadian income security system is essentially 
categorical, differentiating between groups which are not generally 
expected to be part of the labour force and those which are either 
part of the labour force or expected to be.75 Within this context four 
basically different types of income security programs have been 
developed:
(i) demogrant;
(ii) social insurance;
(iii) income supplements for certain groups such as the
elderly; and
(iv) social assistance.76
Demogrant programs are universal, flat-rate payments made to 
individuals or families solely on the basis of demographic 
characteristics, such as age, rather than on the basis of need, as in 
the case of social assistance, or previous contributions, as in the 
case of social insurance. Two of the largest demogrant programs are 
Old Age Security payments and Family and Youth Allowances paid by the 
federal government. The only major provincial demogrant program is
73 Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects 
for Canada, Volume Two, p. 771.
74 Ibid., p. 783.
75 Ibid., p. 778.
76 Doern and Phidd, p. 362.
25
the Quebec Family Allowance program which provides benefits for 
children.
Social insurance programs make up the next largest component of the 
income security system. The two largest programs are the Canada and 
Quebec Pension Plans and Unemployment Insurance. Workers' 
Compensation, the third most important social insurance program, was 
the first major income security program introduced in this century 
when the Province of Ontario passed the Workmen's Compensation Act in 
1914.
Third are programs that guarantee the income of a certain groups 
such as the Guaranteed Income Supplement for pensioners. In 1971 it 
consisted of a basic annual payment of $660 to single persons and 
$1,140 to married couples, less a tax at a rate of 50% on all private 
income so that the basic payment was reduced to zero for single 
persons with private income in excess of $1,320 and married couples 
with private income in excess of $2,280.77 This program is the closest 
that Canada has come to implementing deliberately a form of guaranteed 
annual income although many have argued that the system of 
Unemployment Insurance as it affects seasonal workers is virtually a 
guaranteed annual income program.
Social assistance, a provincial responsibility, is the residual 
element in the income security system - the last resort for the needy 
who do not qualify for other income security programs or whose income
77 David A. Dodge and John H. Sargent, 'Towards a New Tax-Transfer 
System in Canada: An Analysis of the Changes Proposed in the White
Papers on Income Security, Unemployment Insurance and Taxation', 
(Discussion Paper No. 49, June 1971), p. 29.
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from other programs is still inadequate.78 Benefits are based on an 
assessment of the applicant's needs and income and vary from province 
to province. This is the most stigmatized of all forms of income 
support. (Banting has referred to social assistance as "the modern 
version of the ancient Poor Laws".)79 As was noted earlier, the 
federal government contributes half of the cost of the provincial 
programs through the Canada Assistance Plan regardless of the level of 
benefits or the form of administration in the provinces.
The following table provides a chronological overview of the 
development of social welfare policy in Canada.
Events in the History of Social Welfare in Canada
1763 Government of Nova Scotia adopts English Poor Laws
1799 Act to Provide for the Education and Support of Orphaned
Children in Upper Canada (Province of Ontario)
1867 British North America Act assigns responsibility for welfare
provisions to the provinces 
1880s Provincial Governments introduce Workmen's Compensation plans
1889 Royal Commission on the Relations of Labour and Capital
1891 Children's Aid Society organized in Toronto, Province of
Ontario
1893 Act for the Prevention of Cruelty to and Better Protection of
Children, Province of Ontario 
1908 Annuities Act, federal government makes pensions available
on a voluntary basis 
1914 Workmen's Compensation in Ontario and subsequently all of
the provinces
1916 Mothers' Allowance Act, Province of Manitoba
1917 Provincial Governments begin introducing minimum wage laws
1919 Federal Department of Health established
1919 Royal Commission on Industrial Relations recommends the
establishment of an old age pension plan 
1927 Old Age Pension Act
1940 Unemployment Insurance Act
Report of the Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations
1943 Report on Social Security in Canada, (Marsh Report)
1944 Family Allowances Act
Creation of the Department of National Health and Welfare
78 Banting, p. 11.
79 Ibid., p. 11.
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Adoption of a national housing policy 
1945 White Paper on Employment and Income
Dominion-Provincial Conference 
1951 Old Age Security Act, Old Age Assistance Act, Blind Persons' Act
1954 Disabled Persons' Act
1956 Unemployment Assistance Act, Hospital Insurance Act
1957 Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Act
1964 Youth Allowances Act
1965 Canada Pension Plan Act
1966 Canada Assistance Plan
1967 Guaranteed Income Supplement (for pensioners)
1968 Medical Care Act
1971 Major Revisions to the Unemployment Insurance Act
Report of the Special Senate Committee on Poverty in Canada 
Report of the Quebec Commission of Inquiry on Health and Welfare
1973 Social Security Review initiated
1974 Mincome Manitoba experiment begins
1975 Social Security Review ends
1979 Mincome Manitoba experiment ends
1.4 SOCIAL POLICY AND FEDERALISM
The overriding aspect of Canadian political life since the founding 
of Canada in 1867 has been its federal structure wherein the powers of 
the state are divided between the national government and the 
provinces. Hence, as one might expect, Canadian politics since 1867 
have been conditioned by ongoing (and often bitter) federal-provincial 
negotiation and dispute concerning jurisdictional powers and financial 
responsibilities.80 Politics and policy-making in Canada, therefore, 
are difficult to understand without an appreciation of this fact of 
Canadian political life.
Constitutionally, federal and provincial jurisdiction is 
interpreted through Sections 91 to 95 of the British North America 
(BNA) Act, 1867 (now known as the Constitution Act, 1867) and the
80 Michael A. Walker, 'Introduction: Canadian Confederation at the
Crossroads' in Canadian Confederation at the Crossroads. ed. 
Michael A. Walker, (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1978), p. 3.
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Constitution Act, 1982 (which includes the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms). The BNA Act established the federal structure of Canada 
out of the then British colonies of Lower and Upper Canada (Quebec and 
Ontario), New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia. The division of legislative 
(law-making) powers between the national government and the provinces 
reflected the fact that the new provinces - especially French-speaking 
Quebec - "did not want to lose control over local matters to a new and 
distant legislature in which their representatives would be a 
minority".81
When the BNA Act was drafted in 1867 such twentieth century phases 
as "income security" and "social services" did not appear in the list 
of jurisdictions and responsibilities assigned to the federal and 
provincial governments.82 Provincial jurisdiction in the health and 
social welfare field, however, is inferred from the specific headings 
of section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which grants provincial 
authority over "hospitals, asylums, charities and eleemosynary 
institutions," "municipal institutions," "property and civil rights", 
and "all matters of a merely local or private nature in the 
province."83 Federal jurisdiction (perhaps prerogative is a better 
term) with respect to social welfare is inferred from more general 
grants of power under section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 such as 
the power to make laws for the "peace, order and good government" of
81 F.L. Morton, 'The Living Constitution1, in Introductory Readings in 
Canadian Government. eds. Robert M. Krause and R.H. Wagenberg, 
(Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), p. 43.
82 Banting, p. 47.
83 Ibid., p. 48.
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Canada and the general spending power of the national government.84 
’Needless to say, the boundary line between these two spheres of 
jurisdiction is not clear, and has been a source of dispute ever 
since’.85
That the framers of the British North America Act showed a clear 
preference for a highly centralized federal structure is attested to 
by the fact that the national government was assigned unlimited taxing 
authority along with the major spending responsibilities then assumed 
by government.86 To ensure the supremacy of Parliament vis-a-vis 
provincial legislatures, the federal government was granted a number 
of constitutional controls over provincial actions including the 
authority to disallow provincial legislation (which it made frequent 
use in the first 20 or so years of the federation). The salient 
feature, therefore, respecting the constitutional division of powers 
is the paramountcy of Parliament and the limiting of the jurisdiction 
of the provincial legislatures.87 Not surprisingly, the provinces have 
been vigilant in defending their constitutional prerogatives and 
powers.88 This especially has been the case with respect to education, 
health, and social welfare as expenditures and the political impact of
84 Ibid., p. 48.
85 Morton, "The Living Constitution", p. 44.
86 Robert F. Adie and Paul G. Thomas, Canadian Public Administration. 
Second Edition, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1987), p. 430.
87 Kelly, 'Emerging Social Security Issues', p. 4.
Irving J. Goffman, 'Some Fiscal Aspects of Public Welfare in 
Canada', Canadian Tax Foundation. (September 1965), p. 17.
88 Thomas J. Courchene, 'The Poverty Reports, Negative Income 
Taxation, and the Constitution: An Analysis and a Compromise 
Proposal', Canadian Public Administration. (Fall 1973) p. 349.
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policy in these areas has grown appreciably in the postwar period. 
Health, education, and welfare are now huge items in provincial 
budgets and of major political significance.89
The ongoing dispute over jurisdiction between the national 
government and the provinces raises the question of the impact of 
institutional arrangements on the formulation of public policy. The 
general proposition is that a federal arrangement constrains both 
rapid expansion and rapid contraction in the scope of state activity 
because,
the fragmentation of power implicit in federal structures 
creates a set of checks and balances and veto points that 
increase the probability that any proposal for change - 
whether involving an expansion or a contraction of the 
public sector - will be delayed, diluted, or defeated. In 
effect, the additional opportunities for blocking change 
raise the level of consensus required before new initiatives 
can be introduced on a nation-wide basis.90
The problem is that policy that proposes significant change involving
both levels of government only can be undertaken with the consent of
eleven governments representing differing provincial, regional, and
ideological interests. Thus Banting has concluded that federalism as
a form of institutional fragmentation is one of the elements of
Canadian political life that incline it towards an incremental process
of policy change.91 Christopher Leman has concluded that because the
89 Richard Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent
Policy in Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p.
40.
In Manitoba in 1990-91, for example, health expenditures accounted 
for 32.5%, education for 18.2%, and family services for 10.4% of 
total budgeted expenditures of $4.6 billion.
90 Banting, p. 206.
91 Ibid., pj 206.
policy making process in Canada is characterized by high-level 
negotiations among competing bureaucracies and between federal and 
provincial authorities in which public debates have little impact, it 
"may be that a country like Canada is the real outpost of 
gradualism".92
1.4.1 Federal-Provincial Relations
Since confederation there have been continuous disputes between the 
two levels of government over jurisdictional prerogative. This has 
been a complicating and often "bewildering" factor in the history of 
federal-provincial relations in Canada.93 From the beginning of the 
federation many of the provincial premiers, but especially those in 
Ontario and Quebec, have insisted on their right to be consulted by 
the federal government on matters of major significance which, 
strictly speaking, may not have been within their constitutional 
prerogative. Finally, in 1906 the first conference of 
federal-provincial first ministers took place which established the 
precedent for the ongoing negotiation of matters deemed to be of 
mutual interest and significance.
Attempts by the provinces to expand upon their jurisdictional 
prerogative by pressing the case for "provincial rights" produced 
mixed results not least because until the 1960s the provinces lacked 
the fiscal and technical clout to stand behind their demands for more 
powers. During the 1920s, after the end of the First World War and
92 Leman, p. 135
93 A.W. Johnson, 'Canada's Social Security Review 1973-1975: The
Central Issues', Canadian Public Policy. (Autumn 1975) p. 447.
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the decline of the sweeping emergency powers assumed by the federal 
government, there was a notable upswing in provincial power and 
responsibilities. The reason was that increasing urbanization and 
industrialization greatly increased the demand for services provided 
by provincial governments - most notably education, health, welfare, 
and highways. To help meet these growing responsibilities the 
provinces became more involved in the personal and corporate income 
tax fields and sought new revenues from various sources such as the 
sale of liquor through provincially-controlled retail outlets.94 
However, as both the scope of the social problems confronting the 
country and the difficulties facing a purely municipal and provincial 
response to them became clearer, advocates for greater action 
including many provincial governments, put increasing pressure on the 
federal government to provide financial assistance.95
With the onset of the Depression any illusions the provinces may 
have acquired during the 1920s about the extent of their financial 
strength were shattered. The Prairie and Maritime provincial 
governments came close to bankruptcy and eventually the federal 
government had to provide significant financial support to all the 
provinces to assist with welfare and employment measures and the 
provision of essential services such as health. In fact, during the 
Depression years federal contributions amounted to almost half of 
total relief expenditures and over 70 percent of total expenditures in 
the Western provinces.96 Indeed, the hopelessly inadequate provision
94 Adie and Thomas, p. 431.
95 Banting, p. 48.
96 Ibid., p. 63.
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of relief during the Depression convinced an entire generation of 
legal scholars and social welfare professionals that strong leadership 
from the federal government was essential to the establishment of a 
modern, co-ordinated social security system.97 With the onset of the 
Second World War the federal government assumed emergency powers 
thereby creating a strong central focus to which the provinces 
deferred. The result was that by the end of the Second World War the 
federal government had clearly established its financial and 
bureaucratic dominance.
After 1945 three major and interrelated factors combined to ensure 
the continued preeminence of the federal government until at least the 
middle 1960s.98 First, there was the acceptance of Keynesian economic 
theories and practices that required the national government to 
exercise the fiscal power (taxation and spending) at its disposal. 
(Doern and Phidd note that although there "was always criticism of 
Keynesian policy, the dominance of the Keynesian idea was not 
seriously challenged until the heady prosperity of the 1950s and early 
1960s came to an end).99 In 1945 the federal government released a 
White Paper (as in Britain, major statements of policy are published 
as "White Papers") promising a full-scale welfare state and central
97 Ibid., p. 59.
Banting goes on to note that many welfare professionals still 
insist that a strong federal role is essential to future expansion 
of the income security system, and that decentralization will
inevitably result in an age of stagnation and confusion in the
welfare world, p. 59.
98 Adie and Thomas, pp. 433-434.
99 Doern and Phidd., p. 355.
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management of the economy along Keynesian lines.100 Thus the general 
perception was that it was the federal government which had the 
expertise, competence, and responsibility to manage complicated social 
and economic policies in an increasingly complex world.
Second, the Liberal Party of Canada which dominated the political 
landscape during this time, was commited after the Second World War to 
the goals of the welfare state.101 Indeed, as Richard Simeon observes: 
"Virtually all Canadian governments have been committed to the notion 
of the Welfare State, though there have been variations between 
them".102 Hence there was internal political and governmental pressure 
on the federal government to assume a strong leadership role in the 
development of social policy as well as in the management of the 
economy.
The third factor was the perception (on the part of 
English-speaking Canadians at least) that there was a need for strong 
central government that would be able to foster a sense of national 
unity. The Liberal Party, in a majority government position through 
several federal elections, was viewed as being able to speak for both 
English and French Canada. For these reasons, this was a period of 
relative centralism with the federal government assuming a highly 
visible and dominant role in the political and economic life of the 
country.
100 Christian and Campbell, p. 63.
101 Ibid., p. 63.
These points will be discussed at greater length later in this 
chapter.
102 Simeon, p. 169.
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However, beginning in the 1960s, serious federal-provincial 
disputes concerning jurisdiction and financial responsibility began to 
surface. Smiley has noted that contemporary provincialism in Canada 
has featured two major thrusts: first, the safeguarding of provincial
autonomy from federal control and, second, an increase in provincial 
influence over federal policies which have a direct impact on the 
provinces.103 For most of the provinces the problem was that of being 
"forced" to participate financially - cost-share - in social programs 
unilaterally initiated by the federal government.104 For the Province 
of Quebec, however, jurisdictional prerogative and the legitimate role 
of the federal government in the field of social policy was the 
overiding issue.105 Hence many of the provinces, but especially the 
Province of Quebec, began to complain about federal intrusions into 
areas of provincial jurisdiction.106
Thus many of the provinces, led by Quebec, began in the early 1960s 
to raise various objections on philosophical, political, financial, 
and practical grounds to federal involvement in provincial matters. 
They pointed out that they now had the technical expertise and 
competence to implement needed services. They also argued that they, 
being the level of government closest to the electorate, were in the 
best position to know how to respond to their needs and wishes. They
103 Smiley, p. 211.
104 Banting, p. 140.
105 Ibid., p. 140.
106 Alain G. Gagnon and Joseph Garcea, 'Quebec and the Pursuit of 
Special Status', in Perspectives on Canadian Federalism, eds., 
R.D. Oiling and M.W. Westmacott, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 
1988,) p. 304.
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further complained that cost-shared programs distorted provincial 
priorities and that frequently the amount of contribution by Ottawa 
was insufficient.
Federal-provincial tension reached acute levels in the early 1970s. 
The reason was that the federal government, under Prime Minister 
Trudeau, increasingly came to view the implementation of some form of 
common public services, such as nation-wide social security programs, 
as being one of the primary tools by which the federal government 
could foster a sense of national unity.107 Perceiving this as a threat 
to provincial autonomy, the provinces became increasingly hostile to 
and bitter about federal involvement in the area of social policy. 
Thus many of the provinces began to demand that Ottawa consult more 
closely with them before launching new programs in which they would be 
asked to participate financially. The Province of Quebec went a step 
further and began to demand consideration of constitutional changes 
that would protect and even enlarge provincial jurisdiction.
1.4.2 Province of Quebec
Richard Simeon suggests that the salient and historically most 
important basis of social diversity in Canada is the existence of what 
is commonly referred to as the "two cultures" of French and English 
Canada.108 Some historians, however, such as Donald Creighton argue 
that this view should not lead to a theory of Canadian federalism
107 A.W. Johnson, 'The Dynamics of Federalism in Canada', reprinted 
from Canadian Journal of Political Science. (March 1968), in 
Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality. ed. J. Peter Meekison,
(Toronto: Methuen Publishers, 1968), p. 102.
108 Simeon, p. 21.
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based on the concept of the cultural duality of Canada.109 He argues 
that Confederation was not a compact between two cultures or two 
nations, English and French, but rather the new Dominion of Canada was 
organized as a triumvirate of three divisions: Quebec, Ontario, and
the Atlantic Provinces as a group.110
In fact, Creighton argues that the last thing the Fathers of 
Confederation wanted was to perpetuate the duality experienced by 
Canada prior to confederation which had paralyzed governments and 
prevented progress for a quarter of a century.111 He suggests that the 
origins of this new theory of Canadian federalism are politically 
motivated and are an outgrowth of the rapid rise of French-Canadian 
nationalism beginning with the election of a liberal provincial 
government in Quebec in 1960 and the subsequent initiation of the 
Quiet Revolution.112 Nevertheless, and despite Creighton's arguments, 
the idea that Canada is essentially comprised of two entities, French 
and English, which constitute the two fundamental partners in the 
federal arrangement seems to be widely accepted by the political 
leadership in the country if not the general population.
French-Canadians constitute about 30 percent of the Canadian 
population and are concentrated in the Province of Quebec where about 
80 percent of the six million inhabitants are of French-speaking
109 Donald G. Creighton, 'John A. Macdonald, Confederation and the 
West', Paper presented to the Manitoba Historical Society, 
Winnipeg, January 11, 1967, p. 1.
110 Ibid., p. 3.
111 Ibid., p. 3.
112 Ibid., p. 1.
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origin. The Province of Quebec, in fact, is highly distinctive with 
respect to its linguistic, cultural, and legal characteristics.113 Due 
both to this distinctiveness and the perception that French-speaking 
Quebecers were for decades discriminated against and disadvantaged, 
many in Quebec look to the provincial government as their political 
voice. Moreover, the way in which the issue of how Quebec's status 
and distinctiveness should be protected and safeguarded is different 
in Quebec as opposed to the rest of the country. In the view of many 
in Quebec "the real question is not the rights of French-speaking 
individuals, but the rights of the French-Canadian collectivity, the 
nation, and the solution lies in extending the safeguarding of the 
rights of that collectivity".114 Former Prime Minister Trudeau, a 
native of the Province of Quebec, treats this collectivist view with 
contempt and derision.
Not surprisingly, successive Quebec governments since at least the 
1920s have argued strenuously against the appropriateness of federal 
intervention in areas of provincial jurisdiction.115 Then, in 1960, 
Quebecers elected a Liberal government headed by Jean Lesage which 
ushered in an era of interventionist and modern government.116 Thus 
began what has been termed the "Quiet Revolution" in Quebec which 
lasted to 1966. Objectives were initiated with respect to virtually
113 Mary Beth Montcalm, 'The Evolution of Quebec', in Introductory 
Readings in Canadian Government, eds. Robert M. Krause and R.H. 
Wagenberg, (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1991), p. 87.
114 Christian and Campbell, p. 70.
115 Perrin Lewis, 'The Tangled Tale of Taxes and Transfers', in 
Canadian Confederation at the Crossroads, ed. Michael A. Walker, 
(Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1978), p. 6.
116 Montcalm, p. 90.
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all Quebec institutions including the school system, the civil 
service, public finance, and labour unions.117 The driving force of 
the Quiet Revolution was a significantly increased role for the 
provincial state and successive Quebec governments have consistently 
pursued special constitutional, fiscal, and program objectives.118
Thereafter Quebec began to demand, among other things, 
constitutional change so to protect existing provincial jurisdiction 
better and, more importantly, wrest additional powers from the federal 
government. This was, in large measure, in reaction to the aggressive 
cost-sharing innovations in the area of social policy which had been 
initiated by the federal government in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
To show how serious it was in the mid-1960s Quebec opted out of 28 
shared-cost programs including the Canada Pension Plan and the Canada 
Assistance Plan. Soon a wide range of different organizations and 
spokesmen in Quebec began to view social policy as a test of Canada's 
ability to respect Quebec's need for significantly more autonomy than 
had been originally visualized or provided for in the Constitution.119
Thus one of the dominating questions in Canadian politics over the 
past forty years, but especially since the 1960s, has been the the 
division of powers between Ottawa and Quebec City.120 In 1966, at the 
insistence of Quebec, the federal government reluctantly agreed to a
117 Peter Desbarats, Rene. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart-Bantam,
1977), p. xvii.
118 Gagnon and Garcea, p. 304.
119 Leman, p. 61.
120 Montcalm, p. 86.
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full-scale constitutional review.121 As one would expect, an important 
issue for Quebec was the distribution of legislative responsibilities, 
especially those pertaining to social policy. For the federal 
government the priorities were a constitutional entrenchment of a 
charter of human rights and the protection of language and cultural 
rights. As it turned out an important objective of the constitutional 
review became that of how to arrive at some kind of consensus with 
respect to the division of responsibility which ought to apply in the 
field of social policy.122
The constitutional review lasted four years during which time there 
were innumerable formal and informal discussions at all levels.123 In 
January, 1971, the Quebec government insisted that the division of 
soical powers be placed on the constitutional agenda.124 In June, 
1971, a full-scale constitutional charter, called the Victoria 
Charter, was drawn up which made various proposals including ones 
respecting language rights, an amending formula, and social policy. 
In the document Ottawa made some major concessions regarding social 
policy.125 Most of the provinces initially expressed tentative support 
and subsequently assented to formal approval.126 The Quebec Cabinet, 
however, rejected the Charter on the grounds that it "failed to
121 Simeon, p. 90.
122 Johnson, 'Canada's Social Security Review 1973-1975: The Central
Issues', p. 457.
123 Simeon, p. 122.
124 Leman, p. 63.
125 Simeon, p. 119.
126 Leman, p. 63.
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protect Quebec's claims and concerns regarding jurisdiction over 
social policy".127 Hence the Constitutional Conference of 1971 failed 
in no small measure over differences concerning the constitutional 
provisions which ought to apply with respect to social policy.128
Constitutional talks were at an end for the time being although 
federal-provincial disputes over jurisdiction and prerogative 
continued unabated. In fact, the "constitutional debate of the 1960s
and 1970s unleased a flood of proposals for redesigning the basic 
elements of the Canadian constitution, including both the structure of 
the central government and the division of powers between the federal 
and provincial levels of government".129 The mid-seventies saw the 
election to provincial power of the separatist Quebecois Party which 
in 1980 held a referendum on independence that was defeated. In 1982 
the federal government under Prime Minister Trudeau repatriated the 
BNA Act which Quebec has since steadfastly refused to acknowledge. In
1990 a major attempt at constitutional reform failed as the rest of
Canada was unwilling to grant Quebec the special status it requested
and the transfer of federal powers it demanded. Now even the 
provincial Liberal government in Quebec has taken the position that 
Quebec's powers must be significantly increased if another referendum 
on independence is to be avoided.
127 Doern and Phidd, p. 368.
128 Johnson, 'Canada's Social Security Review 1973-1975: The Central
Issues', p. 457.
129 Banting, p. 197.
42
1.4.3 Federal Spending Power
Unlike the United States where the federal role in the area of 
social policy arose in the 1930s within a relatively short time, the 
Canadian federal role has developed gradually over the past forty to 
fifty years.130 Furthermore, few issues have been more controversial 
in Canadian constitutional and political development than the extent 
to which the federal government has used its "spending power" in the 
area of social policy.131
Both the federal government and the provinces, up to the mid-1970s 
at least, have at various times sought to increase their political 
profile through the enactment of social welfare measures. Using 
income security as an instrument for sustaining or enhancing political 
power and profile has been especially important to the federal 
government since virtually all community and social services in Canada 
are provincially delivered.132 The problem, however, has been that of 
being involved in an activity that is clearly, from a constitutional 
point of view, a provincial prerogative.
The federal government has attempted to extend its role in the 
field of income security in two major ways. First, in some cases such 
as Unemployment Insurance and Old Age Security it has obtained the 
agreement of the provinces to a constitutional amendment that would 
permit federal legislation in areas that were formerly the exclusive
130 Leman, p. 33.
131 Richard A. Musgrave, Peggy B. Musgrave, and Richard M. Bird, 
Public Finance in Theory and Practice. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill 
Ryerson Limited, 1987), p. 30.
132 Ibid., p. 177.
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preserve of the provinces. Second, it has made use of what is 
commonly referred to as the federal spending power. The spending 
power of the federal government is usually regarded as one of a number 
of general discretionary federal powers and most cost-shared programs, 
as well as many direct transfer programs (such as Family Allowances), 
which make payments to individuals represent the exercise of the 
federal spending power.133
The constitutional right of the provinces to make welfare payments
and provide services to individuals has never been in doubt. The same
cannot be said with respect to federal initiatives in the area of
social welfare. Some authorities have argued that the right to
provide transfers is inherent in the Royal Prerogative and therefore
resides in both provincial and federal governments. The federal
government however,
tends to argue that its power is derived from section 91(3) 
of the BNA Act, which empowers it to raise money by any mode 
of taxation, and section 91(1A ), which empowers Parliament 
to deal with "public debt and property", and which the 
federal authorities construe broadly so as to include all 
federal assets, including the Consolidated Revenue Fund".134
Together these sections are said to confer on the federal government
the right to spend for any purpose "provided the legislation does not
amount to a regulatory scheme falling within provincial powers".135
However, there has been remarkably little constitutional assessment of
the spending power attempted in the courts136 and therefore the
133 Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects 
for Canada, Volume Three, p. 243.
134 Banting, p. 52.
135 Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects 
for Canada, Volume Three, p. 243.
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constitutional status of this argument has never been settled 
authoritatively.137
The federal government has exercised its spending powers in two 
principal ways. First, the federal government has extended its role 
by means of spending enactments allowing for provision of direct 
payment of transfers to individuals - Family Allowances being the 
major example. Second, it has employed conditional grants whereby it 
enters into cost-sharing agreements with the provinces that meet 
certain federal conditions - The Canada Assistance Plan, Hospital 
Insurance, and Medicare are examples. Since the Second World War (and 
especially in the 1960s) the federal government has responded to the 
ongoing problem of national unity and the lack of fiscal capacity on 
the part of the provinces by developing a vast array of conditional 
and cost-shared programs. The provinces, not surprisingly, have 
tended to view these federal initiatives as attempts to use fiscal 
methods to force the provinces to help pay for the establishment of 
social welfare measures desired by the federal government but in areas 
for which the federal government does not have any jurisdiction under 
the Constitution. Hence most, if not all of the provinces, have more 
or less consistently objected to the use of cost-sharing by the 
federal government with the Province of Quebec being the most adamant 
and outspoken in its objections.
136 Banting, p. 243.
137 Ibid., p. 52.
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Former Prime Minister Trudeau has argued that constitutionally the
term "spending power" has come to have a specialized meaning in Canada
in that it means the power of Parliament to make payments to people or
institutions or governments for purposes on which Parliament does not
necessarily have the power to legislate.138 Trudeau has also stated
the case for the federal spending power in political terms:
The case for a federal spending power for the purpose of 
enabling Parliament to contribute toward provincial programs 
in fields of provincial jurisdiction is to be found in the 
very nature of the modern federal state - in its economic 
and technological interdependence, in the interdependence of 
the policies of its several governments, and in the sense of 
community which moves its residents to contribute to the 
well-being of residents in other parts of the federation.
To understand these characteristics of an industrialized, 
Twentieth Century federal state is to understand the 
rationale for the spending power of the Parliament of 
Canada.139
Trudeau believed that it was the obligation of Parliament to use its 
spending power in the interests of national unity which meant more or 
less uniform social policy across the country. The problem with 
respect to federal-provincial relations, as A.W. Johnson has observed, 
is that in Canada the "role of the state has so increased that it is 
scarcely possible for the federal government to exercise its powers 
without affecting provincial programs, or for provincial governments 
to occupy their jurisdiction without affecting federal politics".140
138 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, 'Federal-Provincial Grants and the Spending 
Power of Parliament', in Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality.
(Toronto: Methuen Publishers, 1968), ed. J. Peter Meekison, p.
216.
139 Ibid., p. 221.
140 Johnson, 'The Dynamics of Federalism in Canada', p. 104.
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Thus the use of its spending powers by the federal government is 
very significant in that the "exercise of spending power provides a 
means by which the federal government can by unilateral action involve 
itself in many matters which under traditional understandings of the 
constitution have been the exclusive concern of the provinces".141 As 
was noted earlier, the federal government maintains that it has the 
power to give money away, and attach conditions if it wishes, even if 
the purposes involved fall clearly within provincial jurisdiction.142 
Therefore, as the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and 
Development Prospects for Canada notes, the question of limiting the 
federal spending power lies primarily in the political realm in that 
the provinces are ultimately protected by their power to refuse to 
participate in the programs.143 However, for the poorer provinces 
especially, this power may be in political terms more theoretical than 
real as it may be very difficult for a provincial government to 
explain to its electorate why it will not "share" in the cost of a 
desired program. Indeed, as Banting has observed, the 
federal-provincial balance in the field of income security has not 
been determined by constitutional amendment but, rather, by the 
distribution of financial and political power between the two levels 
of government.
141 Donald V. Smiley, 'The Rowell-Sirois Report, Provincial Autonomy, 
and Post-War Canadian Federalism', reprinted from Canadian Journal 
of Economics and Political Science. (February 1962), in Canadian 
Federalism: Myth or Reality, ed. J. Peter Meekison, (Toronto:
Methuen Publishers, 1968), p. 65.
142 Banting, p. 52.
143 Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects 
for Canada, Volume Three, p. 243.
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The changing size and nature of federal transfers (to individuals 
and to the provinces) has been, therefore, both a major dynamic 
element in Canadian federalism and a constant focus of debate and 
discussion.144 By the 1970s the debate had taken on a more urgent tone 
as concerns with increasing social welfare expenditures, overlapping 
federal and provincial programs, and federal intrusions into areas of 
provincial jurisdiction increased. In 1970 the federal government 
offered its view of what it believed its role should be with respect 
to income security policy.145 First, the federal government should 
endeavour to make income security measures for which it is responsible 
more effective in reducing poverty. Second, it should be involved in 
co-operating with the provinces in their efforts to make income
security measures more effective. Third, it should attempt, in
co-operation with the provinces, to provide better co-ordination,
particularly at points where federal and provincial income security
programs overlap. It is clear that the federal government envisaged a 
continuing role for itself in the field of income security even though 
it recognized that future initiatives would have to take seriously the 
concerns and priorities of the provinces.
144 Musgrave, Musgrave, and Bird, p. 32.
145 Canada, 'Income Security for Canadians', p. 17.
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1.5 SOCIAL SCIENCE AND INTERVENTION
Decision-making in the policy process is invariably about politics 
and political elements in which the emphasis is on reaching some 
agreement through the processes of persuasion, bargaining or the 
straight exercise of power.146 However, since the end of the Second 
World War there has been in modern government the growth of a 
phenomenon in which policy discourse is conducted as though it were 
neutral and objective rather than being motivated by various 
interests: indeed, policy arguments "have to appear 'scientifically
respectable' to get a fair hearing".147 The growth of the social 
sciences (among other factors such as the rise of the management 
sciences and the apparent success of Keynesianism) has contributed 
greatly to this phenomenon.148
This approach to policy-making is based on the premise that it is 
insufficient to frame or justify policy choices in purely (or 
primarily) ideological terms.149 It further assumes that social 
science research is the major source of objective, unbiased, and 
nonpolitical information.150 Faith in the methodology of the social 
sciences (characterized by the adaptation of the scientific method) is 
indicative of a belief "in the need to identify causality, to
146 John O'Shaughnessy, Inquiry and Decision. (London: George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd., 1972), p. 172.
147 Pal, p. 70.
148 Ibid., p. 70.
149 Ibid., p. 77.
150 Carol H. Weiss, 'Evaluation Research in the Political Context', in 
Handbook of Evaluation Research, eds. Elmer L. Struening and 
Marcia Guttentag, (London: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 18.
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establish 'the facts', and to distinguish facts from values".151 The 
embrace of the scientific method in the social sciences has been 
overwhelming despite the fact that there "has always been a feeling of 
uneasiness among philosophers and scientists concerning the concept of 
causality".152 Most sociologists, nevertheless, have been relatively 
unconcerned with the philosophical debate over the status of 
causality.153
By the mid-1960s there "was much hoopla about the rationality that
social science would bring to the untidy world of government".154
Furthermore, it came to be widely believed that effective government
could not rely only on practised amateurs, but also needed the advice
and guidance of social science experts.155 Moreover, there was a
growing public belief that not only was the government,
responsible for the detailed operation- of the economy and 
the welfare of individuals, but that solutions did exist for 
all problems if only adequate structures and processes were 
put in place to anticipate, to plan, and to coordinate 
government activity.156
151 Doern and Phidd, p. 140.
152 Rick Linden and Cathy Fillmore, 'Causal inferences in 
non-experimental research: a reply to Gomme', The Canadian Review
of Sociology and Anthropology. (November 1985), pp. 579.
153 Ibid., p. 580.
154 Carol Weiss, 'Introduction' in Using Social Research in Public 
Policy Making, ed. Carol H. Weiss, (Lexington: D.C. Heath and 
Company, 1977), p. 4.
155 Pal, p. 72.
156 M.J.L. Kirby, H.V. Kroeker, and W.R. Teschke, 'The Impact of 
Public Policy-making Structures and Processes in Canada, Canadian 
Public Administration. (Fall 1978), p. 412.
50
The emphasis was, in fact, on planning which requires causal knowledge 
theories157 - the very kind of knowledge promised by social science 
research. Therefore not only was social science research to provide 
hard data for planning, but was also expected to provide
cause-and-effeet theories for policy-making thereby indicating which 
variables governments should alter in order to get desired 
outcomes.158
Hence a number of people both within and outside of government
became convinced that a way could be found through which the work of 
government could be better organized and evaluated.159 Furthermore, 
many people began to believe that the key to better organization and 
evaluation in government lay in making more and better use of social 
science research. For example, in 1966 the Coleman Report (a large 
study mandated by the Civil Rights Act and funded by the U.S. 
government of the differences between public schools for blacks and 
whites) commanded attention because it "had the force of social 
science and a government imprimatur".160 As a result, social science 
research became increasingly relied upon in the social policy-making
process.161 The expectation was that increased use of social science
157 Aaron Wildavsky, Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of
Policy Analysis. (Toronto: Little Brown & Co., 1979), p. 120.
158 Weiss, 'Introduction', p. 4.
159 Kirby, Kroeker, and Teschke, p. 413.
160 Nicholas Lemann, 'A False Panacea', A book review of Politics. 
Markets, and America's Schools, by John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, 
in The Atlantic Monthly. (January 1991), p. 101.
161 Pettigrew, 'Can Social Scientists be Effective Actors in the
Policy Arena', in Social Science and Social Policy, eds. Lance R.
Shotland and Melvin M. Mark, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1985),
p. 122.
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research would result not only in more rational policies (decisions) 
but, as well, in more rational policy-making (decision-making) 
processes.162
In the minds of those committed to social science research, social 
problem-solving is largely (if not entirely) identified with a
rationalistic and scientific investigatory process - a process
characterized by identifiable problem-solving steps supported by
factual and objective information.163 Crucial to this process is the 
credibility of the methodology used to generate factual and objective 
information. The scientific method is relied upon because it is
believed to be underpinned by careful, systematic analysis of 
verifiable evidence that can be checked by other researchers using the 
same methodology.164 Such information may then .provide evidence of 
patterns from which generalizations and predictions can be made. That 
is, it becomes possible to analyze relationships of cause-and-effeet 
and thus to explain why something happens and to predict that it will 
happen again under the same conditions in the future.165
The social sciences became self-consciously and deliberately 
scientific when social scientists began to attempt to imitate the 
research techniques of the natural sciences which had established the
162 John O ’Shaughnessy makes the point: "The emphasis in rationalistic 
decision-making lies in justifying action by following a rational 
process, as right thinking is an aid to right action", p. 165.
163 A process referred to in the social science and public policy 
literature as the "rationalist" model of policy-making.
164 Ian Robertson, Sociology. (New York: Worth Publishers, 1981), p.
7.
165 Ibid., p. 7.
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credibility of the scientific method. The adoption of a "scientific"
research approach has allowed social scientists to suggest that valid
knowledge about society should take the form of propositions and other
law-like statements that are testable and subject to empirical
verification.166
In other words, the modern social sciences are based on the 
premise that regularities in social behaviour exist, that 
these regularities can be identified and expressed in the 
form of law-like statements about society, and that valid 
knowledge about social systems is collected and verified 
according to professionally agreed upon rules.167
The claims of social scientists to have expertise in a particular
field of social relationships are thus based on two purported
characteristics of the social scientific enterprise: systematic •
research and value-free analysis.168 In short, it is believed by many
that clear, unequivocal, and non-partisan answers to social and
economic issues can be provided by social science research techniques
conducted in accordance with the supposedly wholly impartial
rationality of a scientifically guided investigatory system.
During the late 1960s and mid-1970s, politicians and officials in 
many industrialized countries supported the establishment of research 
units both within and outside government that would use policy 
research techniques consistent with accepted scientific 
methodology.169 For example, in Canada, the Economic Council of Canada
166 Stephen Brooks and Alain G. Gagnon, 'Politics and the Social
Sciences in Canada1, eds., Alain G. Gagnon and James P. Bickerton, 
Canadian Politics. (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1990), p. 42.
167 Ibid., p. 43.
168 Ibid., p. 43.
169 Peter Solomon, 'Government Officials and the Study of
Policy-making', Canadian Public Administration. (Fall 1983), p.
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was established in 1963 and the Science Council of Canada in 1966 to 
provide detached and expert advice to the federal government.170 As 
Michael Prince and John Chenier have pointed out, during this time the 
organizational and political worlds were steeped in an era of 
rationality and high expectations.171
The policy-making process in Canada was not immune to the promises 
of a more "rational" decision-making process based on the availability 
of social science research. Not unexpectedly from the mid-1960's to 
the mid-1970's the main demand for applied social researchers came 
from the federal and provincial governments.172 The problem was that a 
shortage of skilled research and policy planning specialists meant 
that many of these units were not fully staffed and/or had to settle 
for less than the best.173
It was during this period of emphasis on rational decision-making 
processes in government that policy-makers in both the United States 
and Canada began seriously to evaluate the advantages and
437.
Pal points out, however, that after the initial proliferation of 
these groups in government in the mid-1970s there was a period of 
reorganization and retrenchment that led to a much more modest 
role and a lower profile than was first envisaged, p. 78.
170 Pal, p. 73.
171 Michael J. Prince and John A. Chenier, 'The Rise and Fall of 
Policy Planning and Research Units: An Organizational 
Perspective', Canadian Public Administration. (Winter 1980), p. 
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172 Paul Lamy, 'Applied Social Research and Canadian Public Policy', 
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disadvantages of the negative income tax concept.174 The difficulty 
was that the available research respecting the labour supply response 
(which was the significant policy question) to a system of guaranteed 
annual income payments was inconclusive. In Canada, "reliable 
estimates of work reduction due to a guaranteed annual income were not 
available and, in the opinion of many researchers, were unlikely 
forthcoming from conventional data".175 Hence policy-makers in both 
countries turned to the research methodology of social experimentation 
as a means of gathering data and information on what was known to be a 
highly controversial policy option. The belief was that social 
experimentation as a highly rigorous and empirical methodology based 
on the demanding technique of experimentation would provide the most 
objective and unequivocal behavioural information.
It was believed by the officials who planned and designed the 
Mincome Manitoba experiment that it would yield factual and objective 
information. It was also believed by the same planners that this 
information would then be used in the review of income security policy 
conducted as part of the Social Security Review.176 Officials in the 
Department of National Health and Welfare (hereafter referred to as 
National Health and Welfare) were deeply aware of the far-reaching 
implications of experimentation and after lengthy contacts with key 
people in the United States devoted considerable effort to 
understanding just what experimental data could and could not
174 Mincome Manitoba, 'The Development and Design of Negative Income 
Tax Experimentation in Manitoba: A Preliminary Report', (July 
1974, draft), p. 2.
175 Hum and Simpson, p. 3.
176 Ibid., p. 7.
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indicate.177
1.5.1 Liberals and New Democrats
Canadian mainstream political parties tend to be characterized, and 
characterize themselves as "moderate" which tends to diminish the 
differences between them.178 This has especially been the case with 
respect to the Liberal Party and the New Democratic Party. The 
Liberal Party, since at least 1945, has attempted to portray itself as 
a centrist, "middle of the road" party in order to draw from a wide 
spectrum of the electorate.179 The NDP, meanwhile, has favoured an 
alliance with welfare liberalism rather than a commitment to socialist 
ideology.180 The policy implications of the shallow ideological 
differences separating the Liberal Party from the NDP can be easily 
illustrated as William Christian and Colin Campbell do when they point 
out that the commitment of successive federal Liberal governments 
after the Second World War to the welfare state deepened and took 
concrete form in large part due to pressure from the rapidly rising 
Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), the predecessor of the New 
Democratic Party.181
177 Director General, Welfare Assistance and Services, National Health 
and Welfare, memorandum to the Deputy Minister, March 30, 1972.
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The focus by the Liberal Party of Canada on "reform" or "positive" 
liberalism dates to 1919 when its leader, McKenzie King, proposed the 
tenets of positive or reform liberalism as an alternative to the 
laissez-faire view of "negative" or "market" liberalism182 (as it has 
been termed). As Milton Friedman (who describes his political 
philosophy as "liberalism" and who has been described as a 
"present-day extreme liberal economist")183 explains (without 
approval):
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, and especially 
after 1930 in the United States, the term liberalism came to 
be associated with a very different emphasis, particularly 
in economic policy. It came to be associated with a 
readiness to rely primarily on the state rather than on 
private voluntary arrangements to achieve objectives 
regarded as desirable. The catchwords became welfare and 
equality rather than freedom.184
Negative liberalism (referred to as business liberalism by Christian
and Campbell) tends to view the state with suspicion as a potentially
coercive force. Negative liberalism, then, has as its primary and
overriding objective the removal of restraints (primarily by
government) on economic activity and individual freedom.185 Reform or
For example, the federal government only introduced the Old Age 
Pensions Act in 1927 after its hand was forced by two Labour MPs, 
J.S. Woodsworth and A.A. Heaps, (future founders and leaders of 
the CCF) whose support was critical during the minority Parliament 
of 1925-26. Banting, p. 62.
182 Ibid., p. 59.
183 Budd, p. 31.
184 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom. (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 5.
In Canada, C.B. Macpherson, who was Professor of Political Science 
at the University of Toronto, has written extensively on the 
history of liberalism.
185 Ibid., p. 7.
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positive liberalism, on the other hand, attempts to integrate the 
traditional liberal focus on the rights and sovereignty of the 
individual with the idea that state intervention may be required in 
the interests of promoting equality of opportunity. Christian and
Campbell suggest that positive government action is not only 
consistent with, but is central to, liberalism in the modern world.186
Since its inception the NDP has consistently looked for inspiration 
form the British Labour Party and to the Social Democrats in Sweden 
rather than to German Marxists.187 To its own members, however, the 
NDP is both an electoral organization and a political organization 
pledged to the eventual transformation of society.188 Reconciling 
these two goals has not always been easy for the NDP and has often 
confused its own supporters as well as the electorate. The notion of 
transforming society, which the NDP has never allowed to wither away 
completely, is more than anything else a carry-over dating to the 
Party's origins as the CCF.
The CCF was born in Western Canada in 1932 as a coalition of labour 
and farm groups proposing "a co-operative commonwealth, in which the 
basic principle regulating production, distribution and exchange will 
be supplying of human needs instead of the making of profits".189 In 
1933, in the now famous Regina Manifesto, the CCF went further stating 
that: "No C.C.F. Government will rest content until it has eradicated
186 Christian and Campbell, p. 60.
187 Christian p. 374.
108 Desmond Morton, Social Democracy in Canada. (Toronto: Samuel
Stevens Hakkert & Company, 1977), p. 3.
189 Ibid., p. 12.
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capitalism and put into operation the full programme of socialized 
planning which will lead to the establishment in Canada of the
Co-operative Commonwealth".190 In 1944 the CCF won the provincial 
election in the Province of Saskatchewan but this was to be its only 
success. By 1957 with only 9.7 percent of the popular vote
nation-wide, the same as it had in 1940, it had become apparent that 
some kind of change was required. Hence in 1961 the CCF transformed 
itself into the New Democratic Party whereby it formed a political
alliance with the trade union movement, moderated its policy agenda in 
order to appeal to a broader section of the electorate, and left 
behind the radical rhetoric of the Regina Manifesto. The alliance 
with the trade unions involved the infusion of a heady dose of the 
welfare liberalism favoured by the trade union movement into the
ideology of the Party.191 Christian and Campbell suggest that this
alliance made a real ideological difference in that as practical
people concerned with this world rather than the next, the unionists
found the millenarian aspects of the CCF unappealing.192
Thus the NDP has usually sought to make an electoral impact in
alliance with welfare liberalism rather than on the basis of a radical 
alternative ideological approach.193 In 1961, consistent with its new 
approach and alliance with the trade union movement it promised jobs, 
national programmes of health insurance, portable pensions and sick 
benefits, free education, and a steeply progressive taxation system.
190 Ibid., p. 12.
191 Christian, p. 376.
192 Christian and Campbell, p. 206.
193 Christian, p. 375.
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It pledged itself to protect the family farm, fishermen, credit 
unions, and even small businesses. Christian and Campbell conclude 
that the alliance with the trade union movement clearly transformed 
the socialist CCF into the social democratic NDP.194
The Liberal Party, unlike the NDP, does not have an automatic or
ideological commitment to interventionist policies. However, by the
1970s it had acquired the habit of intervention as a result of the
influence of Keynesian economic policies, positive or reform liberal
ideology, and pressure from nationalists within the party195 which has
further exacerbated the competition between the Liberal Party and the
NDP for the centre vote. Hence the NDP has often been at pains to
separate its position on economic and social policy (but especially
social policy) from that of the Liberal Party. Just how difficult
this can be is illustrated by the attempt of the national leader of
the NDP in 1988:
The other parties are much more committed to the principle 
of a corporate global economy, of allowing market forces to 
go where they will . . .  We have always been much more 
conscious that political power should be used to help shape 
the economy in ways that are compatible with a number of 
social goals, like full employment.196
The point is that while the NDP is certainly more ideologically
predisposed to state intervention than is the Liberal Party, the NDP
is not by any stretch of the imagination committed to the
socialization of the "means of production” just as the Liberal Party
194 Christian and Campbell, p. 206.
195 Ibid., p. 78.
196 Edward Broadbent quoted in 'Search for an Opening: An NDP Surge1, 
interview by Michael Rose, in Contemporary Canadian Politics, eds. 
Robert J. Jackson, Doreen Jackson, and Nicolas Baxter-Moore, 
(Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1987), p. 319.
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is not ideologically neither unable nor unwilling to justify various 
forms of state intervention. The key to understanding the competition 
between the Liberal Party and the NDP at the polls, therefore, is to 
recognize the short distance between the adherence of the Liberal 
Party to positive or reform liberalism and the NDP's truly social 
democratic rather than socialist nature.
Under the parliamentary form of government the basic features of 
the political regime in power can be shaped by the philosophy, style, 
and objectives of the Prime Minister, or in the case of the Canadian 
provinces, the Premier. In fact, Peter Aucoin argues that Canadian 
and comparative studies on executive government make it clear that 
changes in the central machinery of government invariably follow 
changes in chief executive offices as new political leaders seek to 
mold structure and process to their personal philosophies of 
leadership, management styles, and political objectives.197 There is 
considerable literature concerning the way in- which governments govern 
in Canada which takes as its starting point the growing power of the 
Prime Minister and Premiers as the senior government member. Robert 
Adie and Paul Thomas, for example, observe that "the role and 
responsibilities of the prime minister are so predominant that some 
commentators have argued that our system would be better described as 
prime-ministerial rather than cabinet-parliamentary".198
197 Peter Aucoin, ’Organizational Change in the Machinery of Canadian 
Government: From Rational Management to Brokerage Politics", in
Contemporary Canadian Politics. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall
Canada, 1984) p. 90.
198 Adie and Thomas, p. 213.
Also see, D.V. Smiley, Canada in Question: Federalism in the
Seventies. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1976), chapter three.
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This will certainly be the case if the Prime Minister or Premier is 
able to dominate other members of their government and party as was 
the case with Prime Minister Trudeau and Premier Edward Schreyer. The 
next section of this chapter will briefly consider the political views 
and governing styles of these two leaders. This is not to suggest 
that their philosophies, styles, and objectives can be easily or 
neatly separated from the intellectual, social, and political 
environment in which they held office. Rather, it is to suggest the 
importance of leadership in the way in which government operates and 
policy is formulated.
1,5.2 Prime Minister Trudeau
In 1968 Pierre Elliot Trudeau defeated the chief proponent of 
business liberalism for the leadership of the Liberal Party of Canada. 
Thereafter, although he often disappointed welfare liberals during his 
leadership, business liberalism played a secondary role in the outlook 
of the Liberal Party.199 One of the results of the ascendancy of 
welfare liberalism and the decline in influence of business liberalism 
in the Liberal Party during Trudeau1s leadership was the lowering of 
the threshold at which intervention was accepted by members of the 
Party and government.200 This was possible under Trudeau's leadership 
because although he was a thoroughly committed liberal with respect to 
the paramountcy, rights, and sovereignty of the individual he was also 
committed to a decision-making process and style that was highly 
rationalistic. This militated against an overly, or even primarily,
199 Christian and Campbell, p. 79.
200 Ibid., p. 78.
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ideological or politically partisan approach to the problems 
confronted by his government.
At the core of Trudeau's philosophical and political views is a 
belief in the sovereignty and rationality of the individual. Richard 
Gwyn traces the sources of his ideas to nineteenth century Liberalism 
and eighteenth century Rationalism.201 It was Trudeau's belief in 
individualism that led him to oppose the nationalism of his native 
Province of Quebec which is based on the primacy of collective rights 
over individual rights. It was his belief in rationality which 
underpinned his defense of federalism as he believed that it was 
through this type of political arrangement that there could be a 
rational and calculated compromise of conflicting regional 
interests.202 As Pal has remarked, Trudeau was the consummate 
rationalist who "firmly believed in the power of logical analysis, 
research and argument to determine the right policy course".203
For Trudeau the common core in every individual was "reason" or 
"rationality".204 This led him to the conclusion that if the 
individual can be thought of as being rational so government should be 
able to make decisions according to a rational process. Trudeau's 
philosophy of governing was "rationalist" in the sense that he argued 
that reason should take precedence over all forms of "emotionalism". 
Thus Trudeau insisted on a "cold, unemotional rationality" in his
201 Richard Gwyn, The Northern Magus. (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1980), p. 52.
202 Ibid., p. 72.
203 Pal, p. 73.
204 Aucoin, p. 72.
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political approach wherein each problem is tackled on its own merits
without reference to dogma and ideologies.205 In 1964 he wrote the
following often quoted passage,
the state - if it is not to be outdistanced by its rivals - 
will need political instruments which are sharper, stronger, 
and more finely controlled than anything based on mere 
emotionalism: such tools will be made up of advanced
technology and scientific investigation, as applied to the 
fields of law, economics, social psychology, international 
affairs and other areas of human relations, in short, if not 
a product of pure reason, the political tools of the future 
will be designed and appraised by more rational standards 
than anything we are currently using in Canada today.206
Trudeau's rationalist approach to decision-making was in sharp
contrast to the incrementalist and informal style of his
predecessors.207
Trudeau came to power in 1968 with the intention of governing in 
accordance with his views on rational decision-making. When he took 
office he immediately set about imposing his views and style on the 
policy process.208 His objectives were threefold.209 First, to 
overcome the tendency by which public policy decision-making was 
determined primarily by partisanship on the one hand and incremental 
drift on the other. Second, to overcome the relative chaos in Cabinet 
decision-making that had prevailed under his predecessor. And, third,
205 George Radwanski, Trudeau. (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1978),
p. 121.
206 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians. 
(Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 203.
207 G. Bruce Doern, 'The Policy-Making Philosophy of Prime Minister 
Trudeau and His Advisors', in Apex of Power. Thomas A. Hockin, ed, 
(Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1971), p. 191.
208 Radwanski, p. 147.
209 Aucoin, p. 92.
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to check and curtail the political influence of the bureaucracy in the 
policy-making process. His two most important reforms were to 
restructure the Prime Minister's office, and to streamline the Cabinet 
decision-making process to permit more detailed and informed 
discussion. These moves were intended to introduce more and better 
planning into the political decision-making function of the 
government.
Hence Trudeau's rationalist philosophy of policy-making "stressed 
clear definition of goals, systematic analysis of policy options, the 
monitoring of the progress of programs and an anticipation of societal 
trends - in short, rational and comprehensive planning".210 The 
reforms he initiated in accordance with his rationalistic aspirations 
were heralded as ushering in a new era in national policy-making. All 
proposals had to be fully documented, their conclusions and 
recommendations based on a careful consideration of alternatives, and 
the pros and cons of the argument presented.211 The addition of formal 
planning units in the Prime Minister's Office and the Privy Council 
Office reflected a formalization of roles that previously had been 
developed only informally.
Trudeau surrounded himself with personal and advisory staff imbued 
with the same ideas.212 As Bruce Doern has pointed out, there was 
little doubt that as a group the Trudeau advisors had a more 
rationalist conception of the way government ought to operate than any
210 Adie and Thomas, p. 106.
211 Mitchell Sharp, 'Decision-making in the federal cabinet1, Canadian 
Public Administration. (Spring 1976), pp. 4-5.
212 Doern, p. 189.
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previous group of central advisors.213 In fact, a considerable amount 
of their time was spent in attempting to conceptualize the "nature" of 
decision-making. Not surprisingly, "various Trudeau governments were 
variously held to be influenced by a fascination with rationality, 
planning and technocratic approaches".214
Nevertheless, as Adie and Thomas point out,
after discounting for the hyperbole which usually
accompanies administrative reforms the structural changes 
introduced by the Trudeau government can perhaps fairly be 
seen as a mixture of limited success and a greater measure 
of failure.215
In fact, many observers would endorse the view that though Trudeau may 
have created the structures of rational policy-making, incrementalism 
continued to predominate within them.216
1.5,3 Premier Edward Schrever
In 1969 the Province of Manitoba elected the New Democratic Party 
to office. This was the first general election won by the NDP in any 
province in Canada since the Party was formed from its predecessor, 
the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in 1961.
213 Ibid., p. 195.
214 Doern and Phidd, p. 140.
215 Adie and Thomas, p. 106.
216 R.J. Jackson, and M.M. Atkinson, quoted in Robert F. Adie and Paul 
G. Thomas, Canadian Public Administration: Problematical 
Perspectives. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, Canada Inc., 1982), p. 
122.
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The NDP won the election in the Province of Manitoba under "former 
CCF boy wonder" Edward Schreyer.217 Schreyer, who had become a CCF 
Member of Parliament at the age of twenty-two, had taken over the 
leadership of the Manitoba New Democratic Party during the campaign. 
Throughout the campaign Schreyer billed himself as a social democrat 
(not a socialist) and a moderate. He promised premium-free Medicare, 
government-run auto insurance, consolidation of municipal governments, 
better roads for the North, more public housing, and so on.218 Against 
the unanimous predictions of the experts, the NDP won the election and 
formed a government with a bare majority of one after an elected 
Liberal joined their ranks. Despite the precarious situation of his 
government, Schreyer stated that he expected to govern for a full term 
and he did.
It is difficult to understand the Manitoba NDP's approach to 
government without accounting for the influence of Schreyer.219 
Schreyer1s social democratic philosophy of government stressed an 
activist approach. As he stated in his first address to the Manitoba 
Legislature as Premier: "The point is that my colleagues and I happen
to believe, and believe sincerely, in an approach to government that 
is essentially activist".220 The purpose of government was to bring 
about greater economic equality and social justice. As Schreyer put 
it:
217 Morton, p. 100.
218 Ibid., p. 100.
219 Ibid., p. 3.
220 Premier Schreyer, Manitoba Legislature Assembly Debates, August 
21 , 1969, in Ed Schrever: A Social Democrat in Power. Paul
Beaulieu, ed. (Winnipeg: Queenston House, 1977), p. 2.
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To my mind this is what the art of good government is or
should be all about: to work towards a more equitable
distribution of those goods that are essential to 
well-being, because without that, civil rights or freedom or 
liberty, whatever way it's described, cannot be 
meaningful.2 21
Schreyer's social and political model was the social democratic system
in Scandinavia. As he stated:
It is very close to the kind of general notion of what I
regard as the best politics, the best philosophy of 
government. There is literally nothing that I know of in 
the Scandinavian social-democratic political philosophy that 
I disagree with.222
Schreyer believed in the importance of a planning framework and 
substantive, rational guidelines for the development of policy.223 
Three examples illustrate the point. First, a three volume document 
of over three hundred pages was produced in 1973 by the Planning and 
Priorities Committee of Cabinet. The stated purpose of the document 
was to provide the information the government needed to intervene in 
the economy in an orderly and rational manner.
Second was the establishment of a Planning Secretariat which 
reported to the Cabinet and several subcommittees of the Cabinet. The 
purpose of involving the entire Cabinet was to raise the profile of 
the planning process and provide the Planning Secretariat with 
multiple points of entry into Cabinet. The intended result was to be 
broader political and bureaucratic input into cabinet planning 
processes and a higher profile for the people doing the planning.224
221 Schreyer in Beaulieu, p. 2.
222 Ibid., p. 190.
223 James A. McAllister, The Government of Edward Schreyer. (Kingston 
and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1984), p. 6.
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Significantly, many of the Planning Secretariat staff were not only 
sympathetic to the NDP, but also shared a background in social 
sciences academic training.225
Third, was Schreyer's commitment to test scientifically, through 
the use of an experiment, a guaranteed annual income proposal. In
1972 he stated:
What astounds me is that so many people have been willing to 
talk about a guaranteed annual income, argue about its pros 
and cons, but no one has really made any effort to 
systematically and scientifically test and probe and weigh 
the evidence in a scientific way to determine just what a 
guaranteed annual income is likely to do.226
Schreyer's commitment to such an undertaking, and his rationale for
doing so, was indicative of the belief, widely held at the time, in
the relevance and desirability of working to develop decision-making
processes supported by empirical and objective information generated
in accordance with the prerequisites of the scientific method.
The following tables provide Manitoba election results and national 
election results from 1968 to 1984.
Manitoba Election Results 1968-1986
1969 June - New Democratic Party
1973 June - New Democratic Party
1977 October - Progressive Conservative Party 
1981 November - New Democratic Party 
1986 March - New Democratic Party
Federal Election Results 1968-1984
1968 June - Liberal Party
224 Ibid., p. 28.
225 Ibid., p. 28.
226 Winnipeg Tribune, 'Schreyer looks at his three-year record1, July 
15, 1972.
1972 October - Liberal Party (minority government)
1974 July - Liberal Party
1979 May - Progressive Conservative Party (minority government)
1980 February - Liberal Party
1984 September - Progressive Conservative Party
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Chapter II 
SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION
In the view of some observers there are three major forces that drive
the "normal" policy-making process in liberal democracies: interests,
values, and causal assumptions.227
Interests refer to the preservation, extension or creation 
of circumstances which will maintain or further one's goals 
(usually economic goals).
Values refer to moral principals which people hold. They 
reflect the sense of what ought to be rather than what is.
Causal assumptions refer to beliefs about the way the world
works empirically, that is, which causes will lead to which
effects.228
The policy process, therefore, is often conflictual (but non-violent) 
as it normally involves the interplay of differing interests, values,
and causal assumptions on the part of those able to influence (or
directly effect) the setting of the political agenda. The primary 
role of factual information in this process is to reduce the amount of 
uncertainty that must be dealt with229 by providing a basis on which 
causal assumptions can be stated and defended. Social science 
research attempts to provide factual information respecting human 
behaviour. To this end, various research methodologies have been
227 Pal, p. 102.
228 Ibid. pp. 102-106.
229 David Twain, 'Developing and Implementing a Research Strategy', in 
Handbook of Evaluation Research, eds. Elmer L. Struening and 
Marcia Guttentag, (London: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 27.
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developed of which social experimentation is one of the most rigorous 
and demanding.
One of the most difficult issues with which to deal in the guest to 
understand and predict behaviour is the significance of rationality or 
reason in the decision-making process. Information is critical to the 
process of reasoning - especially information that can be used to make 
inferences and causal assumptions. However, as John Haltiwanger and 
Michael Waldman point out, a recurring controversy in economic thought 
has been the conflict between the assumption of rationality and the 
fact that economic agents have limited and very different capacities 
to process information.230 Further complicating the issue, as Keith 
Wilde et al. note, is that the "difficulty of making intelligent 
decisions, whether personally or in an organization, has changed from 
ability to get information to one of processing a super abundance".231
In the late 1960s and early 1970s there was a great deal of concern 
respecting the behavioural implications of social assistance 
programmes and, in particular, the extent to which their availability 
would have the effect of discouraging individuals from undertaking 
low-wage work.232 Much of the discussion centered around the question 
of the incentive/disincentive effects of income security measures. 
This concern was a political flashpoint because of the strong feelings
230 John Haltiwanger and Michael Waldman, 'Rational Expectations and
the Limits of Rationality: An Analysis of Heterogeneity',
American Economic Review. (June 1985), p. 326.
231 Keith D. Wilde, Allen D. LeBaron, and L. Dwight Israelsen,
'Knowledge, Uncertainty and Behavior', American Economic Review.
(May 1985), p. 407.
232 Butler, p. 138.
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associated with the value and role of the work ethic. Part of the 
problem was the lack of empirical data that would either support or 
not support economic theory which hypothesized a reduction in work 
effort in response to income supplementation.
In the United States during the late 1960s and early 1970s the 
possibilities of social experimentation as a means of investigating 
the behavioural response to government interventions were considered
so great that hundreds of millions of dollars were spent conducting
social experiments. Social experiments were conducted in many social 
policy fields including education, mental health, economics, criminal 
justice, race relations, and labour.233 The justification was that the 
information generated by these experiments could serve as the basis 
for designing national programs that could ultimately run into the 
hundreds of billions of dollars. Hence the large research outlays 
associated with social experiments were considered small if they would 
help policy-makers avoid errors in the implementation of potentially 
costly programs.234 This led to the financing and implementation of a 
number of income maintenance experiments.
This chapter will review the technique of social experimentation, 
the idea of a guaranteed annual income, the features of the negative 
income tax model, and the income maintenance experiments that were
conducted in the United States.
233 Lenard Saxe and Michele Fine, Social Experiments. (London: Sage 
Publications, 1981), p. 65.
234 Robert Ferber and Werner Z. Hirsch, 'Social Experimentation and 
Economic Policy: A Survey', Journal of Economic Literature.
(December 1978), p. 1,380.
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2.1 SOCIAL EXPERIMENTS
Policy-makers and economists have long faced the problem of how to
measure the effect of changes in policy variables on behaviour.235 The
basic purpose of a social experiment is to generate behavioural
information about the effectiveness of some means of attaining a
desired social policy objective.236 More precisely, the aim is,
to state a functional relationship between an experimentally 
induced effect and its outcome on the basis of controlled 
observations, and to use that relationship to predict the 
outcome of a similar policy for a total population of which 
the experimental subjects are only a sample.237
The promise, therefore, of social experimentation is that it will
generate reliable and defensible behavioural information, namely,
measureable and predictive information concerning a behavioural
response to some change that can be generalized from a sample to .the
general population.238
Many social scientists are of the opinion that experimentation is 
the optimal methodology with respect to social science research and 
should be used where possible. Lenard Saxe and Michele Fine suggest 
that it is when the experimental method is used that empirical inquiry 
generates the least ambiguous data and dispels the greatest number of
235 Ibid., p. 1,379.
236 Henry W. Riecken and Robert F. Boruch, 'Social Experimentation1, 
in Social Experimentation: A Method of Planning and Evaluating
Social Intervention, eds., Henry W. Riecken and Robert F. Boruch, 
(London: Academic Press, 1974), p. 2.
237 Tom Atkinson, James Cutt, and H. Michael Stevenson, Public Policy 
Research and The Guaranteed Annual Income: A Design for the
Experimental Evaluation of Income Maintenance Policies in Canada. 
(Toronto: Institute for Behavioural Research, York University,
1973, unpublished), p. 28.
238 Atkinson, Cutt, and Stevenson, pp. 16-17.
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alternative explanations.239 Carol Weiss notes that it is because the 
controlled experiment promises information from which inferences and 
generalizations can be made that it has become the methodology of 
investigation preferred by many social scientists.240 Pal is of the 
opinion that the ideal method of evaluating the impact of a policy 
intervention is the classic experimental design.241 After reviewing 
the Mincome Manitoba experiment and the income maintenance experiments 
conducted in the United States, Hum and Simpson concluded that policy 
experimentation should be used in Canada for other social policy 
issues such as employment and training.242
The significance of the claim to scientific credibility by social 
science research with respect to the results of experimental research 
can hardly be overstated. An example concerning research on 
educational achievement can illustrate the point. In 1978 a review of 
the research respecting the effect of class-size on student 
achievement in elementary and secondary school was prepared by Gene 
Glass and Mary Lee Smith.243 Although the research and related 
literature on the subject of class-size is immense, other reviewers of 
this research had concluded that the relationship between class-size
239 Saxe and Fine, p. 50.
240 Carol H. Weiss, 'Evaluation Research in the Political Context', p. 
20.
241 Pal, p. 53.
242 Hum and Simpson, p. 92.
243 Gene V. Glass and Mary Lee Smith, 'Meta-Analysis of Research on 
the Relationship of Class-Size and Achievement', (San Francisco: 
Far West Laboratory for Educational Research and Development, 
1978).
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and pupil achievement was inconclusive.244 Nevertheless, in their 
review of the same research, Glass and Smith concluded that there was 
a definite inverse relationship between class-size and pupil learning. 
Glass and Smith based their dissenting conclusions on the findings of 
only 14 of the 80 studies reviewed. The findings of the 14 were used 
because these studies were deemed to have exercised good 
"experimental" control. The research and findings by Glass and Smith 
received such a lot of attention and publicity that the Educational 
Research Service found it necessary to publish a special report 
examining fully (and refuting) Glass and Smith's findings and 
implications.
2.1.1 Experimentation
The particular strength of a social experiment as a research 
methodology is that it employs the technique of an "experiment". The 
essence of experimentation is that it attempts to demonstrate and 
explain the relationships between dependent and independent variables 
on the basis of empirical, measureable, and reproduceable information. 
Arthur Copeland notes that experimental tests constitute a fundamental 
aspect of scientific methodology.245 Thus it is the use of 
experimentation which allows social experimentation to make such a 
strong claim to being an objective and scientifically credible form of
244 Educational Research Service Inc., 'Class-Size Research: A 
Critique of Recent Meta-Analysis', 1980. The Educational Research 
Service Inc. is an independent, nonprofit corporation in the 
United States whose purpose is to serve the research and 
information needs of the United States school system.
245 Arthur H. Copeland, Sr., 'Mathematical Proof and Experimental 
Proof, Philosophy of Science. (December 1966).
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policy research. Donald Campbell, for example, states: "To be truly
scientific we must be able to experiment".246 George Fairweather and 
Louis Tornatzky point out that it is essential that social experiments 
be very sound from a scientific point of view which means that the 
procedure must involve an actual experiment.247
The superiority of the experimental method lies in the fact that,
in a true experiment the differences between a treated 
(experimental) group and an untreated (control) group can be 
attributed entirely to the effect of the treatment plus an 
accidental (random) error component which can be accurately 
estimated and which will be evenhandedly distributed across 
the control and the experimental groups alike.248
Experiments therefore are characterized by the systematic provision
for the measurement of outcomes, for the establishment of controls
over the experimental environment, and for the random assignment of
subjects to different treatment groups.249 Furthermore, because in an
experiment an independent variable is manipulated in order to gauge
its effect on a dependent variable, an attempt is made to control the
experimental environment as much as possible so that any variation in
246 Donald T. Campbell, 'Reforms as Experiments', in Social Research: 
Principles and Procedures, eds. J. Bynner and Keith M. Stribley, 
(London: Longman Groups Ltd., 1978), p. 80.
247 George W. Fairweather and Louis G. Tornatzky, Experimental Methods 
for Social Policy Research. (Toronto: Peramon Press, 1977), p. 18.
248 Riecken and Boruch, p. 5.
249 Margaret Emma Boeckmann, 'The Contribution of Social Science 
Research to Social Policy Formulation: A Study of the New Jersey
Income Maintenance Experiment and the Family Assistance Plan', 
Ph.D. Dissertation, (The John Hopkins University, 1973), p. 16.
Randomization in experiments is a relatively recent idea first 
introduced by R.A. Fisher. Experiments that do not randomly 
assign subjects to different treatment groups are often referred 
to as "quasi-experiments". Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. 
Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-experimental Designs for Research. 
(Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1963), p. 2.
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response other than that caused by the stimulus is minimized.250
The major difference between a social experiment and a laboratory
experiment is that a social experiment attempts to measure the
behavioural response on the part of a sample population to a
particular "treatment" in an actual social setting. The treatment is
usually some intervention or change to be introduced by government
which is expected to cause a change in the behaviour of the
recipients. Social experimentation, therefore, means that,
one or more treatments (programs) are administered to some
set of persons (or other units) drawn at random from a
specified population; and that observations (or 
measurements) are made to learn how (or how much) some 
relevant aspect of behaviour following treatment differs 
from like behaviour on the part of an untreated or control 
group.251
Social experimentation as a technique of policy research has been 
considered to be superior to other forms of analysis in at least two 
ways.252 First, in terms of the degree of confidence or assurance that 
can be placed in the functional relationships between the 
characteristics of some policy and the effects on the population 
influenced by that policy. Second, in the ability to extrapolate from 
the results of an experiment about these relationships to the effects 
of a policy formulation not explicitly tested in an experiment.253 
That is, inferences or predictions can be made about the effect of
250 O'Shaughnessy, p. 87.
251 Ibid., p. 87.
252 Three principal non-experimental alternatives forms of analysis: 
(i) demonstrations; (ii) new survey research; and (iii) analysis 
of existing programmatic data. Gary Burtless and Larry L. Orr, 
’Are Classical Experiments Needed for Manpower Policy1, Journal of
Human Resources. (Fall 1986), p. 609.
253 Atkinson, Cutt, and Stevenson, p. 26.
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variations of the experimental variable on the population from which 
the sample in the experiment was drawn.
It is important to distinguish between social experiments and 
"demonstration" or "pilot" projects.254 In a demonstration project the 
intent is to show that a particular treatment can be administered to a 
given population and that the status of this particular population 
will be altered in some discernible fashion. Because no attempt is 
made to control for the effect of non-treatment variables on the 
chosen population, it is not possible rigorously to generalize the 
results to other populations or times, or to slightly altered 
treatment variables. Mordecai Kurz and R.G. Spiegelman, therefore, 
suggest that "a 'demonstration1 or 'pilot' project is intended to 
dramatize a program which the policy maker has already selected as the 
single most desired action."255 Or, as Hum and Simpson have put it: 
"Demonstrations are often employed to dramatize some program already 
selected on a priori considerations as the committed course to 
follow, while pilot projects are typically feasibility studies of some 
proposed mechanism to test procedures or detect unforseen 
features".256 A social experiment, on the other hand, seeks to provide
254 J.T. Allen, 'Discussion Paper on Strategy for Income Maintenance 
Experimentation,1 (July 1969, unpublished), p. 3.
Also see Larry L. Orr, ’Introduction: Strategies for a Broad
Program of Experimentation in Income Maintenance1, in Income 
Maintenance: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Research, eds. Larry
L. Orr, Robinson G. Hollister, and Myron J. Lefcowitz, (Chicago: 
Markham Publishing Company, 1971), p. 47.
255 Mordecai Kurz and R.G. Spiegelman, 'Social Experimentation: A New 
Tool in Economic and Policy Research', (Research Memorandum 22, 
Menlo Park: Stanford Research Institute, November 1975), p. 2.
256 Hum and Simpson, p. 45.
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information on the effects of a given treatment which can be 
generalized not only to populations other than the particular one 
covered by the experiment, but also to variations in the treatment 
itself. Although a social experiment is conceptually far more 
difficult and may be more costly than a demonstration project, it 
potentially yields much more "powerful" causal information.
During the quest of the 1970s for those social science research
tools that would be the most effective in a "rational" policy process
many social scientists became strong advocates of social
experimentation. Campbell, as an example, wrote that:
The United States and other modern nations should be ready 
for an experimental approach to social reform, an approach 
in which we try out new programs designed to cure specific 
social problems, in which we learn whether or not these 
programs are effective, and in which we retain, imitate, 
modify, or discard them on the basis of apparent 
effectiveness on the multiple imperfect criteria 
available.257
Henry Riecken and Robert Boruch stated that:
It is reasonable to encourage policy strategists and program 
managers to adopt an experimental attitude toward their 
work, employing experimental designs or experiment like 
approaches, because some experimental or quasi-experimental 
design can be devised for nearly every social setting and 
nearly every kind of social intervention which a 
policy-maker may be concerned.258
Fairweather and Tornatzky were of the opinion that: "If enough time
and thought is given to such techniques and to the problem involved,
it is usually possible to create an experiment for almost any social
problem".259 Saxe and Fine suggested that: "The methods of social
257 Campbell, 'Reforms As Experiments', p. 80.
258 Riecken and Boruch, p. 8.
259 Fairweather and Tornatzky, p. 18.
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experimentation and the scientific logic which underlie its 
application are useful anywhere that rational decision-making is 
required . . . The spectrum of research designs suitable for social
experimentation appears to be infinite".260
Much of the interest in social experimentation on the part of 
social scientists in the United States during the 1970s was the result 
of a search for more precise and credible program evaluation 
techniques in light of the notable failings of the "War on Poverty" 
programs of the 1960s.261 During the 1970s the United States 
government spent over $500 million on social experiments (mostly on
income maintenance experimentation) although much of this money was
received by experimental participants as transfer payments 
(treatments).262 The argument was that experimental design methodology 
offered the greatest opportunity for determining what, if any, causal 
linkages exist between policy action (income payment) and policy 
impact (work effort change).263 It was further argued by some that 
increasing the use of experimental methodology as a policy research 
technique would lead to a more rational and orderly policy-making 
process.264
260 Saxe and Fine, p. 65.
261 Ibid., p. 28.
262 Jerry A. Hausman and David A. Wise, 'Introduction', in Social 
Experimentation. eds. Jerry A. Hausman and David A. Wise, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1985), p. 1.
263 Frank P. Scioli, Jr. and Thomas J. Cook, 'Experimental Design in
Policy Impact Analysis', in Methodologies for Analyzing Public 
Policies. eds. Frank P. Scioli, Jr. and Thomas J. Cook, 
(Lexington: Lexington Books, 1975), p. 89.
264 George W. Fairweather, 'Methods for Experimental Social 
Innovation'. (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc, 1967).
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2.1.2 Advantages and Disadvantages
The central issue with respect to social experimentation is the 
extent to which expensive and difficult experiments are useful or 
necessary for conducting policy research.265
The most obvious circumstance in which the experimental approach to 
social policy research is warranted is when other sources of data are 
unavailable or inadequate. For example, in the case of a proposed 
negative income tax scheme the total cost of the program cannot be 
estimated unless the labour supply response to a particular program 
with a specified tax-back rate and guarantee level is known. However, 
when various negative income tax schemes were being considered 
seriously in the late 1960s, the usual types of economic and 
sociological data - governmental and private censuses and surveys - 
were not adequate to answer the question.266 Some means had to be 
devised to generate the required behavioural information related to 
the parameters of the proposed policy. Experimentation was viewed as 
one means of generating such information.
A second situation in which a social experiment will look 
attractive is if there is significant uncertainty as to which 
theoretical approach should be used (due to either a total absence of
265 David B. Pillemer and Richard J. Light, 'Using the Results of 
Randomized Experiments to Construct Social Programs', in 
Reanalyzing Program Evaluations, eds. Robert F. Boruch et al., 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1981), p. 225.
266 David Elesh et al., 'The New Jersey-Pennsylvania Experiment: A 
Field Study in Negative Taxation', in Income Maintenance: 
Interdisciplinary Approaches to Research. eds. Larry L. Orr, 
Robinson G. Hollister, and Myron J. Lefcowitz, (Chicago: Markham 
Publishing Company, 1971), p. 23.
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theory or an over-abundance of theories) when considering the effects 
of some intervention.267 The results of an experiment can be
model-free in the important sense that the observed results do not 
depend on an unknown mechanism.268 Put in the simplest terms, if there 
are two groups of identical subjects and one group is given a specific 
treatment and the other no treatment, the difference in response is a 
purely experimental result which is identifiable.
A third reason for conducting a social experiment is that
independent variables can be varied over whatever range is needed,
which from the point of view of the policy-maker means the range
relevant to feasible policy options. In this case,
experimentation is warranted and necessary when the
environment does not contain sufficient variations of
conditions to include those which must be examined or when, 
even if the conditions exist, there is no possibility of 
establishing sufficient methodological or statistical 
controls to establish cause-effect relationships.269
For example, with respect to research concerning income maintenance
proposals, one of the major advantages of the experimental method over
non-experimental methods is that the experimental method offers the
possibility of better exogenous variation in the wage and income
variables.270 In these instances, the debate on whether experiments
are "worth it" depends on the belief in the ability of the experiment
versus the real world to generate truly exogenous variation in the
267 Frank P. Stafford, 'Income-Maintenance Policy and Work Effort: 
Learning from Experiments and Labor-Market Studies', in Social 
Experimentation. eds. Jerry A. Hausman and David A. Wise, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1985), p. 100.
268 Kurz and Spiegelman, 'Social Experimentation', p. 9.
269 Atkinson, Cutt, and Stevenson, p. 24.
270 Stafford, p. 109.
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variables of interest.271
In many situations social experimentation may not be the most
appropriate research strategy. First, it may be that the policy issue
can be resolved with more traditional and less expensive research 
methods. For example, experimentation respecting income maintenance 
policy can be an extremely expensive research undertaking not only in 
financial terms but also in terms of research expertise. Hence if 
relevant nonexperimental data exist the presumption should be against 
using experimentation to generate new data.272
Second, it may simply be that the phenomenon at issue is one which
cannot be simulated adequately in an experimental context.273 For 
example, the treatment population of interest may be too small or too 
different to be able to make meaningful inferences that could be 
generalized to a larger population. Or, it may be that some important 
policy variables, for example interest rates or the national debt, 
cannot be disaggregrated so as to be able to observe differential 
effects on separate groups or sections of the population.274 It may 
also be that it is ethically unjustifiable to conduct an experiment 
which requires that a group of people be divided into treatment and 
control groups and then treated differently. For example, it may be 
impossible on ethical grounds to construct an experimental design that
271 Ibid., p. 101.
272 Orr, p. 48.
273 Robinson Hollister, 'Introduction', in Income Maintenance: 
Interdisciplinary Approaches to Research. eds. Larry L. Orr, 
Robinson G. Hollister, and Myron J. Lefcowitz, (Chicago: Markham 
Publishing Company, 1971), p. 9.
274 Pal, p. 54.
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deliberately withholds a potentially life saving technology from some 
of the participants.275
Third, it may be that it is legally, administratively, or 
politically impossible or inappropriate to conduct a social 
experiment. Peter Rossi has pointed out that with respect to the 
political and administrative difficulties of conducting controlled 
experiments in social settings, it is not easy either to get the 
freedom to undertake properly controlled experiments or to do them 
even when that consent is obtained.276 Tom Atkinson et al. note that 
politically experimentation may be considered impractical when the 
introduction of microprograms as experimental treatments might have 
the effect of advertising programs and building up commitments to 
their continuation before there has been a political commitment to 
implement such a program on a long-term basis.277
Finally, as Donald Campbell and Julian Stanley caution,
even though we recognize experimentation as the basic 
language of proof, as the only decision court for 
disagreement between rival theories, we should not expect 
that 'crucial experiments' which pit opposing theories will 
be likely to have clear-cut out-comes.278
In other words, despite the credibility and defensiblity of the
methodology, experimental research cannot be expected to provide data
leading to analysis from which unequivocal conclusions can be drawn
275 Ibid., p. 54.
276 Peter H. Rossi, 'Evaluating Social Action Programs', copyright 
June 1967 by TRANS-action, Inc., New Brunswick, N.J., in Readings 
in Evaluation Research, ed. Francis G. Caro, (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundations, 1977), p. 279.
277 Atkinson, Cutt, and Stevenson, p. 24.
278 Campbell and Stanley, p. 3.
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concerning human behaviour. For these reasons some observers have 
concluded that because of the expense involved in terms of time, 
money, and expertise, social policy experiments should only be 
undertaken in very particular, and perhaps, relatively infrequent 
situations.279
2.2 GUARANTEED ANNUAL INCOME
The notion of a guaranteed annual income as a policy prescription 
can be traced back to at least 1796 when a conference of poor-law 
officials of Berkshire County, England, decided to establish "a table 
of universal practice" which became known as the Speenhamland Act. 
Under this practice, the amount of relief by which a family could be 
eligible was determined to be the cost of the amount of bread needed 
for sustenance.280 This "bread scale" was used to supplement the wages 
of labourers whose earnings were less than the amount needed to buy 
the required bread. This method of determining income support has 
been described as "the ancient predecessor of today's official poverty 
definition which provides price level adjustments based on a range of 
consumer goods and services".281
279 D.S. Mundel, ’The Use of Information in the Policy Process: Are 
Social-Policy Experiments Worth While?', in Social 
Experimentation. eds. Jerry A. Hausman and David A. Wise, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1985), p. 245.
280 Walter A. Friedlander, Introduction to Social Welfare. (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 21.
281 J. Patrick Madden, 'Poverty Statistics: A Guide to Interpretation, 
(Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The 
Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 12.
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Since the Speenhamland Act the notion of guaranteeing a minimum 
level of livelihood whether through guaranteed employment, state 
underwritten social insurance, social assistance, or some combination 
of all three has had a long and often controversial history. The two 
most contentious issues have been that of determining eligibility 
especially with respect to the employed poor, and of establishing the 
appropriate type and level of support for those in need whether 
employed or not.
The idea of guaranteeing a minimum income for the poor - including 
the employed poor - through direct income supplementation has 
circulated in policy and academic circles in the United States since 
the enactment of the Social Security Act in 1935.282 However, it was 
not until the 1960s that a guaranteed annual income as a policy 
proposal began to be discussed seriously.283 The debate culminated in 
the 1969 proposal by President Nixon to introduce a form of guaranteed 
annual income through the Family Assistance Plan (FAP). In the five 
years following the proposed FAP legislation a number of other 
countries including Britain, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Norway, France, Australia, West Germany, and Japan considered adopting 
a guaranteed annual income plan based on the negative income tax
282 Leslie Lenkowsky, Politics. Economics, and Welfare Reform; The 
Failure of Negative Income Tax in Britain and the United States. 
(London: University Press of America Inc., 1986), p. 23.
283 In the United States G.J. Stigler, Milton Friedman, Robert 
Theobald, James Tobin, Robert Lampman, Edward Schwartz, and in 
Canada, Reuben Baetz, Clarence Barber, the Special Senate 
Committee on Poverty, the Quebec Commission of Inquiry on Health 
and Welfare and various provincial governments.
The notion of a guaranteed livelihood has also been associated 
with Edward Bellamy's novel, Looking Backward published in 1888.
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model.284
It is the opinion of some observers that a consensus has persisted
among economists that a modest negative income tax program would be
good public policy.285 In 1962 Professor Milton Friedman proposed a
guaranteed annual income fashioned on the basis of the negative income
tax model. In 1973 Professor John Kenneth Galbraith recommended
consideration of "the provision of a guaranteed or alternative income
as a matter of right to those who cannot find employment".286 In 1985
a Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for
Canada (the Macdonald Commission) stated that,
the provision of a Universal Income Security Program with 
relatively low guarantee levels and tax-back rates is an 
appropriate long-term goal for the Government of Canada and 
the provincial governments to pursue, in order to reform the 
current income-security system".287
In 1985-86 a movement in Europe "was developing among academics from a
number of disciplines, and politicians across the political spectrum"
to consider seriously a guaranteed annual income as a long-term policy
option and in 1986 a conference in Belgium led to the formation of a
Basic Income European Network.288 In 1991, Greg Mason, former
professor of economics at the University of Manitoba and now a partner
in Prairie Research Associates Inc., stated that: "I don't think any
284 Lenkowsky, p. 3.
285 Stafford, p. 95.
286 John Kenneth Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose. (New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), p. 251.
287 Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects 
for Canada, Volume Two, p. 803.
288 Bill Jordon, 'The Prospects for Basic Reform', Social Policy & 
Administration. (Summer 1988), p. 115.
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economist, left or right, doesn't agree a guaranteed annual income is 
a good idea".289
The strategy of implementing a guaranteed annual income through the 
mechanism of a negative income tax was first proposed in 1946 by G.J. 
Stigler.290 Stigler started from the fundamental principle that those 
equally in need should be helped equally. He meant that eligibility 
for assistance should be based on the relationship between income and 
family size/composition rather than on occupation or ability to work. 
Accordingly, not only the unemployed poor but also the employed poor 
would be entitled to receive an income supplement. The dilemma, as 
Stigler saw it, was how to provide income assistance to the employed 
poor without impairing the incentive to work or creating a dependency 
on social assistance. He believed that if the negative tax rates were 
properly graduated some measure of incentive for a family and 
individuals to increase their earned incomes could be retained while 
they were receiving assistance.
The concept received little attention until the mid-1960s when the 
idea of a guaranteed income or negative income tax began moving out of 
academia in the United States.291 The better known advocates have been 
Professor Robert J. Lampman of the University of Wisconsin, Professor 
James Tobin of Yale University, and Professor Milton Friedman of the 
University of Chicago.292 Hum and Simpson note that the "proposals by
289 Winnipeg Free Press, 'Guaranteed income gets strong backing', July 
4, 1991.
290 G.J. Stigler, 'The Economics of Minimum Wage Legislation', 
American Economic Review. (1946).
291 Hum and Simpson, p. 3.
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Friedman, Lampman, and Tobin during this period were all based upon 
considerations of fiscal efficiency and tax equity”.293 The theories 
of Friedman and Tobin have received the most attention.294 Both have 
favoured a universal income-support system that would provide an 
income guarantee at a zero level of income and a marginal tax-back 
rate such that benefits are reduced as income rises.295
The notion of a guaranteed annual income based on a negative income 
tax gained a wide audience after it appeared in Friedman's influential 
book Capitalism and Freedom in 1962.296 Robert Theobald, for example, 
has noted that the most striking factor accounting for the shift in 
the opinions of many regarding guaranteed annual income plans was the 
acceptance of direct payments to the poor by Friedman.297 Friedman 
agreed with Stigler in two important respects. First, if the 
objective is to alleviate poverty then any program should aim at all 
the poor and not any particular group, which meant including the 
employed poor as well as the unemployed and the unemployable. Second,
292 K.P. Kisker, 'A Note on the Negative Income Tax', National Tax 
Journal. (March 1967).
293 Hum and Simpson, p. 93.
294 Sar A. Levitan, 'The Pitfalls of Guaranteed Income', The Reporter. 
(May 1967), p. 13.
295 Stafford, p. 95.
296 Friedman, pp. 191-193.
297 Robert Theobald, 'Introduction' in The Guaranteed Income: Next 
Step in Economic Revolution?. ed. Robert Theobald, (New York: 
Doubleday and Company, 1966), p. 16.
Theobald argued for a guaranteed income based upon the view that 
new technology and automation increasingly would displace people 
in the work place; hence he advocated a guaranteed income as an 
absolute and constitutional right. Hum and Simpson, p. 93.
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such a program (as far as possible) should not distort the market or 
impede its functioning, meaning that the market-determined wage rate 
should remain unaffected by transfer payments. In other words, a
guaranteed annual income should not induce people to work less nor
should it bid up the wage rate.
2.2,1 Negative Income Tax
A general negative income tax model may be characterized as a 
universal, objective, income-conditioned transfer mechanism aimed at 
minimizing the work disincentives of the employable and the employed 
poor.298 It is universal in that it is not limited to specific 
recipient groups, for example, the aged or unemployable. It is 
objective since the benefit entitlement is not susceptible to 
discretionary adjustments except those based on income. It is 
income-conditioned since the major eligibility criterion is the
pre-transfer income of the recipient. Further, it seeks to encourage 
labour force participation by reducing the benefit entitlement by less 
than the full amount of any earned wages. Such proposals are
"guaranteed annual income" plans in that they would ensure that
families having no earnings whatever receive a minimum allowance.299
They are based on the "negative income tax" model in that the delivery 
of income supplementation is usually related to the personal income 
tax.300
298 Derek P. J. Hum, Michael E. Laub, and Brian J. Powell, 'The 
Objectives and Design of the Manitoba Basic Annual Income
Experiment', (Mincome Manitoba Technical Report No. 1), p. 7.
299 Hum and Simpson, p. 3.
300 Ibid., p. 3.
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There are three essential elements in a negative income tax model. 
First is an established minimum income or support level to which all 
persons are entitled if they have no income from earnings or other 
sources. Second is the subsidy payment to those with incomes until 
their total income (including the subsidy) reaches a break-even point. 
The third element is the reduction of the income subsidy for persons 
with other income (usually wage income) according to a predetermined 
tax-back rate.
Most negative income tax proposals contain the following basic 
components:301 the guaranteed income level, G, which varies with 
family size and composition and represents the guaranteed minimum 
income to be paid to families or individuals with no other income; the 
tax-back rate, t, at which the level of income guarantee is reduced as 
income from other sources, Ya, rises; and break-even income, Yb, at 
which point the income payments cease. Income payments, P, are 
determined by the formula:
P = G - tYa
and the break-even amount of income is given by:
Yb = G/t
Most negative income tax programs containing these elements would work 
as follows. An income floor would be set probably having some 
relationship to the official poverty line. The official poverty line
See Friedman, Freedom and Capitalism, page 192, for an explanation 
of the relationship of the negative income tax model to the 
positive income tax system.
301 C. W. Meyers, 'A Base for the Negative Income Tax', Social Science 
Quarterly. (September 1970).
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could be established in absolute terms (that is with reference to 
basic physical needs) or in relative terms (that is with reference to 
a particular social setting and point in history) - most official 
poverty lines are defined in relative terms. All families or 
individuals would be entitled to receive transfer payments bringing 
their incomes up to the income floor. Income earned beyond this floor 
would result in part of the transfer payment being taxed back at some 
rate less than 100 percent until a break-even point was reached after 
which all transfer payments would cease and the positive income tax 
rate would take effect.
The primary challenge from a policy and political point of view is 
that of choosing the "best" combination of guarantee levels and 
tax-back rates which together determine the break-even point.
Accordingly, this is also the primary problem encountered when
designing a negative income tax experiment.302 The difficulty is that 
choosing the guarantee level and the tax-back rate raises the two 
issues of most concern to policy decision-makers: cost, and effect on
work effort. If the income guarantee level is too low it will fail to 
raise incomes above an acceptable poverty threshold. If, however, it 
is too high the total costs will be high and some recipients may be 
induced not to work at all. A low tax-back rate will mean a high
break-even point which not only increases the total costs of the
program, but also means that higher income families will get more 
benefits. A high tax-back rate, on the other hand, lowers the 
break-even point, and hence the total cost, but also reduces the work
302 David N. Kershaw, 'A Negative-Income-Tax Experiment', Scientific 
American. (October 1972), p. 20.
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incentive.
The choice of the guarantee levels and the tax-back rates will have 
different consequences for different groups. For those more or less 
regularly employed, the guaranteed income level is less important than 
the tax-back rate. The people in this group need only a relatively 
small guarantee level since they already have earned income and the 
benefit is only intended to supplement this income. They would prefer 
a low tax-back rate so that they can keep as much of their earned 
income as possible. However, for those outside the regular labour 
force with little possiblity of employment the tax-back rate applied 
to these earnings is far less important than the income guarantee 
level. L.A. Kelly has put the dilemma facing policy-makers as 
follows:
It is doubtful whether any income maintenance program can be 
fully protected against the possibility of payments going to 
persons who wish to take advantage of the opportunity to 
receive income without work - unless the qualifying and 
related conditions for receiving payment are so restrictive 
that they penalize those for whom they are intended.303
These are important considerations as the costs of a guaranteed
annual income based on the negative income tax model can be high.
Professor Robert Lampman, for example, in 1967 estimated that a 
"reasonable” plan in the United States, that is one providing a high 
enough guarantee level to bring everyone to the poverty threshold and 
a low enough tax-back rate to provide an incentive to secure earned 
income, could cost the social security system as much as an additional 
$22 billion.304 Others estimated the cost to be as high as $25
303 L.A. Kelly, Income Maintenance. Tax Savings and the Incentive to
Work. (Kingston: Queen's University, 1970), p. 3.
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billion.305
Implementing a guaranteed annual income through a negative income 
tax scheme has found support from across the political spectrum albeit 
for different reasons.306 Four features of the concept are usually 
cited as being particularly attractive.307 First, the problem of 
poverty is defined as primarily a matter of income and not ability to 
work - hence there is less reason to distinguish between the employed 
poor and the unemployed poor. Second, there is the possibility of 
being able to simplify the administration of welfare (which can be 
exceedingly complicated) and thereby reduce costs. Third, the stigma 
associated with receiving income support payments would be less as the 
employed as well as the non-employed poor would be eligible for 
benefits. And fourth, the incentive to work is retained because the 
transfer payments are reduced by only a percentage of earned income.
There are three basic and persistent objections to negative income 
tax plans. First, it is not thought to be politically (some would say 
ethically) feasible to introduce income supplementation measures 
whereby those able to work or working would be entitled to benefits.
304 Levitan, p. 13.
305 Elesh et al., p. 23.
306 Morely Gunderson, Economics of Poverty and Income Distribution. 
(Toronto: Butterworths t Co., 1983), p. 145.
Robert J. Fersh, 'An Assessment of Major Welfare Reform Proposals 
of the 95th Congress', in Income Support. eds. Peter G. Brown, 
Conrad Johnson, and Paul Vernier, (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 
1981), p. 305.
307 Peter H. Rossi and Katherine C. Lyall, Reforming Public Welfare: A 
Critique of the Negative Income Tax Experiment. (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 1976), p. 7.
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Second, it is widely believed that under such a program a certain 
amount of labour would be withheld during the short term, while over 
the long term the work ethic would be seriously damaged and eventually 
eroded hence exacerbating the problem of welfare dependency. Indeed, 
the contention that welfare programs undermine the work ethic has a 
plausible economic proposition at its core.308 Theoretically, any 
income maintenance payment, by reducing the cost of leisure, will have 
an adverse effect on the incentive to find or remain in employment, 
that is, the higher the payment, the greater will be its disincentive 
effect.309 The third objection is that an income supplementation 
program that would provide transfer payments to the employed poor as 
part of a guaranteed annual income would be very costly. Most 
proponents acknowledge that the costs of providing income maintenance 
through a negative income tax plan would cost significantly more than 
existing income maintenance measures.
As an idea developed largely by academics and advocated by 
ostensibly disinterested experts both within and without government, 
the negative income tax version of a guarantee annual income has come 
to be viewed by many as "the quintessence of the professionalization 
of reform".310 Nevertheless, wherever it has been proposed the 
negative income tax model version of a guaranteed annual income has, 
for the most part, never been implemented.311
308 James M. Gripton, 'Negative Income Tax Experiments: Can Canada
Succeed Where the US Failed?', Perception. (November/December
1977), p. 36.
309 Kelly, Income Maintenance. Tax Savings and the Incentive to Work.
p. 1.
310 Lenkowsky, p. 3.
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In 1969 the Republican Administration of President Richard Milhouse 
Nixon proposed that the United States Congress enact legislation that 
would make all Americans eligible for income support. Despite Nixon's 
remarks to the contrary, the Family Assistance Plan proposed a form of 
guaranteed annual income.312 Some observers viewed the FAP as being 
the most innovative piece of social policy to be proposed in the 
United States since the enactment of the Social Security Act in 1935. 
Indeed, some believed that if enacted such a policy would become the
benchmark against which other Western and developed countries would
measure the development of social policy in their countries.313
To those interested in the policy-making processes of pluralistic 
and democratic political systems, the very fact that such innovative 
social legislation was being proposed by the President and supported 
in the Congress was as significant as the actual content of the 
proposal. Although the proposed legislation was finally defeated in 
the Senate, after being twice passed by the House of Representatives, 
that it had occupied such a prominent place in the President's 
domestic political priorities and was debated and voted on in the
Congress was taken to be testimony of the capacity of the American 
political and policy-making system to develop policies (in particular 
social policies) proposing fundamental change as opposed to
incremental tinkering. The FAP proposal, therefore, was taken by some
311 Ibid., p. 3.
312 Leman, p. 53.
313 Daniel P. Moynihan, The Politics of Guaranteed Annual Income. (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 197317
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to be dramatic evidence that, when required, rational, comprehensive, 
and fundamental policy alternatives could and would be developed 
within pluralistic political and policy-making structures.
Much of the debate in the United States (as elsewhere) during the 
late 1960s and early 1970s concerning poverty, welfare reform, and 
proposals such as the FAP centered around the need to maintain 
adequate work incentives.314 In the United States (as in Canada) the 
"so-called 'working poor' have in the past received almost no income 
transfers from the American welfare system - such transfers have 
predominantly been paid to 'nonworking' categories of the 
population".315 The central question, then, was how to make income 
assistance available to the poor, including the employed poor, while 
at the same time encouraging recipients to seek and maintain 
employment. The policy problem concerning negative income tax 
proposals was to determine just what the effects of given combinations 
of guarantee levels and tax-back rates would have on the work effort 
of recipients. The research problem was that the usual types of 
economic and sociological data - governmental and private censuses and 
surveys - were not adequate to answer this question316 (as was also 
the case in Canada).317
314 Atkinson, Cutt, and Stevenson, p. 47.
315 G.F. Cain and H.W. Watts, in Income Maintenance and Labor Supply,
eds. Glen F. Cain and Harold W. Watts, (Chicago: Rand McNally
College Publishing, 1972), Introduction.
316 Elesh et al., p. 2.
317 Hum and Simpson, p. 3.
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To acquire the relevant data and information (especially 
behavioural information respecting the labour supply response), five 
income maintenance experiments based on the concept of the negative 
income tax were initiated by the United States Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare and the Office of Economic Opportunity. The 
five income maintenance experiments were the Urban Income Maintenance 
Experiment (UNIME) in New Jersey and Pennsylvania; the Rural Income 
Maintenance Experiment (RIME) in North Carolina and Iowa; the Gary 
Income Maintenance Experiment (GIME) in Indiana; the Seattle Income 
Maintenance Experiment (SIME) in Washington; and the Denver Income
Maintenance Experiment (DIME) in Colorado.
The five experiments taken together were the most ambitious attempt 
at social experimentation ever undertaken in the United States.318 
Some social scientists and economists were of the opinion that the 
experiments represented "a great leap forward in economics as a 
behavioral science".319 Indeed, it has been suggested that as a 
"research endeavour they established a precedent in introducing large 
scale randomized controlled experimental designs to the social 
sciences, and resulted in methodological advances in many areas."320 
Hum and Simpson, for example, maintain that the experience gained from 
social experimentation, especially in the United States, provides a
318 Mordecai Kurz and Robert G. Spiegelman, ’The Seattle Experiment: 
The Combined Effect of Income Maintenance and Manpower 
Investments', American Economic Review. (May 1971) p. 22.
319 James N. Morgan, 'Income Maintenance Experiments - Discussion', 
American Economic Review. (May 1971), p. 39.
320 Derek P.J. Hum, 'Negative Income Tax Experiments: A Descriptive
Survey with Special References to Work Incentives', (Draft of a 
paper prepared for the Economic Council of Canada. 1979), p. 2.
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basis for effective experimentation in matters of Canadian public 
policy.321
All of the experiments focused on the controversial problem of work 
incentives in an income maintenance system. The primary research 
objective in each case was to measure the effects of alternative 
tax-back rates and/or different minimum income guarantees on the 
incentive to work. Each experiment attempted to measure such effects 
for a different population group or geographical area in order to 
determine whether work behaviour responses vary by population groups 
and/or by area.
The experiments were planned and overseen by members of the 
academic community, many of whom were associated with research 
institutes such as the Institute for Poverty Research and the Stanford 
Research Institute. Federal government representatives were involved 
in the planning of all the experiments but as advisors rather than as 
principal investigators. Funding was provided by the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare and the Office of Economic Opportunity. 
The evidence from the experiments concerning the labour supply effect 
has been mixed as the tax-back effects were sometimes positive and 
sometimes negative.322
The following summarizes the features and results of each 
experiment:
321 Hum and Simpson, p. xvi.
322 Robert Moffitt, 'Work Incentives in the AFDC System: An Analysis 
of the 1981 Reforms', American Economic Review. (May 1986), p. 
220.
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The Urban Income Maintenance Experiment's main research 
interest was in the labour supply response of the working 
poor; its participants were restricted to low-income, 
male-headed, able-bodied family units; the findings 
presented a picture of generally small labour supply 
differentials between treatment and control groups as a 
whole.
The Rural Income Maintenance Experiment focused upon the 
work efforts of rural low-income families; included 
female-headed families as well as aged-headed families in 
addition to male-headed families; found that although the 
response patterns differed significantly by site and race 
the overall results concealed great variations in response 
among individual family members (husbands in particular 
responded very little).
The Gary Income Maintenance Experiment's target population 
represented segments not prominently treated in other 
experiments - black and female-headed families in a ghetto 
setting; reported initial findings of a modest disincentive 
effect.
The Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiment (sometimes 
referred to as two experiments), the largest and most 
elaborately designed of the experiments, had as its major 
research objective the work effort and family stability 
responses of families to a variety of negative income tax 
plans in combination with manpower programs and training 
subsidies; the sample was stratified by race, number of 
family heads, and income; based on the second year of data 
the estimated total effects were found to be quite large.323
2.3.1 New Jersey Experiment
The first and seminal experiment was the Urban Income Maintenance
Experiment conducted in New Jersey and Pennsylvania (hereafter
referred to as the New Jersey experiment). This experiment, as a
piece of social policy research, stood out from all previous research 
conducted on social policy proposals for two reasons.324 First, it was
a genuine experiment involving the use of a social program as an
323 Hum, 'Negative Income Tax Experiments: A Descriptive Survey with
Special Reference to Work Incentives', pp. 8-23.
324 Rossi and Lyall, p. 2.
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experimental "treatment" given to subjects and withheld from a 
statistically equivalent group. Second, the experiment dealt with 
prospective social policy and, as such, was intended to contribute to 
the formulation of future policy by providing information on several 
critical political issues.
The research objective of the experiment was to measure the effect 
of a negative income tax scheme in an urban setting on the labour 
supply response of male household heads and their family members. A 
number of secondary research issues were also identified including the 
measurement of attitudes towards work and job satisfaction, 
consumption and expenditure patterns, family integration, general 
mobility, dependency on government and so on. In addition, the 
experiment was expected to yield significant insight into the problems 
associated with the utilization of the technique of social 
experimentation.
The experiment cost $8 million, involved 1,350 families, and lasted 
five years. Both the design and the execution of the experiment has 
been criticized: it restricted the target population to low-income,
work-eligible, male-headed families; was conducted as a series of 
"test bores" in four urban sites rather than as a national sample; 
failed to appreciate fully that the administration of an experimental 
treatment is also part of the treatment; and was deficient in the 
measurement of the labour supply response.325 Nevertheless, the 
researchers were able to report some results.
325 Gripton, pi 37.
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In 1971 Harold Watts reported that preliminary data indicated, at 
the very least, that transfer payments of the kind administered in the 
New Jersey experiment had not induced immediate and widespread 
withdrawals from the labour force. The report was made to Congress in 
response to a very urgent plea from the Administration for evidence 
that would support President Nixon's FAP legislation. Or, as Watts 
has put it, "some very preliminary results were untimely ripped from 
the first available batches of data".326 In 1973 Harold Watts and Glen 
Cain reported that the labour supply results presented a picture of 
generally small absolute labour supply differentials between the 
experimental and control groups as a whole.327
In 1977 Albert Rees reported that for white and Spanish-speaking 
families, and for the treatment group as a whole, the labour supply 
response effects were negative but not very large.328 The results 
consisted of a reduction in hours for white male heads, an increase in 
the unemployment rate of Spanish-speaking male heads, and a large 
relative reduction in the labour force participation rate of white 
wives. The major surprise was the absence of any negative effect on 
the labour supply response of black households, however this result
326 Harold W. Watts, 'The Graduated Work Incentive Experiments:
Current Progress', American Economic Review. (May 1971), pp. 
15-16.
327 Harold W. Watts and Glen G. Cain, 'Basic Labor Supply Response
Findings from the Urban Experiment (New Jersey-Pennsylvania)',
(Report of research from the Graduated Work Incentive Experiment
for presentation at the annual meetings of the American Economic 
Association, New York, December 30, 1973).
328 Albert Rees, 'The labor-supply results of the experiment: a
summary', in The New Jersey Income-maintenance Experiment: Labor
Supply Responses eds. Harold W. Watts and Albert Rees, (New York: 
Academic Press, 1977), p. 31.
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was considered to be "strange" and unexplainable.329
Based on her study of the New Jersey experiment and the Family 
Assistance Plan, Margaret Boeckmann concluded that Congressional 
members opposed to a policy proposal will tend to ignore, reject, or 
look for flaws in the research concerning the proposal; if supporting 
a policy proposal they will tend to accept the research findings as 
valid; and if neutral they will tend to look to opinion leaders for 
cues as to where they should stand on the issue.330 Not surprisingly, 
therefore, the New Jersey experimental effort was discredited by those 
members of Congress who did not favour the introduction of a 
guaranteed annual income and were therefore opposed to Nixon's FAP 
legislation. The results were discredited mainly on the grounds that 
the people who reported them worked for and were supported by an 
agency (the Office for Economic Opportunity) advocating the 
introduction of a guaranteed annual income policy.
As Peter Rossi and Katherine Lyall explain, part of the problem 
with the reporting of the initial findings was that because the 
researchers never conceived of the experiment as a prototype negative 
income tax program (but, rather, as a piece of behavioural research 
designed to get some information on the "raw materials" of 
income-conditioned transfer programs) they were unprepared to answer 
political and administrative questions and this seriously undermined
329 Ibid., p. 31.
330 Margaret Emma Boeckmann, 'The Contribution of Social Research to 
Social Policy Formulation: A Study of the New Jersey Income
Maintenance Experiment and the Family Assistance Plan', Ph.D.
Dissertation, (The John Hopkins University, 1973), 'Abstract'.
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their credibility.331 Viewed from this perspective, the New Jersey 
experiment provides an illustration of the precariousness of policy 
research in the politically competitive world of policy formulation - 
even policy research based on sound scientific procedures, principles, 
and assumptions. This precariousness is due, in large measure, to the 
differing purposes and rationale underlying the social science 
research enterprise as opposed to the politically charged world of 
values, interests, and power. This is not to suggest that social 
science research is always (if ever) completely value free or immune 
to the influence of self-interest or power. It is, however, to 
suggest that such factors play a much lesser role in social science 
research than in the political world of policy-making as the 
objectives and conceptual framework of each is quite different. It is 
important that these differences be understood and appreciated by 
those attempting to have social science research taken into account by 
policy decision-makers.
David Kershaw has listed what he considers to be the weaknesses and 
strengths of social experimentation based on the experience of the New 
Jersey experiment.332 The weaknesses are that it is an expensive way 
of gathering information; it takes a long time to get results since 
measuring human behaviour with confidence requires at least several 
years; and it is difficult to control the environment of a social 
experiment. The strengths are that it is the only way to obtain 
information on some kinds of behavioural change before a new program 
is introduced; it is the best way to collect precise information on
331 Rossi and Lyall, p. 177.
332 Kershaw, p. 25.
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specific issues because social experiments are carefully structured 
and controlled; and social experiments can help to focus attention on 
new issues.
Kershaw concluded that the most important and lasting result of the 
New Jersey experiment was the support it provided for the idea of 
social experimentation. Rossi and Lyall state that "one cannot stress 
too much the importance of this experiment as setting a precedent" in 
the field of social experimentation.333 Robert Haveman concurs: "The
New Jersey project represented the general acceptance of large-scale 
social experimentation as a valid tool for estimating important 
behavioral responses to proposed policy interventions".334 In 1971, 
Larry Orr observed that the New Jersey experiment had raised the 
prospect of an ambitious program of experimentation in social programs 
in general, and income maintenance programs in particular.335
333 Rossi and Lyall, p. 2.
334 Robert H. Haveman, 'Foreword1, in Income Maintenance: 
Interdisciplinary Approaches of Research. eds. Larry L. Orr,
Robinson G. Hollister and Myron J. Lefcowitz, (Chicago: Markham 
Publishing Company, 1971), p. v.
335 Orr, p. 47.
Chapter III 
GUARANTEED ANNUAL INCOME IN CANADA
It is not unusual for an idea or an issue to gain prominence in Canada
only after it has in the United States. For example, the budgetary
technique called planning-programming-budgeting (PPB) was only 
introduced into Canada after it had been brought into the United 
States government ten years earlier in 1961 by Robert McNamara.336 The 
concern with poverty during the 1960s was no exception. Shortly after 
the United States declared its "War on Poverty" program in 1964 and 
began to conduct research into the nature and extent of poverty in the 
U.S., Canada followed suit.337 By 1964 the Pearson Liberal government 
was already putting together a number of programs to do something 
about poverty, even if they were not seen primarily as poverty 
programs.338
Thereafter, numerous reports and studies concerned with poverty in 
Canada were written. In most of these reports three facts were noted 
consistently.339 First, in relative terms, the distribution of income
336 David Siegel, 'The Evolution of the Expenditure Budget', in Public
Administration in Canada, ed. Kenneth Kernaghan, (Toronto: Nelson, 
1988), p. 180.
337 Rand Dyck, 'The Canada Assistance Plan: The Ultimate in 
Cooperative Federalism', Canadian Public Administration. (Winter
1976), p. 90.
338 Leman, p. 41.
339 'Fifth Annual Review' (1968) and the 'Sixth Annual Review (1969),
- 107 -
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had not changed much over the last twenty years or so.
Distribution of Family Income in Canada by Ouintiles 
—  Percentage Distribution of Income —
Bottom Second Third Fourth Top
year Fifth Fifth Fifth Fifth Fifth
1951 6.1 12.9 17.4 22.4 41.1
1957 6.3 13.1 18.1 23.4 39.1
1961 6.6 13.5 18.3 23.4 38.4
1967 6.4 13.1 18.0 23.6 38.9
1969 6.2 12.6 17.9 23.5 39.7
1971 5.6 12.6 18.0 23.7 40.0
Source: David Ross, ’Income Security', in Canadian Public Policy.
Shankar A Yelaja, (ed.), 1978.
Second, most of those in Canada who experienced low incomes were 
employed in full time jobs - a finding that was contrary to the belief 
of most people. In 1968 the Economic Council of Canada stated in its 
'Fifth Annual Review' that 27 percent of the Canadian population lived 
in poverty, very stringently defined, and that of all the designated 
poor families in Canada, 68 percent were headed by workers - that is, 
the majority of the poor were employed Canadians and not part of the 
welfare caseload. In 1971 the Senate of Canada Special Report 
'Poverty in Canada' reported that the heads of many poor families were 
not on welfare but in fact were employed - of the 832,000 families who 
fell below the poverty line in 1967, 525,000 or 64 percent had heads
who were employed.340 In 1977 the National Council of Welfare reported 
that 60 percent of low-income family units headed by persons aged
Economic Council of Canada; Report of the Quebec Commission of 
Inquiry on Health and Welfare (the Castonguay-Nepveu Report), 
(1971); Canada, National Health and Welfare, 'Income Security for 
Canadians' (1971); Senate of Canada Special Report, 'Poverty in 
Canada', (1971); Adams etal., The Real Poverty Report. (1971); 
Manitoba, 'Welfare Policy in Manitoba', (Barber Report), (1972).
340 Special Senate Committee on Poverty, 'Poverty in Canada', Senate 
of Canada, (1971), p. 133.
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under 65 relied on employment rather than government assistance for 
their incomes.341
Welfare and Working Poor
year welfare poor working poor
1961 32% 68%
1967 36% 64%
1971 46% 54%
Source: David Ross, 'Income Security'.
Third, the percentage of low-income people in Canada had not 
changed much, if at all, over the previous decade and a half - another 
finding that was contrary to what most people believed. The federal 
government's 1970 White Paper, 'Income Security for Canadians', 
reported that in 1967 nearly one-fifth of all families and two-fifths 
of unattached individuals had low levels of income.342 In 1971, the 
Special Senate Committee on Poverty put the number of Canadians living 
in poverty at one in four. The Canadian Council on Social Development 
reported that 18.1 percent of Canadian families fell below its poverty 
line in 1967 and 18.2 percent in 1973. The Senate Committee reported 
that 23.3 percent of Canadians were poor in 1967 compared to 22.2 
percent in 1973.343
One of the first reports to draw attention to poverty in Canada was 
the Economic Council of Canada's 1968 'Fifth Annual Review'. The 
Economic Council reported that at least one Canadian in every five
341 National Council on Welfare, 'Jobs and Poverty', (June 1977), p. 
2.
342 Canada, National Health and Welfare, 'Income Security for 
Canadians', (1970), p. 6.
343 Anthony Westell, The New Society. (Toronto: McClelland and Stuart,
1977) p. 127.
110
lived in poverty.344 The impact of the Council's report was 
wide-spread and generated a lot of interest in the issue of poverty 
and welfare reform in Canada.345 As David Ross noted in 1978: "The
current examination of income security and poverty can probably be 
traced back to the interest and shock generated in 1968 by the 
material contained in the 'Fifth Annual Review' of the Economic 
Council of Canada".346
The Economic Council's Review was a shock because despite the 
wide-spread perception that the large amounts of money being spent on 
income security measures were not as effective as could be reasonably 
expected, it was still surprising to many Canadians that so many 
people lived on so little. In 1970 the federal government recognized 
that there might be problems with the delivery of income security 
programs with the statement that: "The central issue to be faced is
the fact that there are about 4 million low income people in this 
country despite an annual outlay of about $4.5 billion on income 
security programs".347
In the minds of some of those concerned with welfare reform, part 
of the problem was that (prior to 1973) no province systematically or 
clearly granted direct income supplementation to the low-income 
employed not on social assistance.348 Hence many observers and
344 Economic Council of Canada, 'Fifth Annual Review', (1968), p. 110.
345 nipjjg Economic Council of Canada reported in 1968 that poverty 
among Canadians was widespread beyond belief." Hum and Simpson, 
p. xi.
346 Ross, p. 51.
347 Canada, 'Income Security for Canadians', p. 8.
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researchers began to conclude that some form of income supplementation 
for the employed poor was necessary if the number of people living on 
incomes below the poverty line was to be reduced significantly*349 
This naturally led to consideration of various guaranteed annual 
income schemes that would provide income assistance to the employed 
poor.
This chapter will discuss public and government opinion in Canada 
concerning a guaranteed annual income as a policy option at the time 
the Mincome Manitoba experiment was proposed. Of particular interest 
is the issue of the work ethic in the debate concerning welfare reform 
and the guaranteed annual income option.
3.1 PUBLIC OPINION
Canadian public opinion has tended to support welfare aid for some 
groups - especially the elderly and fatherless families - despite 
persistent concerns about cost and suspicions regarding "welfare 
abuse". A Gallup poll conducted in 1964 which asked "Which is more 
often to blame if a person is poor - lack of effort on his own part, 
or circumstances beyond his control?" found that 30 percent of those 
surveyed cited lack of effort, 34 percent cited circumstances, 30 
percent cited both, and 6 percent were undecided.350 Nearly half of 
those answering felt that 30 percent or more of all welfare recipients
348 David Ross, ’Income Security1, in Canadian Social Policy, ed. 
Shankar A. Yelaja, (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press,
1978), p. 53.
349 Banting, p. 15.
350 Leman, pp. 7-9.
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were abusing the system which was a far higher estimate than the three 
to five percent usually reported by researchers and cited by 
government reports.
Not surprisingly, therefore, public support has never been 
especially high for providing direct income assistance to the employed 
or the employable. In 1973 a survey carried out for the Province of 
Alberta found that more than half the adult population of the province 
believed that "the Government should assist only those people who are
unable to work because of age or sickness; the others must look out
for themselves".351 Nevertheless, in 1974, another Gallup poll found 
that almost half of Canadian adults (43%) predicted that a guaranteed 
annual income for all would be a reality within the next ten years, 
and that about six in ten (58%) approved of the idea.352 The level of 
approval for a guaranteed annual income scheme was the lowest among 
the better educated (47%) as compared with high school graduates (57%) 
and those with elementary school education (67%).
Between 1966 and 1970 the idea of a guaranteed annual income was 
widely discussed in Canada.353 Indeed, in the late 1960s and early 
1970s a number of political parties and governments representing the 
spectrum of democratic political opinion in Canada either endorsed or 
at least expressed a strong interest in the idea of a guaranteed 
annual income. In 1969 the leader of the national Progressive
Conservative Party proposed introducing some form of guaranteed annual
351 Globe and Mail, 'Poor will always be with us1, April 26, 1973.
3 5 2 The Gallup Report, *2—to—1 Approval Given Guaranteed Annual
Income', (February 2, 1974).
353 Leman, p. 41.
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income.354 The 1973 policy statement by the Liberal Party of Manitoba 
proposed that a basic income support system to replace the existing 
welfare system - tied to a program of job incentives and training - be 
adopted.355 The Parti Quebecois (the separatist party in the Province 
of Quebec) in its presentation of a proposed budget for an independent 
Quebec outlined a series of sweeping reforms highlighted by the 
replacement of existing welfare programs with a guaranteed annual 
income plan.356 In December, 1973, the Social Services Minister of the 
Province of Saskatchewan stated that a guaranteed annual income was 
necessary to solve the problem of poverty in Canada.357 The 
Progressive Conservative government of the Province of Ontario (not 
known for its innovations in the field of social policy) seriously 
considered undertaking a guaranteed annual income experiment in 1973. 
At the February, 1974, Federal-Provincial meeting of Welfare Ministers 
the case for a guaranteed annual income was made by the Minister of 
Human Resources for the Province of British Columbia.358
Various labour, church, social activist, and other organizations 
were also either studying, debating, or endorsing the idea of a 
guaranteed annual income. In 1972 a seminar on guaranteed annual
354 Winnipeg Tribune, 'Stanfield presses for guaranteed annual
income', December 4, 1969.
355 Liberal Party of Manitoba, 'Initial Platform Statement - 1973' 
(Adopted at the Annual Meeting - March 25, 1973).
356 Globe and Mail, 'Parti Quebecois unveils budget with $181,520,400 
surplus' October 10, 1973.
357 The Commonwealth, 'Guaranteed income needed to fight poverty: 
Taylor', December 19, 1973.
358 Toronto Star, 'A guaranteed income may be "only solution" to the 
welfare jungle', February 23, 1974.
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income was organized by the Canadian Council on Social Development 
which heard papers delivered by experts from several nations.359 In 
1974 the Ontario Federation of Labour urged the provincial government 
to consider introducing a guaranteed annual income.360 The Federation 
of Labour in the Province of Nova Scotia suggested that work be
started immediately to introduce a guaranteed annual income.361 The 
United Church of Canada offically favoured a guaranteed annual income 
policy362 and the Lutheran Council of Canada endorsed the idea in
principle.363 Guaranteed annual income proposals were prepared by the 
Canadian Association of Social Workers, the National Council of
Welfare, the Canadian Council for Social Development, and the newly
created National Anti-Poverty Organization.364
Opposition to a guaranteed annual income came from the Canadian 
Chamber of Commerce on the grounds that it would eventually destroy 
the work ethic.365 However, a federation of employer organizations in
359 Canadian Council on Social Development, 'Guaranteed Annual Income: 
An Integrated Approach', (Ottawa 1973).
360 Ontario Federation of Labour, 'Legislative Proposals 1974', (April
1974).
361 Halifax Chronicle Herald, 'Lynk urges guaranteed annual income in 
1974', December 12, 1973.
362 United Church Observer, 'Guaranteed income guinea pig cautious', 
(September 1974).
The United Church's associate secretary, appointed to head up its 
concern with poverty, stated that as automation makes full 
employment unattainable in Canada the implementation of a 
guaranteed annual income plan is inevitable. Dauphin Herald, 
'Minister favours G.A.I.', November 2, 1973.
363 Division of Social Services, Lutheran Council in Canada, 'The 
Guaranteed Annual Income', (February 1970).
364 Leman, p. 59.
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the Province of Quebec, representing 80 percent of the Province's 
employers (Conseil du Patronat du Quebec), favoured a guaranteed 
annual income through the mechanism of a negative income tax on the 
grounds that it was a better means of fighting poverty than an 
increased minimum wage.366 As Leman has noted: "Even businessmen
listened patiently to talk of a guaranteed income".367
3.2 REPORTS
Debate concerning a guaranteed annual income in Canada was, 
however, plagued by a lack of clarity concerning what an actual plan 
might look like.366 This problem was further exacerbated by the fact 
that different types of guaranteed annual income schemes were being 
proposed by various experts and academics.369 The three most 
influential reports prepared in the early 1970s which recommended the 
implementation of some form of a guaranteed annual income in Canada 
were the Senate of Canada Special Report, 'Poverty in Canada' (Senate 
Report on Poverty); the Report of the Quebec Commission of Inquiry on 
Health and Welfare (Castonguay-Nepveu Report); and 'Welfare in
365 Winnipeg Tribune, 'Chamber view on income rapped' April 5, 1974.
366 Globe and Mail, 'Quebec firms favor guaranteed income', January, 
12, 1974
367 Leman, p. 59.
368 Iacobacci, p. 141.
369 Ibid., p. 141.
In July, 1991, it was reported that "Canada doesn't lack support 
for the idea of a guaranteed annual income program, but they can't 
agree on a blueprint for replacing a hodge podge of support
systems with one easy-to-administer plan, economists say".
Winnipeg Free Press, 'Guaranteed income gets strong backing', July 
4, 1991.
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Manitoba1 (Barber Report).
3.2.1 Special Senate Report
In 1968 the Canadian Senate (an appointed body), largely in
response to the Economic Council of Canada's 'Fifth Annual Report',
set up a Special Committee with a mandate to,
investigate and report upon all aspects of poverty in 
Canada, whether urban, rural, regional or otherwise, to 
define and elucidate the problem of poverty in Canada, and 
to recommend appropriate action to ensure the establishment 
of a more effective structure of remedial measures.370
The Committee identified poverty as "the great social issue of our
time"371 and spent three years holding public hearings in every
province, hearing testimony from 810 witnesses, and receiving 109
briefings.372 (Robert Doyle notes that many considered the Senate
Committee to have been little more than a "travelling circus" used as
platform by vocal citizen groups across the country.)373 The Committee
reported that one Canadian in four lacked sufficient income to
maintain a basic standard of living374 and that sixty percent of the
poor worked.375 Furthermore, the Committee maintained that only two
percent of those on welfare could be considered to be there on
370 Extract from the Minutes of the Proceedings of the Senate of 
Canada, (October 8, 1970).
371 Special Senate Committee, p. xiii.
372 Members of the Committee met with the poor in their homes and at 
evening gatherings in order to gain a first-hand and personal 
impression. Leman, p. 59.
373 Robert Doyle, 'Canada's Social Security Review', Australian 
Journal of Social Issues'. (February 1978), p. 26.
374 Special Senate Committee, p. xiii.
375 Ibid., p. xv.
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fraudulent terms.376
The Committee condemned the social welfare system in Canada with
its conclusion that,
the social-welfare structure so laboriously and 
painstakingly erected in Canada over the past forty years 
has clearly outlived its usefulness. . . The whole welfare
system, at all levels, costs Canadians more than six billion 
dollars a year, yet it has not significantly alleviated 
poverty, let alone eliminated it.377
With respect to public opinion concerning the poor, it made the
following comment:
The prevalent public attitude to the work ethic has 
engendered a blind refusal to deal with the present 
realities, and a total unwillingness to search for bold and 
courageous solutions. The notion that the poor do not want 
to work can be quickly dispelled. The plain fact is that 
the vast majority of the "working poor” continue to work at 
jobs that pay no more than they would receive on welfare.378
Thereupon, without any reference to the Constitution or
federal-provincial jurisdictional controversy in the area of social
policy,379 the Committee recommended that the Parliament of Canada
enact legislation to provide a guaranteed annual income for all
Canadians.360 The establishment of a guaranteed annual income program
was viewed by the Committee as an idea whose time had come.381
376 Ibid., p. xvii.
377 Ibid., pp. xiii-xv.
378 Ibid., p. xvii.
379 Courchene, p. 356.
380 Special Senate Committee, p. xvi.
381 Ibid., p. 175.
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Before reaching this conclusion the Committee had explored three 
income maintenance approaches:382
(i) reform and expansion of existing income-maintenance 
programs;
(ii) payment of a flat-rate subsidy to all citizens meeting 
simple demographic criteria; and
(iii) a negative income tax system.
The negative income tax approach was considered the most feasible 
because it met three basic requirements:
(i) it would provide adequate income;
(ii) it would preserve the incentive to work; and
(iii) it was fiscally possible.383
The Committee recommended a negative income tax scheme in which the 
income floor would not be allowed to fall below 70 percent of the 
poverty lines it had identified, the tax-back rate would be set at 70 
percent, and implementation would be phased in over a number of years. 
The following table gives the poverty lines and the corresponding 
guaranteed annual income amounts recommended by the Committee.
Recommended Guaranteed Income Levels
Family Unit Size Poverty Line GAI Level
1 $ 2,140 $ 1,500
2 3,570 2,500
3 4,290 3,000
4 5,000 3,500
5 5,710 4,000
6 6,430 4,500
7 7,140 5,000
10 9,290 6,500
Source: Special Senate Committee on Poverty in Canada, 'Poverty in
Canada', p. 179.
382 Ibid., pp. 177-178.
383 Ibid., p. xvi.
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It was the view of the Committee that the adoption of a guaranteed 
annual income would necessarily mean the abolition of much of the 
existing social-welfare system (for example, Family Allowances, Old 
Age Security, and the Canada Assistance Plan) although some form of 
special assistance still would be necessary to meet special needs.384 
It was also expected that those parts of the social security system 
such as Unemployment Insurance, the Canada Pension Plan, and Veterans' 
Allowances with social insurance goals would be retained.385
The Committee estimated that its recommended guaranteed annual 
income program would have cost an additional $655 million in 1967. 
Four factors were considered.386 First, the savings which could be 
realized from the curtailment or elimination of certain social-welfare 
programs. Second, the direct costs of guaranteed annual income 
transfers themselves. Third, the costs incurred by the elimination of 
personal income taxes of those below the poverty line. Fourth was the 
factoring in of the provincial share of social assistance payments.
The Committee noted that it seemed probable that significant 
savings would accrue from the simplification of administration under a 
guaranteed annual income plan. It also pointed out that although 
there was no basis on which such savings could be estimated for 
Canada, in the United States one estimate of savings based on a 
similar proposal was in the order of 40 to 64 percent of existing 
administrative costs.387
384 Ibid., p. xvii.
385 Ibid., p. xvii.
386 Ibid., p. 188.
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3.2.2 Castonquav-Nepveu Report
In 1971 the Quebec Commission of Inquiry on Health and Welfare 
released its report in which the technical means required for the 
devolution of social policy from the federal to the provincial 
government were laid out.388 The Commission took four years 
(1966-1970) to complete its inquiry and the Report totaled seven 
volumes with twenty-eight appendix volumes. The Commission proposed 
nothing less that the restructuring and coordination of a wide range 
of health, social service, manpower training, and income security 
programs in the Province of Quebec.389 Moreover, there was no place in 
the proposals for the federal programs of Old Age Security, Guaranteed 
Income Supplementation, Family Allowances, or even the Canada 
Assistance Plan. The Commission made it clea.r that the Province of 
Quebec wanted near total control over social policy.
The Commission pointed out that with respect to income levels, the 
situation in Quebec had been historically less favourable than in the 
rest of Canada - 28 percent of Quebecers had inadequate income (even 
after the payment of social benefits) in 1961 whereas for Canadians 
generally it was 25 percent.390 Furthermore, it was among breadwinners 
aged 25 to 54 years that the gap between the Quebec situation and that 
of Canada as a whole was the most significant.391 In addition,
387 Ibid., p. 191.
388 Leman, p. 62.
389 Ibid., p. 62.
390 Commission of Inquiry, Vol. 1, p. 33.
391 Ibid., p. 39.
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statistical studies indicated that, in Quebec, income inadequacy was 
strongly related to employment difficulties since the risk of 
unemployment was high.392 The Commission concluded that "poverty in 
Quebec does not result mainly from inability to work but especially 
because of unemployment, insufficient employment and low salaries".393
Hence the Commission emphasized the situation of low-income workers
and the lack of employment incentive in social assistance programs.
The Commission favoured a social assistance system that would both 
make it possible directly to assure sufficient income to the 
chronically unemployed and the unemployed who temporarily could not 
find jobs and, as well, supplement the earnings of the employed who
could not obtain adequate income on the labour market.394 In light of 
these objectives a three-point system was recommended for
consideration:
(i) a general social allowances plan (GSAP), whose role of 
income replacement and complement, not exceeding a 
pre-established level, would be similar in concept to that 
of the guaranteed income supplement for the aged;
(ii) an integrated social insurance plan whose development 
and extension was to be spread over several years and which 
would provide regular labour force participants with basic 
protection in the event an economic or social risk should 
occur (e.g. unemployment); and
(iii) a universal and standard family allowance plan, 
designed to serve as a hinge between the two preceding 
programs and directly meet the needs created exclusively by 
the incidence of family obligations.395
392 Ibid., p. 209.
393 Ibid., p. 57.
394 Ibid., p. 253.
395 Ibid., p. 259.
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The purpose of the GSAP component (which was to replace existing
social assistance programs) was to address situations of inadequate
income for both the employed and the unemployed by providing income
allowances. The allowance would be paid when the income situation of
families or unattached individuals justified it without any
examination of the circumstances giving rise to the situation.396 The
principal assumption underlying this objective was that,
a guarantee of minimum resources is an essential condition 
for participation by each citizen and each family in the 
society in which they live, as well as for the utilization 
of means to develop within it and to subsequently achieve a 
certain degree of development.397
With respect to the GSAP component, the Commission recommended a 
two-tiered approach to guaranteeing income levels. In terms of a 
negative income tax model, the two-tiered approach means setting two 
income guarantees with different tax-back rates. Under the GSAP 
proposal, the first tier would have low guarantee levels and low 
tax-back rates primarily aimed at those with significant earned 
income. The other tier would have high guaranteed income levels and 
high tax-back rates primarily aimed at those with no significant 
earned income. Access to the first tier was to be based on income 
whereas access to the second was to be based on income and, as well, 
whether the potential recipient was thought to be employable.
Under the first tier, the benefit structure was to be related to 
the negative income tax concept in that it would be possible for a 
recipient to combine income and social assistance in such a way that
396 Ibid., p. 262.
397 Commission of Inquiry Volume II, p. 16.
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the amount of assistance would be reduced by only a fraction of other 
income. The basic allowance would be equal to 60 percent of an 
established minimum income level but be taxed back at less than 100 
percent. This benefit structure was considered appropriate for those 
who were expected to find employment or who already had other 
individual resources in that it was intended to provide a strong 
incentive to remain employed.
Those included in the second tier would be eligible for a basic 
allowance which would be relatively high so as to meet the needs of 
unattached persons or families with no earning possibilities either on 
a short-term (one year) or a long-term basis. Other income would be 
subtracted in total from the maximum allowable, that is the tax-back 
rate would be set at 100 percent. This program was thought to be 
appropriate for the unemployable or those experiencing a prolonged 
period of unemployment as a high guaranteed income level in 
combination with a high tax-back rate would allow for an adequate 
transfer to individuals but at the same time keep total costs down.
Despite its apparent similarities to a negative income tax model, 
the GSAP proposal was believed by the Commission to differ from 
negative tax proposals in two significant ways.398 First, the GSAP 
plan would involve administrative mechanisms independent of the 
administration of income tax. Second, the GSAP plan was designed for 
two levels of income guarantee to be related to income characteristics 
and employment possibilities rather than only one guaranteed income 
level for both the employed and unemployed which is typical of
398 Ibid., pp. 271-273.
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negative income tax proposals. In other words, the GSAP was modelled 
as a two-tiered guaranteed annual income approach as opposed to a 
one-tiered approach.
Net costs of between $640 and $720 million were estimated after 
allowing for the fact that there would be changes in the level of 
benefits paid by the Old Age Security and Family Allowance plans, and 
that the GSAP would replace existing social assistance 
expenditures.399
3.2.3 Barber Report
In Manitoba responsibility for the provision of social assistance 
is divided between the Province and its municipalities. The Province 
assumes responsibility for the longer-term cases and the 
municipalities assumes responsibility for shorter-term cases. In the 
early 1970s, Manitoba’s welfare allowances were close to the average 
level provided by the three prairie provinces and near the top among 
all Canadian provinces. There was, however, substantial variation in 
the scale of allowances provided by the municipalities within the 
Province.
In 1972, in response to public concerns about increasing welfare 
costs and program effectiveness, Manitoba commissioned Professor 
Clarence Barber from the University of Manitoba to investigate the 
major aspects of welfare policy in the Province. The objective of the 
Barber Report was to,
399 Ibid., p. 56.
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appraise present welfare policy in the context of the 
complex system of social welfare that exists in Canada . . . 
and to show how and in what way the present system of social 
allowances relates to the overall degree of poverty that 
exists in the Province of Manitoba.400
Barber concluded that much of the criticism directed against the
system of welfare was unjustified:
Contrary to widely repeated charges that the "welfare 
system" in our economy is a mess, a careful examination of 
the evidence gives little support to this thesis. . . . the 
popular "myth" that the typical welfare recipient is an able 
bodied individual with a large family who refuses to work 
because he is better off on welfare has little substance.401
The provincial government agreed with Barber's characterization of the
"myth".402 It believed that the proportion of individuals receiving
welfare who were capable of working and supporting themselves
constituted at most between five and 10 percent of the provincial
caseload.403 The federal government shared this point of view. It
stated that not more than 10 to 20 percent of families receiving
social assistance in Canada would qualify as being able and expected
to work and only a fraction of these could be said to be "abusing the
system".404
One of the most serious weaknesses in the system of welfare in 
Manitoba cited by Barber was its failure to provide adequate 
incentives for recipients to seek and obtain employment either on a
400 Barber, p. 5.
401 Ibid., p. 35.
402 Province of Manitoba, 'Guidelines for the Seventies - Volume 2 
Social Goods and Services', March, 1973, p. 36.
403 Ibid., p. 37.
404 Canada, 'Working Paper on Social Security in Canada', p. 12.
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part- or full-time basis.405 With minor qualifications, the existing 
system provided for a 100 percent tax-back rate on earnings from 
part-time employment, and for full-time ' employment the monetary 
incentives to seek work was likely to be weak or non-existent for 
anyone with three or more dependents.
Barber recommended two alternatives to the Province’s welfare 
system: a guaranteed annual income, and some form of guaranteed
employment.406 With respect to guaranteed annual income, he 
recommended that consideration be given to a two-tier formula similar 
to that proposed in the Castonguay-Nepveu Report.407 Barber was of the 
opinion that a two-tiered guaranteed annual income plan could be 
significantly less costly than a universal, one-tiered plan.
Barber did not recommend that a guaranteed annual income program be 
introduced as a replacement for the whole system of welfare as it 
would not be expected to replace the Canada Pension Plan, the Old Age 
Security, or the Unemployment Insurance Plan.408 Furthermore, a 
guaranteed annual income program was not was not thought to be 
feasible as a complete alternative to the welfare payments made under 
the Canada Assistance Plan as many recipients of a guaranteed annual 
income would require support beyond the income levels provided by 
guaranteed annual income payments. Hence those who would be expected 
to benefit most from a guaranteed annual income would be the employed
405 Ibid., p. 9.
406 Ibid., p. 56.
407 Ibid., p. 9.
408 Ibid., p. 56.
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poor - those individuals who were earning incomes below or just above 
the poverty level.409
Two likely effects that a guaranteed annual income plan would have 
on work effort were noted.410 On the one hand, strong work incentives 
could be expected to encourage potentially employable people receiving 
social assistance to find employment. On the other hand, it could be 
expected that low-income workers eligible for the guaranteed annual 
income supplement might choose to work less. Barber concluded that 
the net effect was unlikely to be large.411
The cost of implementing a guaranteed annual income in Manitoba 
under two sets of income guarantees with a tax-back rate of 50 percent 
was estimated. The following table shows the guaranteed income levels 
proposed for the two plans.
Guaranteed Income Levels 
Size of Family Plan One Plan Two
1 $ 1,600 $ 1,800
2 3,000 3,000
3 3,300 3,600
4 3,600 4,200
5 or more 3,900 4,800
Source: Clarence L. Barber, 'Welfare Policy in Manitoba', 1972, p. 60.
For 1971 the net additional costs over and above existing welfare 
expenditures were estimated to be between $38 to $66 million for Plan 
One, and between $94 and $123 million for Plan Two.412 It was noted by
409 Ibid., p. 58.
410 Ibid., p. 61.
411 Ibid., p. 62.
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Barber that reducing the guarantee level by one-third would result in 
cost savings as high as one-half or two-thirds.
3.3 GOVERNMENT OF CANADA
In 1970 Canada released a White Paper called 'Income Security for
Canadians' for public debate and discussion.413 The challenge posed by
the White Paper was to,
arrive at a renewed affirmation of income security policy 
which will have the effect of assisting the people in 
greatest need, without detracting from programs designed to 
stimulate the economic development which is the basis of 
national well-being.414
The major issue identified was whether or not the existing income
security system should be replaced by a guaranteed annual income
program. Arguments that poverty could be eliminated by the creation
of a single, large guaranteed annual income plan replacing all income
security programs were explored at length. The preferred alternative,
it was stated, was to exploit the existing system in a more effective
manner and in a way which would develop more fully the potential of
existing programs.415
Four major problems with a guaranteed annual income policy were 
identified. First, there was the question of the impact of such a 
policy on the incentive to work. The White Paper suggested that,
412 Ibid., p. 60.
413 Canada, Minister of National Health and Welfare, 'Income Security 
for Canadians', (1970), p. 1.
414 Ibid., p. 1.
415 Ibid., p. 23.
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a great deal of further study and investigation, like the 
experiments now underway in New Jersey and Seattle in the
United States, is needed to find out what effects such a
program would 'have on people’s motivation, on their 
incentives to work and to save. Until these questions are
answered, the fear of its impact on productivity will be the
main deterrent to the introduction of a general overall 
guaranteed income plan.416
Second was the concern that if guaranteed income payments were made
applicable to those normally in the labour force the complexity of
administration (including difficulties in the reporting and
verification of incomes) would be greatly increased.417 Third was a
concern about the potential cost of a guaranteed annual income
program. Using the guaranteed income levels suggested by the Economic
Council of Canada in its brief to the Senate Poverty Committee, and a
tax-back rate of 50 percent, the White Paper estimated the gross costs
for 1971 to be $5 billion with the net (incremental) cost estimated to
be between $2 and $2.6 billion.418 The fourth concern was that
constitutional and jurisdictional problems would make the development
of one comprehensive income security system very difficult.419
Hence the White Paper concluded that the best approach for 
overcoming the deficiencies of the social assistance system did not 
lie in the dismantling of the entire social security system in favour
416 Ibid., p. 25.
417 Ibid., p. 25.
418 Ibid., p. 26.
419 Ibid., p. 17.
In fact, the White Paper stated that: "The development of one
comprehensive income security system is not possible under these 
[federal] circumstances. This would be possible in a unitary 
state". Ibid., p. 17.
130
of one, overall guaranteed annual income program.420 Instead it was 
proposed that the best approach was to revise each of the four 
instruments of income security policy - demogrants (universal 
programs), social insurance, guaranteed income for the elderly, and 
social assistance - to redirect their emphasis and scope and to seek 
the combination that would best meet basic income security 
objectives.421 Surprisingly, however, the White Paper recommended that 
the selective use of the guaranteed income concept be extended beyond 
its current use as a means of supplementing the incomes of pensioners, 
and that the development of the guaranteed income technique as a major 
anti-poverty policy be pursued.422
In 1973 the federal government presented its 'Working Paper on 
Social Security in Canada' as a starting point for the Social Security 
Review.423 The proposals contained in the Working Paper became the 
subject of the most intensive federal-provincial consultations ever 
attempted in Canada.424 Leman has referred to the Social Security 
Review as a "massive experiment in federal-provincial 
policymaking".425
420 Ibid., p. 2.
421 Ibid., p. 27.
422 Ibid., p. 2.
423 Canada, Minister of National Health and Welfare, 'Working Paper on 
Social Security in Canada', (1973).
424 Leman, p. 113.
425 Ibid., p. 113.
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The White Paper noted the following deficiencies in Canada's social 
security system:
(i) full employment cannot always be achieved;
(ii) the income of people who are employed often is 
inadequate to meet family needs;
(iii) there is too little - in some cases, virtually no - 
incentive to get off social assistance;
(iv) differing levels of assistance are available to 
families who have similar needs but who are in differing 
circumstances (e.g. working at minimum wage, in a training 
program, on social assistance);
(v) problems concerning the interrelationship between income 
support plans and social insurance plans;
(vi) the income security system was a "patchwork quilt" of 
programs without adequate coordination; and
(vii) there was the problem of the stigma associated with 
social assistance.426
It listed the basic values the federal government believed (or wished
to believe) Canadians shared regarding social security policy:
(i) a belief in the independence (or self dependence) of the 
individual - it was expected that individuals would meet 
their own needs through their own efforts to the extent 
possible;
(ii) interdependence - that when it comes to people who are 
unable or are not expected to work that those able to work 
will contribute to their care; and
(iii) that there is a need for equity in distributing the
benefits of a growing country.427
The following principles were proposed as a guide for the review of
Canada's social security system:
(i) the social security system must assure to people who
cannot work, the aged, and the blind a compassionate and
equitable guaranteed annual income;
426 Canada, 'Working Paper on Social Security in Canada', pp. 6-11.
427 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
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(ii) the social security system as it applies to people who 
can work must contain incentives to work and a greater 
emphasis on the need to get people who are on social 
assistance back to work;
(iii) a fair and just relationship must be maintained 
between the incomes of people who are working at or near the 
minimum wage, the guaranteed incomes assured to people who 
cannot work, and the allowances paid to those who can work 
but are unemployed;
(iv) the Provinces may wish to have the structures of social 
security vary in accordance with social needs, income 
standards and the cost of living in different communities; 
and
(v) the consideration of Canada's social security system 
must be conducted jointly by the Federal Government and the 
Provinces.4 2a
The Working Paper made it clear that the federal government 
rejected the idea that the social security system should be designed 
on the assumption that the "work ethic" was dead. It stated that 
Canadians had not come to the conclusion that everyone should be given 
a choice as to whether to work or not, and be paid whatever that 
choice might be. The federal government was firmly of the view that 
income guarantees or supplements should not be offered at such levels 
that might impair willingness to work.429
This concern notwithstanding, two situations were described in 
which people who are working may need to have their family income 
supplemented.430 First, when due to family size employment earnings 
were insufficient to support the family. Second, when it was
428 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
429 Khalid Sayeed, 'Politics and administration of poverty programs in 
affluent societies', Canadian Public Administration. (Summer
1975), p. 310.
430 Canada, 'Working Paper on Social Security in Canada', p. 21.
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impossible, or perhaps undesirable, to relocate people with 
insufficient employment income to areas where they would be able to 
find jobs.
Two measures were recommended as part of the effort to provide
income assistance to the poor whether employed or unemployed.431
First, that there be a substantial increase in Family Allowances.
Second, a system of income support and supplementation was outlined.
For those not expected to work a support program was proposed that
would provide for fairly high support payments but with little
incentives to work - a 75 percent tax-back rate was a common figure in
early discussions.432 For the employed poor, an income supplementation
plan was proposed which would provide for lower income payments but
very favourable work incentive measures - most proposals had the
tax-back rate under 40 percent.433 Such a plan,
would not pretend to provide a 'guaranteed income1 
sufficient to support people who are not working and/or had 
no income; it would be designed instead to provide an 
acceptable minimum income when combined with private or 
family earnings (income).434
The supplement available under such a plan would provide a continuing
incentive to increase employment earnings by reducing the supplement
by only a proportion of earned income.435
431 Ibid., p. 22.
432 Leman, p. 114.
433 Ibid., p. 114.
434 Canada, 'Working Paper on Social Security in Canada', p. 22.
435 Ibid., p. 23.
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It was proposed that the income supplementation levels for the 
employed be set by the individual provinces with federal cost-sharing 
so long as the income levels met national minimums and norms. The 
National Council on Welfare considered this strategy to be an 
exceedingly important innovation as it had the potential to be the 
long-sought solution to the jurisdictional impasse which had blocked 
previous income security initiatives.436 The provinces would be given 
the power to vary the levels subject to three conditions:
(i) the provinces would be bound to observe the minimum 
standards set by the Parliament of Canada in respect of the 
income support programs administered or financed by the 
Government of Canada;
(ii) the provinces would not be free to use this flexibility 
in such a way as to increase net federal payments to any 
province beyond what would have been paid under the ’’program 
norms" legislated by Parliament to determine total federal 
contributions to the program; and
(iii) the provinces would be required to contribute to the 
social security system the amount they would otherwise have 
contributed prior to any changes in the system, and before 
any changes in the levels of federal allowances or income 
support payments under any new "flexibility formula".437
It was believed by the federal government that this approach, 
encompassing the two propositions of "provincial flexibility" and 
"national minimum standards", represented a major constitutional 
innovation.438 As the Minister of National Health and Welfare stated, 
one of the objectives of the Social Security Review was to resolve the 
deep differences which had developed over how responsibility for 
social security measures should be divided between the federal
436 National Council of Welfare, 'Incomes and Opportunities', 
(November 1973), p. 42.
437 Canada, 'Working Paper on Social Security in Canada', p. 27.
438 Ibid., p. 28.
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government and the provinces.439 It was clearly the central problem of 
national unity which dictated the federal-provincial strategy as laid 
out in the Working Paper.440
Hence by 1973 Canada was of the opinion that a two-tiered 
guaranteed annual income program could be an effective weapon used 
against poverty and therefore was sympathetic to such proposals.441 
What the federal government favoured, to reiterate, was a plan in 
which recipients would be categorized according to 
employability/unemployability with a full guaranteed income for the 
latter group (basically social assistance) and income supplementation 
(at a rate less than what would be required for a livelihood) for the 
former. As Leman notes, these proposals were strikingly similar to 
the two-tier plan advanced in the Castonguay-Nepveu report in 1971 
since that report had emphasized the need to have separate plans for 
the unemployable and the employable.442 Furthermore, besides being a 
means of deflecting Quebec's expected argument that the federal system 
could not accommodate its preferences in this area, this two-tiered 
proposal was more likely than a unitary scheme to give the federal 
government a direct role in administration.443 Thus the federal 
government sought, through the proposals in the Working Paper to 
maintain the prerogative with respect to discussions of income
439 Minister, National Health and Welfare, 'Notes for an Address to 
the Canadian Tax Foundation', (November 20, 1973).
440 Sayeed, p. 311.
441 Minister, National Health and Welfare, Debate in the House of 
Commons, (March 19, 1974).
442 Leman, p. 67.
443 Ibid., p. 68.
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security options.
Given the federal preference for guaranteed annual income measures
that separate the unemployable from the unemployable, it is not
surprising to find the Minister of National Health and Welfare state
in 1973 that a guaranteed income plan which would give Canadians a
choice whether to work or not to work would not be consistent with the
values of the vast majority of Canadians.444 In 1974 the Minister had
this to say about a general, one-tiered approach:
Such an approach would be very costly indeed, at the income 
levels involved, and would impose a considerable pressure to 
adjust the tax system. Even more important, it could well
imply a significant shift in our social priorities, 
involving as it might turn out to do, a shift away from our 
current policy of providing more assistance to those people 
who are least able to help themselves. We would have to ask 
whether such a change in social priorities would, in fact, 
be involved, and whether it would be consistent with the
values and standards held in the community today.445
He further stated that, with respect to the unemployed, the answer was
to find employment opportunities rather than guaranteeing an income.
On January 11, 1973, the Minister stated in a speech to Parliament
that one of the corner-stones of social security policy was employment
at a decent rate of pay for those who could work.446
Thus Canada consistently expressed serious reservations about a 
one-tiered guaranteed annual income program because of the potential
444 Minister, 'Address to the Canadian Tax Foundation', (November 20, 
1973).
445 Minister, National Health and Welfare, 'Notes for an Address to 
the Canadian Conference on Social Welfare', (June 18, 1974).
446 Minister, National Health and Welfare, Speech in the House of 
Commons on the Subject of Canada's Social Security Policy, 
(January 11, 1973).
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impact on the incentive to work and the cost.447 This reservation 
seemed to preclude the development of a universal guaranteed annual 
income program offering employables enough to live on in the absence 
of any earned income - the very kind of universal and non-categorized 
negative income tax program tested by the Mincome Manitoba 
experiment.448
3.4 GOVERNMENT OF MANITOBA
In November, 1970, the social democratic Government of Manitoba 
stated that it viewed poverty "as a function of the dispersion range 
in the distribution of both wealth and power in today’s society".449 
An attack on poverty was not simply considered to be a matter of 
providing sufficient income (whether considered in relative or 
absolute terms) but, as well, a question of the manner or the process 
by which sufficient income was provided.
Hence Manitoba presented its anti-poverty proposals in the context 
of an "overall social developmental" approach which was to encompass 
all government departments in an attempt to redistribute power as well 
as income. Manitoba believed that a guaranteed annual income program 
should only be one element in such an approach:
447 Winnipeg Free Press, 'A Sensitive Social Assistance Experiment', 
February 25, 1974.
448 Director, Manitoba Minimum Annual Income Project, memorandum to 
the Secretary, Cabinet Planning Secretariat, December 3, 1974.
449 Manitoba Health and Social Services, 'A Social Development 
Approach to Poverty1, A brief to the Special Senate Committee on 
Poverty by the Government of Manitoba, November 4, 1970.
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By itself, it is not a remedy for poverty; it is not even 
sufficient, on its own, to fully assist those presently 
caught in the poverty cycle. To suggest that the G.A.I. is 
an effective solution to the poverty problem would be 
irresponsible and dangerous. It would be irresponsible in 
that it could delay the adoption of a much needed, 
comprehensive social development framework for government 
programming and decision-making at all levels; it would be 
dangerous because it could arouse false hopes and ultimately 
result in frustration and disappointment.450
Rather, the Manitoba Minister of Health and Social Services testifying
before the Senate Special Committee on Poverty, stated that "we must
now develop a new approach which deals directly with the root social
causes of poverty. This will require changing the structure and
operation of the existing social order11.451 Nevertheless when asked if
he would put into force a guaranteed annual income program if he
could, the Minister replied, "Definitely".452
By July, 1971, Manitoba appeared to be significantly more
sympathetic to the possibilities of a guaranteed annual income
program. When asked about the proposed Mincome Manitoba experiment
the Premier stated: "We are definitely committed to the idea of
trying out such a project and I'm quite optimistic we will".453 In
September, 1971, he stated that:
In the field of income security - which I stress is but part 
of the overall approach to social development - one of the 
most promising approaches appears to be the establishment of
450 Manitoba Health and Social Services, 'A Social Development 
Approach to Poverty'.
451 Testimony of the Manitoba Minister, Health and Social Services, 
'Proceedings of the Special Senate Committee, on Poverty', 
November, 4, 1970.
452 Ibid.
453 Winnipeg Tribune, 'Schreyer outlines guaranteed annual income 
test', July 10, 1971.
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a guaranteed annual income, a G.A.I.454
Manitoba took the position that if the cost proved to be too high, 
or if it was found on scientific investigation not to work for some 
reason, then the Province would not proceed with the plan. The 
Premier stated that he was firmly convinced of the need "to 
systematically and scientifically test and probe and weigh the 
evidence in a scientific way to determine just what a guaranteed 
annual income is likely to do" and, depending on how the test worked 
out, "either adopt a guaranteed annual income or else put it to rest 
for all time".455
Manitoba considered it to be the responsibility of the federal 
government to provide adequate funding if a guaranteed annual income 
program was to be implemented.
3.5 SOCIAL SECURITY REVIEW
In November, 1972, at the Conference of Welfare Ministers the 
provinces joined in insisting that a federal-provincial conference be 
called to consider the means by which the social security system in 
Canada could be restructured and rationalized.456 Or, as Doyle has put 
it:
454 Premier of Manitoba, Speech to the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, Winnipeg, Manitoba, September, 1971.
455 Winnipeg Tribune, 'Schreyer looks at his three-year record1, July 
15, 1972.
456 Johnson, 'Canada's Social Security Review 1973-1975: The Central
Issues', p. 457.
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This conference turned out to be a tirade against the 
federal government's intrusions into provincial 
jurisdictions - with ill conceived programs that were 
neither coordinated with one another nor with provincial 
programs. The frustration of provincial politicians, even 
in those from provinces in which the Liberal Party held 
power, had reached an all time high.457
It was the view of the provinces that the federal government had been
taking a far too unilateral approach to social policy-making whereby
it would secretly formulate policies to which the provinces would then
be asked to "react”.458 Thus there was deep and growing resentment on
the part of the provinces over what was perceived to be federal
intrusion into provincial jurisdiction with what were felt to be
ill-conceived and unco-ordinated social programs.459
Other factors and events also played an important role: indeed,
"almost no one was content with the current system - doing nothing, 
maintaining the status quo, did not seem to be a viable 
alternative".460 First, the "War on Poverty" programs in the United 
States and increasing pressure by influential organizations concerned 
with social policy was making welfare reform in Canada a prominent 
public issue.461 Second, for at least a decade prior to 1975,
457 Doyle, p. 27.
456 Ibid., p. 27.
459 Hum and Simpson, p. 43.
Moreover, as Hum and Simpson note: "Provincial dissatisfaction was 
fueled by the federal government's unilateral changes to
unemployment insurance in 1971 and its proposed reform of family
allowances", p. 43.
460 Federal-Provincial Social Security Review, 'Background Paper on
Income Support and Supplementation', Prepared by Officials of the 
Federal-Provincial Working Party on Income Maintenance, Published 
under the Authority of the Federal-Provincial Conference of
Ministers of Welfare, February, 1975, p. ii.
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expenditures on social programs in Canada had been increasing at a 
considerably faster rate than either the gross national product or 
government spending. For example, between 1965 and 1975 the increase 
in spending for the nine social programs studied by Michele Bergeron 
was fivefold while GNP only tripled and overall government spending 
quadrupled.462 Finally, after the 1972 general election the Liberals 
ended up with only two more seats in the House of Commons than the 
Progressive Conservatives with the NDP holding the balance of power. 
Hence the minority Liberal government agreed, at least informally, to 
review social policy and particularly to expand demogrant programs as 
partial return for the support of the New Democratic Party.463 The NDP 
decided to sustain the Liberals in office in the expectation that they 
would be able to extract a number of policy concessions.464
It was not, however, only because the provinces were clamoring for 
a review, or that there was a general and widespread belief that the 
social assistance system was in need of serious reform, that prompted 
the federal government to initiate the Social Security Review. In 
fact the "impetus for the review in 1973 was not an overriding concern 
about the lack of progress in redistributing income nor was it due to 
escalating costs or a welfare backlash".465 According to Doern and 
Phidd the only backlash in Canada was over the generosity of changes
461 Ibid., p. 27.
462 Bergeron, p. 4.
463 R.J. Van Loon, 'Reforming Welfare in Canada: The Case of the
Social Security Review', Public Policy. (1979), p. 475.
464 Christian and Campbell, p. 229.
465 Doern and Phidd, p. 368.
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made to unemployment insurance in 1971.466 Rather, as Richard Van Loon 
points out, a major factor motivating the federal government was the 
collapse in the summer of 1971 of a major attempt to rewrite and 
"patriate" the BNA Act.467 A series of federal-provincial meetings 
from 1968 to 1971 had led to basic agreement between the Premiers and 
the Prime Minister respecting the patriation, an amending formula, and 
a Bill of Rights which collectively came to be known as the "Victoria 
Charter". The Charter was, however, unexpectedly rejected by the 
Quebec Cabinet a few days later on the grounds that it failed to 
provide for jurisdictional settlement in the field of social policy, 
and control of social policy had become fundamental to the Quebec 
government's determination to acquire the powers needed to foster a 
strong French culture in North America.468 The result "was much 
discontent in federal-provincial relations after the Victoria 
conference".469 This discontent on the part of the provinces was 
further exacerbated by major changes made by the federal government in 
1971 to the Unemployment Insurance program and in Ottawa's 1971-72 
proposal to change family allowances from a demogrant to a 
means-tested program, both made without consultation with the 
provincial governments.470
466 Ibid., p. 368.
467 Van Loon, p. 473.
468 Ibid., p. 474.
469 Hum and Simpson, p. 43.
470 Doern and Phidd, p. 369.
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In fact, Prime Minister Trudeau did not appear much interested in 
social policy in general or income security reform in particular until 
Quebec scuttled the Victoria Charter over the issue of social policy. 
However:
The foundering of the Victoria Charter over income security 
- of all things - changed Pierre Trudeau's view on the 
subject. Because it had proven capable of scuttling such 
truly important matters, it was something which had to be 
fixed.471
Shortly thereafter, Marc Lalonde, a close associate of Trudeau's who 
had been his primary policy secretary during the years of the 
Constitutional Review,472 became the Minister of National Health and 
Welfare. One of his first duties was to resolve the jurisdictional 
differences with the provinces in general and Quebec in particular 
over social policy in order to facilitate a process of constitutional 
negotiation and change. In short, as Van Loon points out, "the Social 
Security Review was initiated in an environment where welfare programs 
were in many respects a surrogate for broader political issues, a 
situation that left the reform process very much open to control by 
larger political and social forces".473
471 Leonard Shifrin, 'Income Security: The Rise and Fall of the
Federal Role', in Canadian Social Welfare Policy, ed. Jacqueline
S. Ismael, (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 1985), p. 24.
472 Leman, p. 66.
473 Van Loon, p. 475.
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3.5.1 Strategy
Thus in the Throne Speech of January 4, 1973, Canada announced its
intention to initiate a joint federal-provincial review of the social
security system. On January 11, 1973, the Minister of National Health
and Welfare stated that Canada was,
proposing that social security be recognized by Parliament 
as one of the two top domestic priorities, and that the 
federal and provincial governments should set about, now, to 
review and revise the system so as to reflect in it more 
adequately the values and the goals of the Canadian 
people.474
The Prime Minister and his Minister of National Health and Welfare 
"promised to make the Social Security Review a truly comprehensive 
one, harmonizing and possibly even combining separate programs for 
social assistance, social services, social insurance, demogrants, and 
manpower programs".475 The Minister of National Health and Welfare
stated that it was important to have the courage to undertake major 
policy reviews and substantial policy revisions.476 The federal 
government did note, however, that it did not wish the launching of 
the Review to be taken as a sign that Canada's social security system 
was "fundamentally unsound and in need of total transformation".477
The Review was begun in April, 1973, with the tabling of the
federal government's 'Working Paper on Social Security in Canada'. 
There was agreement among the provincial Welfare Ministers that the 
suggestions contained in the Working Paper formed an appropriate basis
474 Minister, 'Speech to the House of Commons'.
475 Leman, p. 115.
476 Minister, 'Speech to the House of Commons'.
477 Canada, 'Working Paper on Social Security in Canada', p. 2.
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for the Review.478 The scope of the Social Security Review was stated:
We have sought in developing our proposals, to comprehend 
the whole sweep of social security policy and to develop a 
comprehensive, logical, and hopefully imaginative approach 
to this field. We have sought, too, to exercise our 
ingenuity in finding new, and if necessary radical, 
federal-provincial or constitutional arrangements, in order 
to achieve the kind of integrated social security system 
which will best serve the needs of the Canadian people.479
The primary objective of Canada’s social security system was
described:
The central, though by no means the sole, objective of
social security in Canada is an acceptable basic income for 
all Canadians - whether that income comes through 
employment, if a person is able to work, or through pensions 
or allowances if a person is unable or not expected to work.
For a basic income is essential if a person is to live in 
decency and in dignity.480
The necessity of an adequate and acceptable income for all Canadians
was emphasized:
But the starting point for all of this must certainly be an 
acceptable basic income. Without this, any person, any 
family, is seriously handicapped from the beginning. This, 
then, will be the focal point of this Working Paper: how
best to achieve the objective of security of income for all 
Canadians.4 81
The emphasis on an adequate income was, of course, to be expected for 
as the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development 
Prospects for Canada notes: "The provision of an adequate income to
all citizens is perhaps the goal most commonly associated with modern 
income-security systems, and virtually all transfer programs address
478 National Council of Welfare, 'Guide to the Guaranteed Income', 
(March 1976), p. 28.
479 Canada, 'Working Paper on Social Security in Canada', p. 2.
480 Ibid., p. 3.
481 Ibid., p. 3.
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it to some degree".482
Five general strategies were proposed concerning employment, social 
insurance, income supplementation, social services, and 
federal-provincial relations. It was anticipated that the policy
review component of the undertaking would be completed within two
years. In several speeches the Minister of National Health and
Welfare spoke of the work of the Social Security Review being 
completed by the summer of 1976 - he hoped that agreement could be 
reached on the details of support/supplementation by that time.483
The Review was conducted under the political direction of the
provincial Ministers of Welfare and the federal Minister of National 
Health and Welfare organized as the Federal-Provincial Conference of 
Ministers of Welfare.484 Between 1973 and 1976 there were eight 
full-dress, two-day meetings of the Ministers of Welfare.485 
Responsibility for the organization and supervision of the technical 
and policy work was assigned to their Deputy Ministers serving as the 
Continuing Committee on Social Security. The Continuing Committee met 
formally at least ten times and informally six times.486
482 Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects 
for Canada, Volume Two, p. 774.
483 National Council of Welfare, p. 36.
484 Doyle, p. 29.
485 Leman, p. 113.
486 Ibid., p. 113.
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Three Working Parties on Employment, Social Services, and Income 
Maintenance reported to the Continuing Committee. The Working Party 
on Income Maintenance was directed to consider the issues involved in 
the development of more adequate social insurance programs, and in the 
provision of income support and supplementation.487 The Working Party 
on Income Maintenance held more than twenty-five meetings across 
Canada.488
3.5.2 Guaranteed Income
Income support and supplementation issues were the most important 
and controversial aspects of the Review. With respect to income 
security, the Ministers of Welfare first focused their attention on 
the income needs of two particular groups - those 65 years of age and 
over, and larger families whose income from employment was considered 
to be inadequate.489 Almost immediately it was proposed by Canada and 
accepted by the provinces that universal Old Age Security pensions and 
Family Allowances be increased. On January 1, 1974, Family Allowances 
were raised and later in the year the federal government passed 
amendments to the Canada Pension Plan which increased both 
contribution levels and benefits paid under the Plan.
487 Canada, Federal-Provincial Conference of Ministers of Welfare, 
Federal-Provincial Social Security Review: Background Paper on 
Income Support and Supplementation', (Prepared by officials of the 
Federal-Provincial Working Party on Income Maintenance and 
published under the authority of The Federal-Provincial Conference 
of Ministers of Welfare, 1975), Preface.
488 Leman, p. 113.
489 Johnson, 'Canada's Social Security Review 1973-1975: The Central
Issues', p. 461.
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Thereafter, the Ministers of Welfare turned their attention to the 
development of a general guaranteed income system for people under 65 
years of age. At this juncture a number of provincial governments 
were committed to, or at least seriously interested in, the 
possibilities of a guaranteed annual income.490 The Ministers of 
Welfare, therefore, initially agreed that a guaranteed or minimum 
income system, in combination with the higher family allowances, 
potentially could replace existing social assistance plans.491 In 
November, 1974, the Ministers agreed to limit their consideration of 
possible mechanisms for guaranteeing incomes to three options:
(i) a single guaranteed income program based on the negative 
income tax which would cover both the working poor and the 
non-working poor - such a program was referred to as the 
unitary system and was favoured by the New Democratic 
governments of British Columbia, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan;
(ii) a two-tiered program with one part (called the support 
program) for those who could not be expected to work and the 
other (called the supplementation program) for those who 
were working but whose wage income was inadequate for their 
families' needs; and
(iii) a two-tiered program similar to the one described 
above but with the supplementation program delivered through 
the income tax system.492
The Ministers of Welfare instructed their officials to carry out
detailed studies of these options.
Eventually the idea of a single, one-tiered guaranteed annual 
income program to replace all existing programs was rejected by the 
federal government and most of the provinces, but there appeared to be
490 Banting, p. 75.
491 Johnson, 'Canada's Social Security Review 1973-1975: The Central
Issues', p. 461.
492 National Council of Welfare, p. 30.
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general agreement respecting a two-tiered system.493 Decisions as to 
the financing of the program, the delivery of the income supplements, 
the operational design of the system, its harmonization with social 
insurance plans, and the timing of its introduction were postponed to 
the operational or implemention stage of the Review.494 Thus the 
Ministers of Welfare abandoned the notion that one "omnibus” 
guaranteed annual income program could do away with the great mixture 
of federal and provincial income security programs.495
Given that one "of the most difficult questions for Canadians to 
face in dealing with reform of the income-security system is whether 
or not to provide, for employable persons, benefits other than those 
provided by Unemployment Insurance",496 it is not surprising that a 
majority of the Ministers of Welfare rejected the idea of single 
guaranteed income system as a replacement for all existing programs. 
The following reasons were given for taking this decision.497 First, 
and most simply, a single new program was thought to be found 
practical as an immediate goal and would, moreover, have resulted in
493 Johnson, 'Canada's Social Security Review 1973-1975: The Central 
Issues', p. 459.
The National Council of Welfare favoured a single guaranteed 
annual income program for all. It stated that the idea of a two 
category, two program approach raises concern because of the 
unfortunate history of categorical programs in the welfare field - 
a history of rigid definitions of categories rigidly applied. 
National Council on Welfare, 'Incomes and Opportunities', p. 41.
494 Ibid., p. 463.
495 Doyle, p. 35.
496 Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects 
for Canada, Volume Two, p. 778.
497 Johnson, 'Canada's Social Security Review 1973-1975: The Central
Issues', pp. 464-466.
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delays in the immediate reforms which were thought to be required in 
the social security system.498
Second, there was the fact that social insurance plans were in 
place in Canada and people were unlikely to accept the dissolution of 
these plans in favour of some unknown plan. Third, and perhaps most 
important, was the fundamental issue of the place of the work ethic in 
the social security system. In fact, ideological differences among 
the provinces and the federal government fueled a protracted argument 
as to whether a one-tier or two-tier approach was better.499 This 
argument was, in essence, about the nature, role, and importance of 
the work ethic in the social, economic, and political life of the 
country.
The concern with the role of the work ethic and the protracted 
debate as to whether a one-tiered or two-tiered approach was better 
eventually resulted in a majority of the Ministers of Welfare agreeing 
that an employment strategy (income through employment) should be the 
first priority in reforming the social security system. Two reasons 
were given.500 First, it was believed that the provision of productive 
employment (where and when possible) was preferred to income 
supplementation by the vast majority of people on social assistance. 
Second, it was believed that the community at large wanted a social 
security system which placed emphasis on making employment available, 
not one which emphasized making social assistance more easily
498 Leman, p. 116.
499 Banting, p. 75.
500 Johnson, 'Canada's Social Security Review 1973-1975: The Central 
Issues', pp. 464-466.
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available. It was thought that the evidence of a "welfare backlash" 
across the country substantiated this view. Leman suggests that by 
1972 events in the provinces reflected an emerging welfare backlash 
that "even found its way to socialist Manitoba"501 although, as noted 
earlier, Doern and Phidd have suggested otherwise.502
3.5.3 Failure
Although the Ministers of Welfare had come to the conclusion that 
the introduction of one "omnibus" program in place of all other 
programs was not feasible, they could not agree as to what a more 
limited, two-tiered guaranteed income program should look like. The 
federal government continued to press for a two-tiered program that 
would separate the employed from the unemployed and treat each as two 
sets of beneficiaries separated into different programs.503 The 
Province of Quebec also preferred a two-tiered program that treated 
the employed and the unemployed differently but wanted all recipients 
to be part of the same program to be administered by the provinces. 
The NDP provinces, on the other hand, continued to support a unitary 
scheme, while the Province of Ontario preferred the alternative of a 
tax credit approach.504 Some of the smaller and poorer provinces 
wondered if they would be able to afford any of the approaches being 
discussed.505
501 Leman, p. 64.
502 Doern and Phidd, p. 368.
503 Leman, p. 69.
504 Ibid., p. 123.
505 Ibid., p. 118.
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Then in February, 1975, the federal government announced that it 
would agree to fund only the two-tier support-supplementation 
approach. Furthermore, it indicated that it wanted the implementation 
of the supplementation component of the agreed upon two-tiered 
approach delayed. The request by the Minister of National Health and 
Welfare to Cabinet for an immediate commitment of funds for a new 
support and supplementation scheme was opposed by the Minister of 
Finance and members of the Treasury Board.506 As well, and fatally, 
the federal government proposed that it share in the administration of 
the supplementation program (once implemented) depending upon the 
level of government the recipient had been dealing with prior to 
receiving a supplementation payment. A press release issued at the 
end of the conference which summarized the agreements reached by the 
federal and provincial ministers seemed to indicate general agreement 
by the provinces to the federal proposals.507
However, at the next meeting of Ministers in April, 1975, responses 
by the provinces demonstrated considerable disagreement and 
dissatisfaction with the federal proposals. Nearly all the provinces, 
and particularly Quebec, spoke out in strong terms against what it 
perceived as yet again an intrusion of the federal government into 
areas that were the exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces.508 The 
three province with NDP governments - British Columbia, Manitoba, and 
Saskatchewan - all reiterated their opposition to treating employed
506 Ibid., p. 122.
507 Doyle, p. 33, and Leman, p. 123.
508 Leman, p. 124.
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and unemployed people differently509 and insisted that they had never 
firmly agreed to a two-tiered system. There were also strong 
objections to the proposed delay in the supplementation component, and 
some provinces objected to the idea of the provincial governments 
having to contribute towards a supplementation program that would 
involve the federal government in its administration.510
Although the federal government offered major concessions in both 
the cost-sharing arrangements and in the area of jurisdiction at the 
eighth and final meeting of the Ministers of Welfare held in June, 
1976, only seven of the ten provinces agreed "in principle" to the 
proposal.511 New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island reserved 
judgement, Ontario rejected the proposals outright, Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba argued that the plan should give more to the employed poor, 
and "virtually all the provinces were uneasy about the costs".512 
Indeed, only the provinces of Quebec and British Columbia expressed 
wholehearted support for the the federal government's proposals.
Thereafter, in a last desperate attempt to salvage something from 
the income security component of the Review, the Minister of National 
Health and Welfare declared that the federal government was willing to 
accord the provinces a full degree of flexibility with respect to the 
timing and phase-in of implementation. However, by 1977, even the 
possibility of implementing something piecemeal had faded largely
509 Ibid., p. 117.
510 Doyle, p. 34.
511 Leman, p. 128
512 Ibid., p. 128.
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because by this time so few provinces were willing to consider further
proposals.513 In the end, even the mild proposals proposed by the
federal government "were flatly rejected by Ontario and deferred by 
several other provinces, dashing the fondest hopes of social reformers 
in the 1970s."514
Many observers, such as Bergeron, would argue that in the end the
Social Security Review had very little impact on Canada's social
security system. He cites three reasons as to why the Social Security 
Review ultimately failed.515 First, the decision early in the Review 
to increase Family Allowances substantially pre-empted new funds that 
would have been required to implement a new income support and 
supplementation package. Second, the inability of the Review
participants to integrate provincial income maintenance programs with 
federal pension and unemployment insurance programs meant that no 
financial leeway could be generated through a rationalization of 
existing programs. Third, the rise of inflation to crisis 
proportions, and the general economic stagnation of the mid-1970s, 
combined to reduce the desire of all governments to undertake 
significant new social program expenditures. Indeed, by the mid-1970s 
the diffuse consensus that had sustained the expansion of social 
programs during the 1950s and 1960s had clearly weakened.516
513 Leman, p. 131.
514 Banting, p. 75.
515 Bergeron, p. 3.
516 Banting, p. 185.
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Others, such as Doyle, suggest that the Review was at least a 
qualified success in that some accomplishments could be identified. 
He lists the following: it assisted both the federal and provincial
governments to recognize and operationalize the interdependency of 
their action in the field of social security and welfare where they 
have joint responsibilities; it had educational effects, especially on 
politicians and public servants; it reaffirmed what many planners have 
always taken for granted - the incremental nature of most planned 
change effort; it came face to face with the lack of a data base for 
projections of program impact, both for cost and administration; and 
it brought to the fore the issue of the need for continuous citizen 
education and input into the process of reviewing highly technical 
programs such as those of social security.517
Still others, such as Van Loon, maintain that from "many 
perspectives the Review was not a failure, even if its "rational" 
plans were not implemented in the time allotted".518 Van Loon points 
out that the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans were significantly
altered, the levels and escalation rules for Old Age Security and the
Guaranteed Income Supplement were revised, and the level and basic 
structures of the Family Allowance Programs were fundamentally 
changed. Furthermore, in his opinion, it is important to note that 
one of the fundamental reasons for the Review was to improve
federal-provincial relations in the social-policy field and in this 
the Review succeeded.519 Banting, however, is of the opinion that
517 Doyle, pp. 36-37.
518 Van Loon, p. 501.
519 Ibid., p. 502.
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federal-provincial conflict was one of the major factors that doomed 
proposals for the restructuring of the income security system through 
the Social Security Review.520
520 Banting, p. 211.
Chapter IV
THE MINCOME MANITOBA EXPERIMENT
In June, 1971, Manitoba indicated an interest in the feasibility of a 
guaranteed annual income program.521 On September 9, 1971, the Premier 
stated:
The Government of Manitoba is committed to launching a pilot 
project - strictly on an experimental basis, in designated 
urban and rural areas - to determine if the concept of GAI 
can be translated into effective action.522
Eight days later Canada announced a program to cover 75 percent of the
cost of guaranteed annual income experiments based on the concept of
the negative income tax and jointly conducted with the provinces.
In June, 1972, Manitoba hired a University of Winnipeg professor 
specializing in political behaviour to begin recruiting staff and 
collecting information about guaranteed annual income experiments 
undertaken in the United States.523 In July, 1972, technical 
discussions began between Manitoba and Canada concerning a guaranteed 
annual income experiment in Manitoba.524
521 Province of Manitoba, 'Proposal for a Guaranteed Annual Income 
Experiment', Prepared by: The Manitoba Minimum Annual Income
Project, March 2, 1973, p. 1.
522 Premier of Manitoba, Speech to the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, September 9, 1971.
523 Dauphin Herald, 'Dauphin headquarters for minimum income study', 
November 14, 1973.
524 Province of Manitoba, 'Proposal for a Guaranteed Annual Income 
Experiment', p. 3.
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In March, 1973, Manitoba submitted a formal proposal to Canada 
suggesting that a guaranteed annual income experiment be jointly 
conducted in the Province. The submission by Manitoba coincided with 
the initiation by Canada of the joint federal-provincial review of 
Canada's social security system. In April, 1973, approval in 
principle to undertake jointly a guaranteed annual income experiment 
in the Province of Manitoba was announced by the two governments.525
In September, 1973, planning for the experiment was begun by 
officials from both governments. Although the experiment was to be 
conducted by officials of the two governments, efforts were made to 
include academics and experts from outside of government in the design 
and research effort. On June 4, 1974, both governments signed a
formal agreement commiting each to joint participation in the 
experiment. The original agreement was subsequently amended on April 
28, 1976, May 2, 1977, and March 10, 1978. Although the experiment
was scheduled to end in December, 1978, the termination date was 
extended to March 31, 1979.
Funding of the experiment was shared with Canada assuming 75 
percent and Manitoba 25 percent of the costs. A final statement of 
total experiment expenditures (audited by the Provincial Auditor of 
Manitoba) was to accompany the final report to be submitted to the 
Experiment Committee by January 1, 1979.526 At Canada’s insistence an
expenditure ceiling of $17.3 million for the experiment was
525 Minister, National Health and Welfare, letter to the Premier of 
Manitoba, April 17, 1973.
526 Agreement Concerning a Basic Annual Income Experimental Project. 
June 4, 1974, p. 21.
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established.
The following table provides a chronological overview of the 
experiment.
Key Dates and Events
1970 General discussions between Manitoba and Canada begin
1971 Jan. Canada announces readiness to share in the costs of
conducting guaranteed annual income experiments with 
the provinces
1971 Sept. Manitoba announces readiness to proceed with a
guaranteed annual income experiment
1971 Sept. Canada announces establishment of a program to finance
up to 75% of approved experiments conducted jointly with 
the provinces
1972 July Officials from Canada and Manitoba start intensive
technical discussions
1973 March Formal proposal submitted to the federal government
by Manitoba
1973 April Manitoba and Canada sign an agreement-in-principle
1973 Sept. Interim financial agreement
1973 Dec. External evaluation of design conducted
1974 June Main financial and design agreement
1975 Jan. Payments begin
1976 Jan. Payments begin for supplementary sample
1976 April Major revision of research objectives
1976 July Further revisions to the research objectives
1977 Dec. End of payments for most participants
1978 Dec. End of payments for supplementary sample
1979 March End of all experimental activities
This chapter will examine the problems encountered in the planning 
of the experiment and briefly outline the design the experiment 
finally took. It will be demonstrated that it was not an easy task 
for Canada and Manitoba to agree eventually on what the purpose of the 
experiment should be and therefore on how the experiment should be 
designed.
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4.1 PURPOSE OP THE EXPERIMENT
In the broadest terms, the objective of the experiment was to
assess the economic and social consequences of introducing a system of
guaranteed annual income payments fashioned as a negative income tax
program.527 In more precise terms, the purpose was to measure the
effect of various combinations of guaranteed income levels and
tax-back rates on the labour supply response of the recipients of
guaranteed annual income payments. The experimental design focussed
on these two parameters because:
The tax rate and the support level are the two basic 
elements of any income-conditioned transfer program, and the 
way in which these elements are combined in the benefit 
structure of a program will similarly have cost 
implications. Thus the Experiment was specifically designed 
to measure the effects of various tax rates and support 
levels on work and earnings.528
By the time the final design features of the experiment had been
confirmed both Manitoba and Canada had agreed that the the labour
supply response was the appropriate primary research focus.529
Associated economic research included the effects of a guaranteed
annual income program on various market variables such as wage rates,
527 Hum, Laub, and Powell, Foreword.
528 Mincome Manitoba, and the Survey Research & Special Projects 
Directorate, p. 4.
529 The final proposal submitted by Manitoba, which formed the basis 
of the formal agreement, stated: "The primary focus of the 
experiment is on labour supply and the relations of individuals 
and families to the labour market". Province of Manitoba, 
'Proposal for a Guaranteed Annual Income Experiment', p. 9.
National Health and Welfare stated: "The Department has
established as the primary objective of experimentation to analyze 
the effect of guaranteed income plans on the relationship of 
individuals to the labour market". 'Guidelines for Financing of
Guaranteed Income Experimentation', July, 1973, p. 6.
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the relative wage structure, and rent levels. Important, but 
secondary research was planned respecting administrative issues 
associated with the delivery of a guaranteed annual income program.530 
Finally, sociological research respecting a number of topics and 
issues such as martial stability were also included.
Anticipating the labour supply response to a proposed system of 
guaranteed annual income payments is essential because of two major 
types of cost implications.531 First, changes in labour supply will 
result in changes in family income and this in turn will affect the 
cost of transfer payments made under the program and hence the total 
cost of such a program. Second, systematic changes in the labour 
supply of a large segment of the population will significantly affect 
the total labour supply available and could result in a decline in 
total national income. As well, there is the concern that if the 
supply of particular types of labour is affected there could be 
adjustment problems for industries, sectors, or regions dependent upon 
that type of labour.
The experiment was considered to be necessary in spite of the very 
similar experiments that had been conducted in the United States and 
which were used as prototypes for the design of the Mincome Manitoba 
experiment.532 It was acknowledged that the design and operation of 
the Mincome Manitoba experiment had benefited considerably from the
530 For a number of reasons which will be discussed in the next 
chapter, during the course of the experiment the administrative 
research assumed an increasing importance and eventually dominated 
the labour supply research objectives.
531 Hum, Laub, and Powell, p. 4.
532 Ibid., Acknowledgement.
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pioneering American efforts.533 It was believed, however, that the
major problem with using the findings of the U.S. experiments was that
it was not valid to generalize the findings to Canada where the social
and economic environment was held to differ significantly.
Furthermore, the samples used in the experiments in the United States
(which concentrated to a great extent on minority groups) were not
thought to be representative of the target population to which a
guaranteed annual income program would be directed in Canada. As the
Department of National Health and Welfare stated:
The work psychology of large segments of the Canadian 
population may well differ from those populations being 
sampled in the U.S. —  with the high proportion of black, 
Puerto Rican, and Mexican families being included —  many 
living in urban ghettoes. This is one reason for mounting 
experiments. In addition, the Canadian populace faces a 
radically different pattern of government income support and 
employment programs, and this institutional difference may 
well affect behaviour. Finally, a sufficient number of 
problems were encountered in the 'early' U.S. projects that 
generalizing from them will be difficult even in the U.S.534
It was also believed that the Mincome Manitoba experiment could
improve upon the American attempts at income maintenance
experimentation and, by including a saturation site, significantly add
to the research information available.
It was agreed by the two governments that Manitoba would be
responsible for all operations including data collection, data
processing, the payments system, and budgetary control. In fact, 
throughout planning discussions with Canada, Manitoba continually
sought to clarify the fact that it was to be responsible for the
533 Mincome Manitoba and Survey Research and Special Projects 
Directorate, p. 22.
534 National Health and Welfare, submission to Treasury Board, January 
5, 1973, p. 3.
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operational management of the project.535 This responsibility was
discharged through an agency called Mincome Manitoba created under the 
auspices of the Department of Health and Social Development.536
Canada's role was to be limited to that of monitoring and approving
proposed budgetary, research, and design changes. Hence, with regard 
to the experiment's operations, Manitoba alone was to be responsible 
with Canada's role limited to evaluating the development of the
operational plans prior to their being launched in the field.537
Canada, however, was careful to maintain a role as an equal partner 
with respect to the setting of the research objectives. It was
Canada's view that a major theme running through the agreement with
Manitoba was that decisions on research were to be taken jointly by 
both governments, and that those decisions would comprise the
"research policy" of the project.538 To ensure a high and continuous 
degree of consultation and communication between the two governments 
an Experiment Committee was established comprised of four officials 
from each government.539 The Experiment Committee was to be
535 National Health and Welfare, memorandum for the Minister,
'Federal-Provincial Agreement with Manitoba', p. 2.
536 The experiment was legally operated under the provincial The
Social Services Administration Act and the Canada and Manitoba 
Agreement Concerning A Basic Annual Income Experiment Project.
Manitoba Health and Social Development, submission to the
Management Committee of the Manitoba Cabinet, 'Mincome Manitoba 
Personnel Termination Plan', November 22, 1977, p. 1.
537 Deputy Minister, National Health and Welfare, memorandum to the 
Minister, May 2, 1974.
538 National Health and Welfare, memorandum for the Minister,
'Federal-Provincial Agreement with Manitoba', circa, spring, 1974,
p. 2.
539 When the Committee was struck in the summer of 1974 the provincial 
representatives were James Eldridge, Assistant Deputy Minister,
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responsible for determining research objectives and for approving and 
guiding the development of specific research projects. It was 
believed that through this mechanism both governments would be deeply 
involved in the actual research undertaking.540 The Experiment 
Committee was to meet at least three times each year. The first 
meeting was chaired by Manitoba with subsequent meetings chaired on an 
alternating basis by Canada and Manitoba. In addition to the regular 
meetings, either party could request a special meeting of the the 
Experiment Committee.541
Both Manitoba and Canada were of the opinion that the decision to 
undertake the experiment was significant in at least two respects.542 
First, it was a manifestation of the decision to evaluate seriously 
the option of a guaranteed annual income program. Second, it was
believed to be significant in that it was the first attempt in Canada 
to use social experimentation to assist in the development of social
Federal-Provincial Relations, Department of Finance; R.S. Hikel, 
Director, Mincome Manitoba; Michael Laub, Director of Research, 
Mincome Manitoba; and Lee Loveridge, Co-ordinator of Operations, 
Mincome Manitoba. Director, Mincome Manitoba, memorandum to the 
Director, Experimental Research Unit, National Health and Welfare, 
August 7, 1974.
Federal representatives (all from the Department of National 
Health and Welfare) were T.R. Robinson, Assistant Deputy Minister; 
B.J. Powell, Director, Experimental Research Unit; P.A. Veness, 
Project Manager; and N.J. Hunking, Senior Research Officer. 
Director, Experimental Research Unit, National Health and Welfare, 
memorandum to the Director, Mincome Manitoba, July 31, 1974.
540 Deputy Minister, National Health and Welfare, memorandum to the 
Minister, May 2, 1974.
541 Agreement Concerning a Basic Annual Income Experimental Project. 
June 4, 1974, p. 3.
542 Mincome Manitoba, and the Survey & Special Projects Directorate,
p. 22.
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policy. Furthermore, it was expected that the experiment would 
provide important information for the Social Security Review as was 
made clear in a joint new release issued on February 22, 1974: "The
Manitoba experiment is expected to make an important contribution to 
the review of Canada's social security system launched last April by 
all ten provinces and the federal government".543
In Canada's view, in the long term, the experiment would be 
relevant to the consideration of a wide range of policy parameters 
such as different support levels and tax-back rates associated with 
negative income tax plans.544 In the short term, the experiment was 
expected to generate data respecting the characteristics of low-income 
families. In Manitoba's view, initially at least, the purpose of the 
experiment was to demonstrate the feasibility of implementing a 
guaranteed annual income program.
4.2 CANADA'S INTEREST
Canada contemplated two approaches respecting the provision of 
support for guaranteed annual income experiments to be jointly 
undertaken with the provinces.545 First, based on the rationale that 
the federal government had no direct jurisdictional responsibility in 
the field of social welfare, it could "respond" to provincial 
initiatives and consider the experiments to be under provincial
543 quoted in Hum and Simpson, p. 44.
544 National Health and Welfare, submission to Treasury Board, January 
11, 1974.
545 Canada, National Health and Welfare, 'Guaranteed Annual Income 
Pilot Project Program', July 19, 1971, p. 2.
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control and responsibility. The problem with this approach was the 
potential for a number of very similar and duplicating experiments 
that would have strained available resources.
The alternative approach, jurisdictionally supported by the fact 
that Canada already had authority for a range of income maintenance 
programs through the use of its spending powers, and financially
justified by Canada's contribution of 75 percent of the cost of
approved experiments, was for Canada to "encourage" specific 
experimental thrusts across the country.546 There were obvious 
advantages to this approach. First, it would be a means of
discouraging the outright duplication of experimental effort in the 
same regions of the country. Second, it would provide the means 
whereby the federal government could influence the design and
administration of the experiments in which it was going to participate 
and for which it would partly pay. The third advantage was that by 
providing a major portion of the funding, the federal government would 
have the financial means to encourage the participation of the poorer 
provinces.
Canada decided in favour of the latter approach and developed a 
program of financial and consultative support for federally approved 
experiments undertaken with the provinces. It was announced in 
January, 1971, during the week of the Federal-Provincial Conference of 
Welfare Ministers, that the federal Cabinet had approved 
appropriations of $25 million over three years to "conduct jointly 
with certain provinces pilot projects designed to test the feasibility
546 National Health and Welfare, submission to Treasury Board, April 
26, 1971, p. 3.
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of the guaranteed income approach”.547 The purpose of the program was
to enable the federal government to,
enter into joint collaborative arrangements with provinces 
intending to conduct experiments with federal assistance, so 
the establishment of the research aims will reflect joint 
interests throughout.548
The research objectives of interest to the federal government were
designated as primary and secondary.549 The primary objective - an
analysis of the effect of guaranteed annual income payments on the
relationship of individuals to the labour market - would be common to
all federally funded experiments. Secondary objectives were divided
into two sets: those which would deepen the analysis of labour supply
response, and those respecting other dependent variables such as
consumption of private and public goods, family behaviour, political
activity, preservation of socio-economic status, etc. Secondary
research objectives were not necessarily to be included in all
federally funded experiments.
Canada's overall aim was to ensure a common and identical "core" of
analysis in all experimentation in line with the primary research
objective. The reasoning was that,
both the federal and provincial interests will be directly 
served if clear, primary research objectives were 
established, reflecting this consensus. This consensus, in 
particular, is that work behaviour response is of primary 
concern to all governments.550
547 National Health and Welfare, 'Guaranteed Income Experimentation', 
(discussion paper), November, 1971, p. 1.
548 National Health and Welfare, 'Guidelines', p. 2.
549 Ibid., p. 6.
550 Ibid., p. 4.
For example, officials in National Health and Welfare felt very
168
Hence all federally funded experiments were to have a common set of 
program features (identical income support levels, tax-back rates, 
program rules), common experimental design features (sample structure 
and size), and a common research objective (measurement of the labour 
supply response). The expectation was that a policy of core 
experimentation would lead to the "comparability" of the behavioural 
response in the various regions of the country and under differing 
economic and social conditions.551
In April, 1971, Canada anticipated providing support for five 
experiments: one in each of the five main geographical areas of the
country - British Columbia, the Prairie region, Ontario, Quebec, and 
the Atlantic region. The objective was to measure the variation in 
behavioural response in various parts of the country in the light of 
social and economic conditions peculiar to each.552 At least three 
provinces other than Manitoba indicated an interest in conducting a 
guaranteed annual income experiment. Ontario gave consideration to an 
experiment of a more limited type than that being proposed in 
Manitoba; British Columbia had made a decision, in principle, to 
proceed with an experiment; and Saskatchewan had indicated a 
willingness to explore the possibility of co-operating in an 
experiment with Manitoba.553 By the fall of 1971 Canada had entered
strongly that they must be involved in any discussions between 
Manitoba and Ontario respecting experimentation. National Health 
and Welfare, memorandum C.L. Gill to A.W. Johnson, February 25, 
1974.
551 National Health and Welfare, 'Paper on Policy Issues', June, 1973, 
p. 4.
552 National Health and Welfare, submission to Treasury Board, April 
26, 1971.
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into extensive consultations with a number of the provinces regarding 
the possibility of jointly conducted experiments.
However, by 1972, despite the fact that Canada had invited the 
provinces to submit proposals, and had begun consultations with many 
of them, Canada had decided that experimentation should not be 
extensive and that it would participate only in a maximum of three 
experiments.554 To Canada's relief, so it would appear, the provinces 
were not exerting "any pressure for a rapid proliferation of 
experimental projects, for many reasons: political considerations,
resources, differences in view about policy reform, costs, and so 
on."555 Indeed, in July, 1973, National Health and Welfare officials 
wrote that the consultations with the provinces were not intended "to 
positively stimulate interests, .nor did they".556 In January, 1974, 
the Minister of National Health and Welfare decided that the Manitoba 
experiment was to be the only one he was prepared to approve. His 
Deputy Minister considered it prudent that his provincial counterparts 
be informed of the decision so as to forestall any future 
misunderstandings.557
553 Mincome Manitoba Director, memorandum to the Manitoba Cabinet, 
'Proposed Design Guaranteed Annual Income Experiment: An 
Overview', December 18, 1972.
554 National Health and Welfare, memorandum to the Working Group on 
Income Supplementation, National Health and Welfare, 'Federal 
Interest in Guaranteed Income Experimentation', July 10, 1973, p. 
4.
555 Ibid., p. 4.
556 National Health and Welfare, draft memorandum for Mr. Robinson, 
July 7, 1973, p. 2.
557 Deputy Minister, National Health and Welfare, memorandum 
'Guaranteed Annual Income Experiments', to J.E. Osborne, T.T. 
Robinson, and Guy Fortier, January 22, 1974.
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Canada set out two major goals with respect to its role in the 
Mincome Manitoba experiment.558 First, it wanted to be in a position 
to be a party to all research decisions throughout the experiment in 
order to ensure that its research priorities were established and 
pursued. Second, it wanted Manitoba to take full operational
responsibility for the experiment. Thus the Agreement Concerning A 
Basic Annual Income Experimental Project contained the following 
provisions:
(i) that the experiment be defined as a joint
federal-provincial project;
(ii) that the federal and provincial governments take joint 
decisions regarding research policy throughout the project, 
though operational responsibility be carried by the Manitoba 
government; and
(iii) that a Joint Federal-Provincial Project Committee be 
established to take joint decisions respecting the research 
objectives and their specifications.559
4.3 MANITOBA'S INTEREST
During 1971 and early 1972 a considerable amount of pre-design work 
was carried out by Manitoba.560 Discussions between senior government 
officials in Manitoba and Ottawa were initiated in November, 1971. In 
June, 1972, Manitoba hired a full-time staff member and in July formal 
discussions were begun between officials of National Health and
558 National Health and Welfare, submission to Treasury Board, January 
11, 1974. p. 7.
559 National Health and Welfare, submission to Treasury Board, January 
11, 1974, p. 1.
560 Mincome Manitoba, 'The Development and Design of Negative Income 
Tax Experimentation in Manitoba: A Preliminary Report', (draft),
July, 1974, p. 5.
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Welfare and the Manitoba Minimum Annual Income Project.561 Agreement 
on the basic aspects of the Mincome Manitoba experiment was reached 
before the end of 1972.
In March, 1973, Manitoba submitted to Canada a draft of the final 
proposal accompanied by a budget.562 Approval in principle was 
announced by the two governments one month later and an interim legal 
agreement was signed covering cost-sharing and the respective design 
roles of the two governments. Later that spring, detailed work was 
begun by a group of federal and provincial researchers and outside 
consultants.563 This work, which took the form of commissioning papers 
to be discussed in seminars, was concerned with the identification of 
potential areas of research and the building of theoretical models to 
guide the collection of data.
Reaching agreement on the basic design of the experiment was not 
without its problems. Early in the planning stages it became apparent 
that the two governments wished to undertake the experiment for quite 
different reasons. Because Manitoba was primarily interested in the 
administrative and operational feasibility of a guaranteed annual 
income program, it wanted the experimental design to reflect as much 
as possible a program that might be implemented. "Indeed, this was 
the basis for its original support by Manitoba".564 Canada, on the
561 Premier of Manitoba, submission to The Planning and Priorities 
Committee of the Manitoba Cabinet. 'Federal-Provincial Agreement 
on the Guaranteed Annual Income Project', February, 14, 1973.
562 Mincome Manitoba, 'The Development and Design of Negative Income 
Tax Experimentation in Manitoba: A Preliminary Report', (draft), 
July, 1974, p. 6.
563 Ibid., p. 6.
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other hand, insisted on the primacy of the measurement of the labour 
supply response which implied a rigorous and controlled experimental 
undertaking.565 Thus, the first task of the joint federal-provincial 
planning group was to reconcile Manitoba's interest in a shorter 
project with immediate policy relevance with Canada's interest in a 
more elaborate exercise which would emphasize the experimental design 
aspects required to deal adequately with the testing of the unknown 
behavioural response.566
That, initially at least, Manitoba was more concerned with 
administrative feasibility than with the labour supply response is 
clear. On June 7, 1971, the Minister of Health and Social Development 
for Manitoba declared at a Conference of Federal-Provincial Ministers 
of Welfare that, in Manitoba's view, it was ''of vital interest to 
examine the complexities involved in the administration of guaranteed 
income programs" and that "much knowledge [could be] gained . . .  in a 
demonstration project".567 On September 9, 1971, the Premier of
Manitoba stated that the big problem to be solved with respect to 
guaranteed annual income proposals was one of administration.568 On
564 Hum and Simpson, p. 44.
565 Bawden, Kershaw, and Watts refer to a continuum bounded on the one 
end by a pilot project, and on the other end by a full-blown 
controlled experiment, with an administrative experiment located 
in the middle. D. Lee Bawden, David N. Kershaw, and Harold W. 
Watts, 'Some Alternatives for a Guaranteed Annual Income Test in 
Manitoba', August 29, 1971.
5 66 Director, Guaranteed Annual Income Project, memorandum to the 
Manitoba Cabinet, 'Proposed Design Guaranteed Annual Income 
Experiment: An Overview', December 18, 1972.
567 Hum and Simpson, p. 44.
568 Premier, 'Speech to the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, September 9, 1971.
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November 27, 1972, the Manitoba Minister of Health and Social
Development stated:
It should be stressed that our interest in experimentation 
with the guaranteed annual income is based upon our
consideration of such testing as a responsible way of 
preparing to introduce a guaranteed annual income program at 
the earliest feasible date. Our attention at the GAI is 
therefore a policy focus more than just an abstract focus on 
experimentation itself.569
In December, 1972, the senior Manitoba official in charge of the
design work stated that much of his time had been taken up
"reconciling the Provincial interest in a shorter project with
immediate policy relevance, and the Federal Government's interest in a
somewhat more elaborate study".570
In July, 1971, Premier Schreyer estimated Manitoba's financial 
involvement at "something over $500,000" and the number of families 
involved "possibly 500" but probably "closer to 300".571 In fact, the 
original plan developed by Manitoba in 1971-72 was to cost an 
estimated $2 million "for a very limited and crude administrative 
demonstration project".572 In late November, 1971, the Planning and 
Priorities Committee of the Manitoba Cabinet discussed possible 
guaranteed annual income experiments on at least two occasions.
569 Minster, Manitoba Health and Social Development, speech to the 
Welfare Ministers' Conference, Victoria, British Columbia, 
November 27, 1972.
570 Director, Manitoba Guaranteed Annual Income Project, memorandum to 
the Manitoba Cabinet, 'Proposed Design Guaranteed Annual Income 
Experiment: An Overview', December 18, 1972.
571 Hum and Simpson, p. 44.
572 Director, Mincome Manitoba, memorandum to the Minister of Health 
and Social Development, 'Briefing Notes, Federal-Provincial Press 
Conference on the Manitoba Basic Annual Income Experiment', 
February 21, 1974.
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General approval was obtained to pursue negotiations with the federal 
government on the basis that the project become operational by July 1, 
1972, the existing field administration of the welfare department be 
used to administer it, and the project last no more than two years.573
The intent of this proposed demonstration project was to produce 
operational and administrative information while at the same time 
generate as much public support for a guaranteed annual income policy 
as possible.574 The proposal, however, was not acceptable to federal 
officials who insisted that an experiment be developed with a more 
"scientific" design and a larger sample size.575 Hence, "what emerged 
was not the simple demonstration involving 300 families and $500 
thousand that Manitoba wanted, but an extremely complicated scientific 
experiment, modelled along the lines of the pioneering U.S. efforts 
and concentrating on the issue of work responses".576
At the time that the experiment was being planned, the scheduling 
of the Social Security Review was announced. This suggested to 
Manitoba that the experiment must be begun as soon as possible if the 
results were to have any impact on social policy decisions stemming 
from the Review. In the view of Manitoba:
573 National Health and Welfare, 'Report on Discussions with Manitoba 
Officials, December 6th and 7th, 1971,(2nd meeting)', December 10, 
1971.
574 Minister, Manitoba Health and Social Development, memorandum to 
the Planning and Priorities Committee of Cabinet, 'Guaranteed 
Annual Income Project', November 25, 1971.
575 Director, Mincome Manitoba, memorandum to the Minister of Health 
and Social Development, 'Briefing Notes, Federal-Provincial Press 
Conference on the Manitoba Basic Annual Income Experiment', 
February 21, 1974.
576 Hum and Simpson, p. 45.
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The converging development of the federal government's 
initiation of an overall social policy review and the 
Manitoba government's interest in experimentation has made 
it possible to design the experiment so that it will yield 
data that are relevant to the major policy options 
identified by the review process. Continuing co-ordination 
is assisted by having the director of the Manitoba 
experiment also serve as Manitoba's chief delegate to the 
federal-provincial Income Maintenance Working Party.577
The sense of urgency and opportunity felt by Manitoba was expressed in
May, 1973, by the Director of the experiment (then called the Manitoba
Minimum Annual Income Project):
Clearly, because of Manitoba's experiment we are at the 
centre of the process; the concept of guaranteed incomes has 
gained considerable political support and legitimacy. The 
one danger now is being overtaken by events, i.e., having 
the data after the policy decisions have been made. To 
prevent this, the fastest possible development of staff and 
implementation will be necessary.578
In February, 1973, the Premier stated in a letter to the Minister 
of National Health and Welfare that he considered the joint 
undertaking of the experiment to be a fundamental response to the 
Minister's call for collaboration between the provinces and Canada in 
reviewing the entire social security structure.579 As well, at the May 
23-25, 1973, Federal-Provincial Conference of First Ministers, the
Premier stated that he believed "the experiment would provide a great 
deal of valuable information which should be evaluated carefully 
before final decisions are made concerning a general national income
577 Mincome Manitoba, 'The Development and Design of Negative Income: 
Preliminary Report', p. 7.
578 Director, Manitoba Minimum Annual Income Project, memorandum to 
Secretary to the Manitoba Planning and Priorities Committee of 
Cabinet, May 1, 1973.
579 Premier of Manitoba, letter to the Minister, National Health and 
Welfare, February 22, 1973.
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security program".580 In January, 1974, in a submission to Cabinet, 
Manitoba Health and Social Development noted that one of the 
justifications for proceeding with the experiment was that it was
closely integrated with the social security review initiated by 
Canada.581 It is clear that Manitoba expected the Social Security 
Review to focus on the option of a guaranteed annual income, and 
equally clear that Manitoba also expected the experiment would become
a vital source of information and analysis for the Review.
4.4 RECONCILING DIFPERENCES
Canada, however, was unwilling to compromise research on the labour 
supply response for the sake of ensuring that the experiment 
replicated an actual program of guaranteed annual payments.582 Nor was 
Canada prepared to hurry the planning and implementation of the 
experiment in order to ensure that results were available before the 
Social Security Review had reached its conclusions. In November, 
1972, the Manitoba Minister of Health and Social Development noted 
that, "Manitoba is eager to get GAI development off the ground. It is 
more difficult to detect a similar sense of urgency at the Federal
level".583
580 Premier of Manitoba, 'Review of the Social Security System', May 
23, 24 and 25, 1973.
581 Manitoba Health and Social Development, submission to Health, 
Education and Social Policy Committee of Cabinet, 'Final 
Federal-Provincial Agreement Concerning the Implementation of a 
Minimum Annual Income Experiment in Manitoba', January 28, 1974.
582 National Health and Welfare, 'Report on Discussions with Manitoba 
Officials - December 6th and 7th, 1971, (2nd meeting)', December 
10, 1971.
583 Minister, Manitoba Health and Social Development, speech to the
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In fact, early in the planning and discussion stages Canada had 
decided that a controlled research experiment would be supported but 
not a pilot project.584 In Canada's view, the important distinction 
was that controlled research experimentation attempts to produce 
empirical data on behavioural responses and therefore does not 
prejudge the features of the program that might be introduced. A 
pilot project, on the other hand, was considered to be a test run of a 
given, already formulated program in order to discover how it could be 
made to work.585 Canada stated that the lack of empirical data about 
the effects of a guaranteed annual income program was what warranted 
federal support of the experiment.586
Officials in National Health and Welfare were well aware of the 
difficulties of implementing social experiments. In anticipation of 
difficulties it was recommended that a departmental official be placed 
in the field during the planning process as during such time "there is
an unending series of critical steps being taken" which if not
successfully planned could "bring the entire project down in 
subsequent years".587 Mistakes made by similar experimental efforts 
undertaken in the United States were identified.588 The conclusion was
Welfare Ministers' Conference, Victoria, British Columbia, 
November 27, 1972.
584 National Health and Welfare, 'Guaranteed Income Experimentation', 
November, 1971, p. 11.
585 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
586 National Health and Welfare, 'Guidelines', p. 4.
587 National Health and Welfare, 'Notes on Staffing Requirements',
March 30, 1973.
588 The deficiencies of the New Jersey experiment were known to the 
Mincome Manitoba researchers when they designed the experiment.
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that the planning stages for social experiments were of critical 
importance as hurried planning accounted for many of the problems that 
had been encountered in various social experiments conducted in the 
United States.589
Thus it was concluded by Canada that planning of the Mincome 
Manitoba experiment could and probably should be a lengthy process. 
In preparation for the implementation of the federal funding program 
(which included the development of a set of guidelines for 
distribution to the provinces), National Health and Welfare officials 
held discussions with a wide range of professional and academic 
opinion. Included in the discussions were officials at the United 
States Department of Health and Economic Welfare; the Office for 
Economic Opportunity; the Urban Institute in Washington; experts at 
the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin; 
the Stanford Research Institute; and officials in all the provinces 
except Prince Edward Island.590
It is not surprising, therefore, to find that when presented with 
Manitoba's first proposal "for a very limited and crude administrative 
demonstration project” Canada insisted on an experiment with a more 
"scientific" design.591 Indeed, in October, 1972, the Director of the
Gripton, p. 37.
589 National Health and Welfare, 'Guaranteed Income Experimentation', 
(discussion paper), November, 1971, p. 13.
590 Ibid., p. 1.
591 Director, Mincome Manitoba, memorandum to Minister, Manitoba 
Health and Social Development, 'Briefing Notes, Federal-Provincial 
Press Conference on the Manitoba Basic Annual Income Experiment', 
February 21, 1974.
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Manitoba Guaranteed Annual Income Project reported that the "bulk of 
my time has been spent in re-designing the Province of Manitoba’s 
G.A.I. experiment to bring it in line with Federal preferences".592 He 
also suggested that the process had been extensively prolonged because 
of the continually shifting conception of experimentation among staff 
in National Health and Welfare. Jodie Allen et al. concluded in their 
report of December, 1973, that while federal involvement had been 
considerable during the initial planning phase, and while this had 
consumed a good deal of Manitoba staff time during a very busy period, 
it had been beneficial.593
The result was that federal-provincial "negotiations" ended with a 
final proposal in which Manitoba presented a project plan with a
significantly modified approach.594 First, the proposal was now
considered to be a social science experiment and not a demonstration 
project wherein the primary policy issue was deemed to be the impact 
of guaranteed annual income payments on the labour supply response of 
recipients. This ensured adherence to a rigorous experimental design 
methodology.
592 Director, Guaranteed Annual Income Project, memorandum to the
Clerk of the Manitoba Planning and Priorities Committee of 
Cabinet, October 20, 1973.
593 Jodie T. Allen, D. Lee Bawden and David A. Dodge, 'Evaluation
Report on the Manitoba Minimum Annual Income Experiment1, December 
10, 1973, p. 13.
594 Province of Manitoba, 'Proposal for a Guaranteed Annual Income 
Experiment', pp. 3-7.
Federal officials were, however, of the opinion that: "With
regard to the basic design features of the experiment, there is
good progress in identifying the issues and the problems. The
work in this area is, however, highly dispersed and ad hoc."
National Health and Welfare, 'Notes on 1st Joint Committee
Meeting: Manitoba Experiment July 25-27, 1973'.
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Second, to accommodate the operational reality of a guaranteed 
annual income if it was implemented as well as the more "purely" 
experimental prerequisites of the experiment, a saturation module was 
proposed. In the saturation module all eligible recipients received 
income payments (in other words there was not a control group), 
whereas in the dispersed module some eligible recipients received 
payments as part of the treatment group while others in the control 
group did not receive payments or were not included in the experiment 
at all. Together the two experimental modules were viewed as 
providing an overall experimental design that was optimally 
satisfactory both from the perspectives of experimental methodology 
and policy relevance.595 The dispersed module, in terms of a 
controlled experiment, was considered to be more scientifically 
rigorous in the measurement of certain relationships regarded as 
crucial in predicting behavioural responses. The saturation module, 
on the other hand, was thought to represent best the social milieu 
likely to be found under a universal guaranteed annual income and 
therefore provide a more realistic setting for the testing of the 
effects of a guaranteed annual income program. Hum and Simpson 
describe the final design of the experiment as a "hybrid" in that it 
"conformed to the format of the 'classic' experiment (the Winnipeg 
portion), but it also included 'demonstration' aspects (Dauphin)".596
595 Province of Manitoba, 'Proposal for a Guaranteed Annual Income 
Experiment', pp. 4-5.
596 Hum and Simpson, p. 45.
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The final point of contention requiring extensive negotiation was 
Canada’s insistence that it would not contribute more than $13 million 
to the costs of the experiment. During the summer of 1973, both the 
Minister of Manitoba Health and Social Development and the Premier 
sent letters to the Minister of National Health and Welfare expressing 
concern over the expenditure ceiling. Both suggested that the 
insistence of the federal government on an expenditure ceiling could 
delay the signing of the final agreement.597
Manitoba considered the ceiling to be a modification of what was
initially understood to be Canada’s willingness to pay 75 percent of
all expenditures. Manitoba objected to the fact that the ceiling
arrangement meant that Canada would know its cost obligations in
advance meaning that Manitoba could be pressured into paying 100
percent of all costs exceeding the overall $17.3 million limit.
Moreover, the ceiling was considered to be inappropriate given that
federal officials were directly' participating in the experiment's
design and planning and were therefore in a position to restrain
planned costs. In short, Manitoba wanted Canada to agree to share in
the payment of any unanticipated costs. As the the Deputy Minister,
Manitoba Health and Social Development, stated in July, 1973:
The only bone of contention concerning the overall project 
appears now to be the $13 million limitation placed on it by
the Federal Government. . . . The Federal Government should
be left under no illusion that the province intends to pick
597 Premier of Manitoba, letter to the Minister, National Health and 
Welfare, August 16, 1973.
Manitoba Minister of Health and Social Development, letter to the 
Minister, National Health and Welfare, August 21, 1973.
The two letters were word for word almost the same - the letter 
from the Premier was sent by mistake.
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up any slack for the sake of rescuing the experiment if this
should become necessary.598
Canada, however, was adamant that the expenditure ceiling remain so 
that the experiment would not be conducted under an open-ended shared 
cost agreement. National Health and Welfare officials were under 
strict instructions to treat the ceiling as a fixed constraint within 
which the research benefits would have to be optimized.599 This 
position was underlined by the federal Minister in a letter to 
Manitoba's Premier on July 3, 1973: "I must stress again, however,
that the ceiling on the federal contribution remains absolute at $13 
million”.600 Finally, after repeated attempts to get Canada to remove 
the expenditure ceiling, Manitoba decided that the experiment should 
proceed despite the ceiling. Interestingly, it was felt by Manitoba 
that to some extent it (and the experiment) was protected as "should 
worse come to worse and the project have to be terminated before it 
has yielded expected information, the Federal Government will have 
jeopardized its own investment which is three times the size of the 
provinces".601 As it turned out, the expenditure ceiling was to have a 
major impact on the fate of the research effort.
598 Deputy Minister, Manitoba Health and Social Development,
memorandum to the Director, Manitoba Guaranteed Annual Income
Project, July 13, 1973.
599 Deputy Minister, National Health and Welfare, memorandum to the 
Minister, June 20, 1973.
600 Minister, National Health and Welfare, letter to the Premier of 
Manitoba, July 3, 1973.
601 Deputy Minister, Manitoba Health and Social Development,
memorandum to the Director, Manitoba Guaranteed Annual Income
Project, July 13, 1973.
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4.5 DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENT
The design of the Mincome Manitoba experiment was based on the 
classical negative income tax model. In an experimental version of 
this model, participants are selected from a number of sites and 
assigned randomly to treatment and control groups, treatment families 
are provided with income-conditioned payments over a predetermined 
period of time, and data respecting the response of the treatment and 
control families is gathered.602 The classical negative income tax 
model can be expressed algebraically,
P = Si - tY,
where
P s payment to the treatment unit
S - income support level
i = number of people in the treatment unit
t = tax-back rate in respect of transfer payments
Y * treatment unit income.
In the case of the Mincome Manitoba experiment, the classical model 
was expanded to include consideration of family wealth and the 
integration of other transfer and tax programs. Thus the classical 
equation was expanded,
P = Si - tY - rW - T,
where
P = payment to the treatment unit
602 Mincome Manitoba and the Survey Research and Special Projects 
Directorate, p. 4.
Hikel, Laub, and Powell emphasize the fact that the experimental 
payment system was designed on the basis of the classical negative 
income tax system. Hikel, Laub, and Powell, p. 5.
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S = income support level
i * number of people in the treatment unit
t = tax-back rate in respect of transfer payments
Y = treatment unit income
r = treatment unit net worth tax-back rate
W = treatment unit net worth
T = transfers of benefits or tax payments.
An additional feature of the Mincome Manitoba experiment, therefore, 
was that it provided for an income support level which depended on 
family size, income, and wealth. As a family's income increased the 
payment for which it was eligible would decline at a rate determined 
by both the income tax-back rate and the net worth tax-back rate.
The primary research objective was to explore the behavioural 
response, specifically the labour supply response, of recipients to a 
variety of combinations of income support levels and tax-back 
rates.603 The research objectives set out in the Agreement Concerning 
A Basic Annual Income Experimental Project were were stated as being:
(i) estimation of the impact of various basic annual income 
plans on such behavioural aspects as hours of work, 
investment in human capital, job search processes, job 
satisfaction, self-esteem and achievement motivation, 
geographic mobility, family splitting, and labour force 
participation;
(ii) investigation of the impact of various basic annual 
income plans on such marked societal variables as wage 
rates, relative wage structure, and rental levels;
603 Hikel, Laub, and Powell, p. 5. (The authors were, respectively, 
Director of Mincome Manitoba, Research Director of Mincome 
Manitoba, and Director of the Experimental Research Unit, Policy 
Research and Long Range Planning Branch, Department of National 
Health and Welfare.)
(iii) investigation of the relationship between the 
complexity of questionnaires and reporting periods on the 
accuracy of information supplied and administrative cost; 
and
(iv) analysis of such other administrative questions such as 
overall cost of administration, efficiency of administrative 
procedures, and participant comprehension of the 
administrative structures.
Other research objectives, such as the effects of various basic annual
income plans on family stability, community participation, consumption
patterns, time budgeting, and other behaviour were to be included at
the discretion of the Experiment Committee.
Research was expected to be conducted by three separate sources:
(i) Canada and Manitoba together;
(ii) Mincome Manitoba (Manitoba) or the Experimental 
Research Unit (Canada) independent of each other; and
(iii) persons not employed by either party but authorized 
for that purpose by both parties.604
Consistent with the process of federal-provincial consultation
regarding research objectives, interim progress reports were to be
prepared by each principal researcher for each research undertaking
and be submitted to the Experiment Committee for review.
Because of the theoretical and policy importance with respect to 
the labour supply response, only the guarantee level and tax-back rate 
were selected as experimental variables - all other basic parameters 
were held constant over all financial treatments.605 The selection of 
the program parameters was dictated by the primary research objective 
of the experiment, namely, measurement of the labour supply response
604 Agreement. p. 8.
605 Hum, Laub, and Powell, p. 19.
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to a range of programs whose characteristics differed in terms of 
income support levels and tax-back rates.606
Three income support levels and three tax-back rates were 
established. The upper income levels were limited by the budget 
constraint of the experiment and the lower levels by existing transfer 
programs. Three considerations influenced the setting of the income 
support levels:
(i) the range of income support levels should extend over 
all the policy relevant levels;
(ii) the range of income support levels should be broad 
enough to permit separate measurement of their effect; and
(iii) the income support levels should take into account 
existing transfer and tax programs.607
When payments commenced in January, 1975, the income support levels
were set at $3,800, $4,800, and $5,800 per year for a family of four
and were adjusted annually to maintain approximately constant real
values over the three-year duration of the experiment. Hence for the
calender year 1977, the three income support levels were raised to
$4,982, $6,114, and $7,246 per year for a family of four. The income
support levels were also adjusted according to the size of the
participating family in order to provide similar minimum standards of
living to all families and hence offer a "neutral" support structure
which would not discriminate systematically against any family size.
The three tax-back rates were set at 35%, 50%, and 75%. The following
considerations influenced the selection:
606 Ibid., p. 20.
607 Ibid., p. 8.
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(i) the policy relevant range of tax-back rates would be 
covered;
(ii) the breadth of the range should be sufficient to allow 
separate measurement of the tax-back effect; and
(iii) no tax-back rate would be so high as to substantially 
remove the work incentive.608
Hence the three income guarantee levels and the three marginal
tax-back rates yielded nine possible combinations which, with the
addition of the control group, yielded a total of ten possible 
experimental cells. However the combination of the highest guarantee 
level with the lowest tax-back rate was not used since it was 
considered to be too far outside the bounds of policy relevance. The 
combination of the high tax-back rate and the low guarantee level was
also omitted in order to minimize the problem of domination by
competing transfer programs. Hence eight experimental cells were 
employed - seven treatment plans to which participant families could 
be assigned, and a control cell.609
Income Support Levels and Tax-back Rates
Combination* Support Levels Tax-Back Rate
1 $ 3,800 35%
2 3,800 50%
3 4,800 35%
4 4,800 50%
5 4,800 75%
6 5,800 50%
7 5,800 75%
* Each combination assumes a family of four.
The experimental sample was comprised of three parts:
608 Ibid., p. 10.
609 Mincome Manitoba and the Survey Research and Special Projects 
Directorate, pp. 10-11.
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(i) a stratified random sample drawn from the City of 
Winnipeg;
(ii) a stratified random sample from several smaller rural 
Manitoba communities; and
(iii) a saturation site sample in a single community - the 
town and rural municipality of Dauphin - wherein all 
families and individuals were eligible to apply for 
enrolment in the program.610
The families in the first two categories were referred to as the
"dispersed sample" in that the sample sizes were small relative to the
Communities from which they were drawn at random. The points drawn
for the dispersed sample were selected by means of information
generated in pre-experimental interviews and an assignment model. The
dispersed sample was also stratified by family type and normal income.
The characteristics of family structure deemed important were the
number of heads and the number of earners. Accordingly, the
categories chosen were double-headed family, both heads working;
double-headed family, one head working; single-headed family; and
single individuals. Families were also stratified in terms of normal
income; that is an income measure from which transitory income
components were removed. Five normal income classes were used with
the cut-off level of income equal to $13,000 adjusted for family size.
Families in the third category were referred to as points drawn 
from the "saturation site". A saturation site was included because 
all the income maintenance experiments conducted in the United States 
had utilized randomly drawn dispersed (and stratified) samples.611 
This procedure was thought to be deficient in that the isolation of
610 Hum, Laub, and Powell, p. 10.
611 Ibid., p. 17.
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the treatment families created a highly artificial environment.612 It 
was believed by the planners of the Mincome Manitoba experiment that 
because a change in work effort or leisure activity often involves 
individuals outside the immediate family, the non-involvement of other 
members of the community in the experiment could exert a significant 
influence on the response of those families and individuals in the 
dispersed sample.
A second concern related to the administrative realism of the 
delivery system - namely, the integration of a guaranteed annual 
income program within the wider social network of a community.613 The 
response of the saturation site sample was expected to approximate the 
response to a universal program, to provide experience with the 
administration of a real program, and to provide information on 
community effects. The major advantages of saturation sampling were 
thus thought to be that:
(i) the individual responses to an experimental negative 
income tax available to all members of the community should 
more closely approximate the response to a universal 
program;
(ii) valuable experience with the administration of a 
"life-like" negative income tax program could be obtained; 
and
(iii) information on community effects could be 
generated.614
612 Ibid., p. 50.
613 Ibid., p. 51.
614 Mincome Manitoba and the Survey Research and Special Projects 
Directorate, p. 19.
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Only one combination of income support levels and tax-back rates was 
used in the saturation component since any differences in treatment, 
though justified by scientific inquiry, would have struck participants 
who lived side by side as inexplicable or inexcusable inequities.
Shortly after the first payments were made to the treatment group 
it was found that an unacceptably large proportion of the families had 
incomes much higher than previously estimated and were therefore 
receiving only minimal payments. Hence it appeared that there might 
not be enough low-income families in the experiment to allow for the 
labour supply response to be estimated efficiently and with acceptable 
precision. In addition, the attrition (drop-out) rate proved higher 
than anticipated, and if assumed to continue, would have led to a 
smaller sample size than desired for research purposes. Finally, it 
was discovered that certain households relevant to the experiment had 
been, for various reasons, systematically excluded from selection 
which further argued for design modifications and sample changes.615
As a result of these and other considerations (and after 
considerable internal disagreement) a supplementary sample was added, 
which was restricted to the City of Winnipeg and confined to those 
household types and income strata for which the existing sample sizes 
were thought to be inadequate.616 The supplementary sample received 
experimental payments for the same length of time as the original
615 Ibid., p. 16-17.
Mordecai Kurz, 'An Evaluation of the Experimental Sample of 
Mincome Manitoba1, April, 1977.
616 The same stratification variables were used in selecting the 
supplementary sample. Mincome Manitoba, and the Survey Research & 
Special Projects Directorate, p. 16.
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sample, but payments commenced one calendar year after the first 
payments to the initial sample were begun.
Experimental payments were made to the participants in the 
treatment cells on a monthly basis.617 Each month families in the 
experimental group were required to report the total income received 
by all members of the family from all sources. Payment for that month 
was then based on the total income reported in the previous month. 
Calculations of the monthly payment took into account any income above
the break-even level in any month and any overpayment was carried
forward to be counted as income in later periods when income fell 
below break-even. At year-end the actual payments received by a 
family over the accounting period were reconciled with the amount to 
which it was entitled based upon the total income received over the 
year. Resulting underpayments to families were corrected and any 
substantial overpayments were recovered.
The experimental and control families were interviewed every four 
months in order to collect detailed information on types of 
employment, hours of work, wage rates, job search, education,
non-labour income, and net worth. In addition, the participants'
attitudes and perceptions about their life, jobs, and involvement in 
the community were recorded. The interviews were long, detailed, and 
personal which contributed to the high drop out rate experienced by 
the experiment.
617 Mincome Manitoba, and the Survey Research and Special Projects 
Directorate, pp. 11-12.
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In November, 1973, an evaluation of the design of the experiment 
(as developed to that point in time) was requested by Canada. It was 
acknowledged that it was not possible to provide definitive answers as 
the experimental design had not yet been finalized, however, it was 
thought that the planning had reached a stage that made it appropriate 
for an independent evaluation.618 The evaluation undertook to answer 
three questions:
(i) Was the experiment well planned?
(ii) Was the experiment feasible within the imposed budget 
constraints?
(iii) Was the experiment feasible from an operational 
standpoint?
The planning of the experiment was considered from the point of 
view of both research and operations. With respect to research, the 
experiment was found to be very well planned and compared to the 
research design of such experiments in the United States (including 
income maintenance experiments) at least as well planned, and in some 
cases, far better planned.619 It was reported that the important 
objectives of the experiment had been addressed in a rigorous manner 
and that the overall research design was basically sound. From the 
point of view of operations and administration, it was noted (on the 
basis of discussions with Mincome Manitoba staff) that although not 
yet in written form there was no reason to believe that plans then 
being developed were not proceeding satisfactorily. It was cautioned, 
however, that at least one U.S. experiment which had been well 
designed from the research standpoint had failed on operational
618 Allen, Bawden, and Dodge, p. 1.
619 Ibid., p. 2.
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grounds, and that all had suffered to a greater or lesser degree from 
inadequate preplanning of operations.
The budgeting process was judged to be satisfactory and the 
preliminary cost estimates to be realistic although it was recommended 
that Canada agree to share the responsibility of inadvertent cost 
overruns should they occur.620 The reason given for the recommendation 
was that: "In the absence of such a promise, the Manitoba government
will most likely build-in a safety cushion which is far too large, 
resulting in a suboptimal design at best, and a noticeable sacrifice 
of research quality at worst".621 Concern was also expressed that 
insufficient attention might have been given to the development of 
procedures (the Rules of Operation as drafted were inadequate), too 
few experienced researchers might be on staff, and that some 
management level people might be overworked.
620 Ibid., p. 3.
621 Ibid., p. 8.
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Chapter V
PROBLEMS WITH THE EXPERIMENT
Conducting large-scale, social science research projects is difficult 
under the most favourable of circumstances. Social experimentation, 
however, is especially prone to problems.622 Because social 
experiments are usually large, complex, and costly they are 
exceedingly likely to experience a variety of organizational, 
technical, and administrative problems. Kurz, for example, notes that 
self-selection in enrolment and attrition during the experiment are 
common problems.623 Indeed, the problems encountered can often be of a 
magnitude or significance sufficient to threaten the credibility of 
the experiment.
Despite careful planning, based in part on the experience of the 
U.S. income maintenance experiments, the Mincome Manitoba experiment 
encountered a number of "scientific difficulties, political 
difficulties, management difficulties, operational difficulties - the 
list goes on".624 In fact, as early as the spring of 1975 federal 
officials were expressing considerable concern about the low number of 
participants, the administrative costs being incurred, the inability
622 Rossi and Lyall, pp. 157-173.
623 Mordecai Kurz, 'An Evaluation of the Experimental Sample of 
Mincome Manitoba', Mincome Manitoba Technical Paper Series, Report 
No. 5, (1977), pp. 3-6.
624 Hum, 'Social Security Reform during the 1970s', p. 41.
- 195 -
of Manitoba to recruit highly qualified senior officials, and 
management and organizational difficulties that were becoming 
apparent.625 By April, 1976, it was becoming increasingly obvious that 
the original research objectives of the experiment could not be 
achieved within the budget of $17.3 million and the time frame that 
had been planned.626
On April 28, 1976, Canada and Manitoba agreed to revise the
research objectives of the experiment and to alter its administrative 
organization. The following reasons were given for revising the 
research objectives:
(i) the original research plans could not be achieved within 
the budget and time originally allocated;
(ii) the two governments were facing a period of fiscal 
restraint;
(iii) doubts were being expressed about the quality of the 
sample, and hence, about the scientific value of the 
experiment; and
(iv) there was a decline in the priority attached to income 
security by both Canada and Manitoba.627
The most important provisions introduced by the Amending Agreement
included:
(i) reiteration of a fixed budget of $17.3 million;
(ii) extension of the experiment by 3 months to March, 1979;
625 National Health and Welfare, 'Suggested Comments: Meeting with
Treasury Board Officials', September 24, 1975.
626 Mincome Manitoba, 'Briefing Note for The Hon. Laurent L. 
Desjardins Minister of Health and Social Development', April 15, 
1977.
Executive Director, Mincome Manitoba, Statement to the 
Federal-Provincial Conference on Government Research in the Field 
of Social Security, March 17, 1977.
627 Mincome Manitoba, Ministerial Briefing Book, March, 1977.
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(iii) the placing of administrative research as a first 
priority with behavioural research identified as a second 
priority to be undertaken only as time and money permitted;
(iv) the transfer of administrative responsibility for 
Mincome Manitoba to the Secretary of the Management 
Committee of the Cabinet of Manitoba; and
(v) the creation of the Mincome Manitoba Steering Committee.
These changes indicated that the labour supply research would probably 
not be undertaken as part of the experiment but, rather, that the data 
base (from which behavioural research could be conducted) would become 
part of the experiment's "final report".628
On July 24, 1976, Canada and Manitoba further revised and defined
the April, 1976, changes made to the research objectives. The 
modifications included:
(i) definite postponement of any analysis respecting labour 
supply response;
(ii) identification of administrative studies and technical 
and scientific documentation as the goals of the experiment; 
and
(iii) a commitment to provide a scientifically valid data 
base to be made available to the research community for 
future analysis of labour supply and other behavioural 
responses.629
In addition, a Research Working Group was established in order to 
bring senior scientific personnel from Mincome Manitoba and from 
Canada together with two of the foremost authorities on U.S. income 
maintenance experiments. Dr. Bawden, from the Urban Institute in 
Washington and Dr. Kurz, a professor of economics at Stanford 
University, were contracted as consultants to Mincome Manitoba to
628 Director, Experimental Research Unit, National Health and Welfare, 
memorandum to the Deputy Minister, November 10, 1976.
629 Mincome Manitoba, Ministerial Briefing, (no date).
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provide ongoing scientific advice and recommendations to Mincome 
Manitoba and the two governments.
This chapter will outline and discuss the problems that eventually 
resulted in the abandonment of research on labour supply response in 
favour of less demanding and costly administrative research. The 
areas to be discussed include sample bias, budgetary constraints, 
personnel and management problems, and federal/provincial 
difficulties.
5.1 SAMPLE BIAS
By the middle of the first year of payments, serious concerns were
being expressed regarding the validity of the sample.630 Two problems
were considered to be particularly serious. First, the attrition rate
and the rate at which potential participants had refused to join the
experiment had greatly exceeded projected rates based on the U.S.
experience which meant that fewer sample points were available than
had been expected. In November, 1975, the attrition rate had reached
»
49%. By comparison, the attrition rate in the New Jersey experiment 
was only 18% over the three year life of the experiment.631
The attrition problem was a serious concern as it is vital to limit 
as much as possible the number of participants who drop out of an 
experiment after it has begun. Most designs require the comparison of 
experimental and control groups at different points in time meaning
630 Kurz, 'An Evaluation of the Experimental Sample of Mincome 
Manitoba', p. 8.
631 Director, Experimental Research Unit, National Health and Welfare, 
memorandum to the Deputy Minister, December 1, 1975.
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that a statistically meaningful number must remain in each group from 
the beginning to the end of an experiment. Attrition in the control 
group (as opposed to the treatment group) can often be a major problem 
(especially in the case of income maintenance experiments) as these 
participants may have little incentive to remain in an experiment.632
The second problem was that the limited size of the sample raised 
the possibility that the sample was "unrepresentative". Because some 
members of the sample received large amounts of other transfer 
payments, a larger than expected portion of the sample had total 
incomes above the break-even level thus raising the possibility of a 
bias in the sample. Furthermore, a large group of low-income families 
had been systematically excluded from the original sample simply 
because they had changed their addresses.633
Officials from both Manitoba and Canada formed the opinion that the 
experimental sample was so small and potentially biased that it placed 
the original research goal - measurement of the impact of guaranteed 
annual income payments on the labour supply response - in jeopardy.634 
Thus they became convinced that an increase in the size of the sample 
was needed if behavioural research regarding the impact on work effort 
was to remain the primary research thrust of the experiment.635 The
632 Riecken, pp. 186-192.
633 20,569 families were missed from the original screening interview 
(16% of the original sampling frame). Director, Experimental 
Research Unit, National Health and Welfare, letter to the Mincome 
Coordinator, November 18, 1975.
634 Director, Experimental Research Unit, National Health and Welfare, 
memorandum to the Deputy Minister, December 1, 1975.
635 Director, Experimental Research Unit, National Health and Welfare, 
letter to Dr. Graham Clarkson, November 7, 1975.
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problem was that to rebuild the sample, and thereby extend the life of 
the experiment, would increase the overall budget from $17.3 million 
to about $25 million. As well, there was considerable disagreement as 
to the potentially biasing effect of adding a supplementary sample.
In December, 1975, the Mincome Manitoba Executive Director proposed 
that the urban (City of Winnipeg) sample be immediately supplemented 
by 200 families.636 Moreover, in his view, virtually no delay was 
possible.637 However, the Director of the Experimental Research Unit, 
National Health and Welfare doubted whether a supplementary sample 
could be successfully enrolled and integrated into the existing sample 
in a scientifically acceptable manner.638 In addition, Canada took the 
position (in view of the firm ceiling of $13 million on the federal 
contribution) that if there was to be supplementary sampling the cost 
had to be accommodated within the existing budget or be financed 
entirely by additional Manitoba funds.639
After extensive discussions both governments agreed that the sample 
would not be enlarged and that the emphasis of the experiment should 
be shifted to the saturation site.640 They also agreed that the
636 Assistant Deputy Minister, Division of Social Security, Manitoba 
Health and Social Development, memorandum to the Deputy Minister, 
National Health and Welfare, December 3, 1975.
637 Executive Director, Mincome Manitoba, memorandum to the Mincome
Manitoba Research Director, 'Redesign Proposals', December 2,
1975.
638 Director, Experimental Research Unit, National Health and Welfare, 
memorandum to the Deputy Minister, December 1, 1975.
639 Deputy Minister, National Health and Welfare, letter to the
Assistant Deputy Minister, Division of Social Security, Manitoba 
Health and Social Development, December 10, 1975.
640 Mincome Coordinator, letter to the Minister, Manitoba Health and
201
experiment would not be lengthened by another year and that the cost
would be contained within the budgeted figure of $17.3 million.641 As
the Secretary to the Management Committee of the Manitoba Cabinet
wrote in November, 1976:
It is my impression, and this has been reconfirmed by 
comparing notes over the last few days with Mr. Desjardins 
and Mr. Miller [former and then Ministers of the Manitoba 
Department of Health and Social Development], that the 
Federal authorities were justified in believing that 
Manitoba was in full agreement with the Federal goal of 
maintaining an absolute ceiling on expenditures during the 
official lifetime of the experiment, and with the shift in 
emphasis.642
In short, it appears as though by the end of 1975 both Canada and 
Manitoba had given up on the labor supply response research objectives 
of the experiment as originally planned and designed.
Nevertheless, in late 1975, the Executive Director of the
experiment decided to increase the sample size without the consent of
either government.643 Hence a supplementary sample of 293 families in 
the City of Winnipeg segment was added bringing the total sample,
including controls and the saturation segment, to over 1,700 families
by early 1976.644 In spite of the fact that both Manitoba and Canada 
had agreed not to increase the size of the sample, and Manitoba 
acknowledged that Canada was under no legal or moral responsibility to
Social Development, April 2, 1976; letter to the Minister,
National Health and Welfare, April 17, 1976.
641 Mincome Coordinator, letter to the Minister, National Health and 
Welfare, April 17, 1976.
642 Secretary, Management Committee of the Manitoba Cabinet,
memorandum to the Premier, November 10, 1976.
643 Mincome Manitoba Coordinator, letter to the Manitoba Minister,
Health and Social Development, April 2, 1976.
644 Ibid., p. 8.
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share in the cost of the sample supplementation, Canada agreed to 
recognize the additional costs as being shareable.645
In June, 1976, Professor M. Kurz conducted an evaluation of the 
experimental sample at the request of Mincome Manitoba after
consultation with Canada.646 The terms of reference instructed
Professor Kurz to:
(i) advise Mincome Manitoba, after consultation with 
officials of both Mincome Manitoba and the Government of 
Canada, on the feasibility and manner of conducting research 
into the issue of the impact of a guaranteed income on 
labour supply response, taking into account data collected, 
or to be collected, by the experiment, and relevant 
operational and budget constraints; and
(ii) help develop a set of recommendations for Mincome 
Manitoba with respect to data base issues, bearing in mind 
operational questions and budget constraints within the new 
Agreement's requirements.
The objective of the evaluation was "to arrive at some conclusions
regarding the scientific merit of the data at hand and the problems
which may be encountered by future researchers and policy makers who
may wish to employ this information".647
645 "Manitoba acknowledges that Canada has no legal or moral 
responsibility to share in any of the costs of the sample 
supplement that was added to the experiment by Manitoba after 
December 2, 1975, and, notwithstanding, Canada agrees, subject to 
paragraph 56, to share the costs of the transfer payments and 
administrative costs associated with those transfer payments as if 
that sample supplement formed part of the experiment for the 
purpose of this agreement". Amending Agreement. April 28, 1976,
p. 10.
646 Second Meeting of the Mincome Manitoba Steering Committee, 
'Minutes", June 30, 1976, p. 3.
647 Mordecai Kurz, 'An Evaluation of the Experimental Sample of 
Mincome Manitoba', p. 1.
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Kurz found that the attrition problem had been severe and critical 
and therefore legitimately raised the question of the scientific 
merits of the sample. Nonetheless, he concluded that although it was 
clear that the sample was inefficient and wasteful there was no 
evidence supporting the view that it was hopelessly biased.648 Hence 
he reported that the experiment had been designed in a sound manner 
and that the data base was sufficient to permit analysis respecting 
the labour supply response if advanced statistical methods were 
utilized.649
It was the opinion of Canada that the results of the evaluation 
were a significant milestone in the development of the experiment and 
that it was the verification of the quality of the sample that allowed 
the experiment to continue.650
5.2 BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
As Hum and Simpson note, the "significance of the fixed budget 
amount established at the beginning of the experiment cannot be 
overestimated".651 By the summer of 1976 both Canada and Manitoba 
realized that it was going to be impossible to accomplish the original
648 Kurz, Mordecai, 'On the Feasibility of a Study of the Impact of 
Guaranteed Income on Labor Supply in Mincome Manitoba', (draft 
report), July 20, 1976, p. 1.
649 Kurz, 'An Evaluation of the Experimental Sample of Mincome 
Manitoba', p. 1.
650 Director, Experimental Research & Special Projects Unit, Policy 
Research and Long Range Planning Branch, National Health and
Welfare, letter to the Executive Director, Mincome Manitoba, 
February 20, 1978.
651 Hum and Simpson, p. 47.
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objectives within the allocated time and budget. Indeed, when the
budget of $17.3 had been set:
No one really believed that this figure was anything but a 
wild guess. The number was a convenient one; it had the 
right "feel" in terms of getting the project approved. As 
the experiment proceeded, more accurate estimates would be 
possible and, accordingly, budgets could be redrafted to 
reflect actual expenditures and resubmitted. Or so it was 
thought!.652
The problem was that the amount of money allotted for income payments 
to the participants in the experiment was not under the experiment's 
control as the payments were indexed and therefore depended upon such 
factors as the rate of inflation.653 Hence "these funds had first 
claim on the $17 million total because of their 'statutory' nature" 
which meant that operational and research costs could only have second 
or third claim.654
Revised budgets prepared by provincial officials estimated an 
overall increase to $25 million if the original research goals were 
pursued and the sample increased by 200. Federal officials estimated 
a potential increase to $23.2 million even after substantial cutting 
in some areas.655 Furthermore, in view of what was perceived to be the 
poor performance of the Mincome Manitoba organization, Canada began to 
question whether its contribution was being utilized in an efficient 
manner. In fact, as early as in April, 1975, federal officials had 
recommended that Canada not commit its full $13 million share until it
652 Hum, 'Social Security Reform during the 1970s', p. 42.
653 Hum and Simpson, p. 47.
654 Ibid., p. 47.
655 Director, Experimental Research Unit, memorandum to the Deputy 
Minister, December 8, 1975.
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had been clearly established that viable objectives had been set and 
that the capability to improve dramatically on past performance had 
been established.656
Thus Canada came to the conclusion that a new agreement should be 
developed that would contain a new design, a new set of limited 
research objectives, and a new budget.657 In any case, by the summer 
of 1975 both Manitoba and Canada agreed that fiscal restraint demanded 
a more modest set of objectives rather than additional funds. Hence, 
in July, 1975, a review of all research projects was undertaken to 
determine which research items within the existing budget were of 
sufficiently high priority to justify their continuing, and whether 
valid research was possible given the nature of the expected 
sample.658 It was concluded that within the existing budget, research 
could continue into administrative issues.
The experiment originally contemplated extensive research programs 
in four major fields: economic topics, sociological topics,
administrative issues, and statistical questions.659 When it became 
apparent that additional funding would not be forthcoming, and that 
existing funding was insufficient, it was decided to eliminate some of 
the originally planned research. The first research programs to be 
eliminated were the sociological topics and farm labour supply
656 Director, Experimental Research Unit, National Health and Welfare, 
memorandum to the Deputy Minister, December 1, 1975.
657 Director, Experimental Research Unit, National Health and Welfare, 
memorandum to the Deputy Minister, December 1, 1975.
658 Research Director, Mincome Manitoba, memorandum to All 
Researchers, July 11, 1975.
659 Hum and Simpson, p. 46.
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projects as neither had widespread support among the project's 
permanent senior research staff.660 The assessment of the impact of 
guaranteed annual income payments on labour force attachment and hours 
of work were now relegated to secondary importance in favour of 
research on administrative issues. In other words, less costly and 
technically less demanding research objectives related to the 
administration of a guaranteed annual income were now given priority 
over the labour supply response question in order to stay within 
budget.
In the summer of 1976 Dr. Bawden was asked to prepare a report
addressing the desirability of conducting research on administrative
issues. His report discussed the feasibility and necessary
prerequisites to carry out such research, and evaluated the
administrative research plans prepared by the Mincome Manitoba staff.
He pointed out that,
it is now believed by most researchers and bureaucrats in 
the income security area that the U.S. overinvested in 
research on recipients' response (primarily labor supply) to 
the basic parameters (tax rate and minimum guarantee) of a 
basic annual income (BAI) type of program, at the expense of 
recipients' response to the way in which the program was 
administered.661
Hence Dr. Bawden concluded that the Mincome Project potentially 
offered not only a feasible but a desirable setting for research on 
administrative issues. Thereafter it was decided that without 
additional funds,
660 Ibid., p. 46.
661 D. Lee Bawden, 'Research on Administrative Issues in the Mincome 
Manitoba Project: Evaluation and Recommendations', 1976.
207
there was virtually no alternative but to declare the 
project a "success" and to close it down gracefully. The
project's mandate was therefore redirected towards
administrative issues for its remaining life. The project 
was told to prepare the data already collected for storage 
and to document whatever work had already been completed.
The data, it was hoped, would at least be preserved for 
analysis at a later date.662
Hum and Simpson ask the obvious question: "Why was the budget
simply not increased?"663 In fact, "concerted attempts to obtain funds 
or seek other sponsors" were undertaken and, moreover, Mincome
Manitoba staff did develop alternative research proposals to
investigate labour supply with much more modest designs in the hope 
that minimal additional funding would be forthcoming.664 By that time, 
however, the policy and political environment had become much less 
favourably disposed towards a guaranteed annual income in that the 
Social Security Review had ended, the economy's performance was poor 
and getting worse, fiscal restraint had become the order of the day, 
and there had been a change in government in both Ottawa and Manitoba. 
The result was that there was no longer "political support in the 
country for sweeping reforms of the type promised by a guaranteed 
income".665 Hum and Simpson conclude that: "Given all this, it is
understandable why everyone wanted Mincome to conclude quietly and 
gracefully".666
662 Hum and Simpson, p. 47.
663 Ibid., p. 47.
664 Ibid., p. 47.
665 Ibid., p. 47.
666 Ibid., p. 47.
208
5.3 PERSONNEL AND MANAGEMENT
By the end of 1975 federal officials were of the opinion that 
management problems in the experiment were acute and in need of 
immediate attention.667 In fact, it was believed that the sample 
problem was, "in good part, a symptom of management deficiencies in 
experimental operations.”668 In June, 1976, the new Executive Director 
of Mincome Manitoba (appointed on a part-time basis at the beginning 
of June and on a full-time basis on July 12, 1976) reported that there 
was clear evidence of a serious gap in communications and working 
relations between the research and operations sides of the 
experiment.669
This view was supported by the evaluation conducted by Dr. Kurz in 
July, 1976, who reported that part of the reason for the early high 
attrition rate was due to the weak relationship between the 
organization of research and operations.670 It was Dr. Kurz's 
assessment that the Mincome Manitoba experiment had "experienced a 
very high early attrition rate because the ’program' nature of the
667 Director, Experimental Research & Special Projects Unit, National 
Health and Welfare, letter to the Mincome Manitoba Executive 
Director, July 31, 1975.
National Health and Welfare, 'Notes for Briefing the Deputy 
Minister', October 22, 1975.
668 National Health and Welfare, 'Notes for Briefing the Deputy 
Minister', October 22, 1975.
Director, Experimental Research Unit, National Health and Welfare, 
memorandum to the Deputy Minister, December 1, 1975.
669 Executive Director, Mincome Manitoba, Report to the Steering 
Committee, June 21, 1976, p. 2.
670 Kurz, 'On the Feasibility of a Study of the Impact of Guaranteed 
Income on Labor Supply in Mincome Manitoba', p. 54.
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project gave more attention to administrative rather than research 
issues".671 Thus he concluded that it was the relative weakness of the 
research division which from the beginning had been the main cause of 
the problems experienced by the experiment. Professor Kurz further 
observed that,
the present research team will never be able to accomplish 
the research program as outlined in the agreement between 
the two governments . . .  to attempt to continue the 
experiment with the existing team will inevitably lead to 
the politically embarrassing outcome that only very weak 
research will come out of Mincome Manitoba and the program 
will be a complete failure.^7"5
Dr. Bawden had pointed out in his evaluation of the experiment in
1976 that successful completion of administrative research required
two prerequisite conditions. First, there had to be staff of
sufficient competence and size to design the research and conduct the
analysis. It was Dr. Bawden's judgement that the existing research
staff at Mincome Manitoba did not fulfill this condition. In a
memorandum he stated:
Any administrative research must be taken seriously, which 
means honest and ambitious effort to explore and test 
relevant alternative procedures. Moreover, the research 
must be conducted in a rigorous and scientific manner, a 
manner which will bring credit to the experiment. To 
accomplish this, the present research staff will have to be 
substantially upgraded, as discussed in my report on 
administrative issues. If. there is not a high probability 
that the required research talent can be obtained, or if the 
analysis cannot be deferred if the required research
671 Ibid., p. 54.
In March, 1976, Dr. Graham Clarkson commented that "there can be 
little doubt that the principal reason for the alarming attrition 
rates was an administrative one". Dr. Graham Clarkson, 
'Commentary on the Basic Annual Income Experiment (Mincome 
Manitoba)', March, 1976, p. 6.
672 Kurz, 'On the Feasibility of a Study of the Impact of Guaranteed 
Income on Labor Supply in Mincome Manitoba', pp. 16-17.
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personnel are not obtained, then the administrative research 
objectives should be dropped.673
This view was shared by some staff members. In an internal document
it was written that,
the provincial members of the experimental team have not 
assumed direct future responsibility for all the types of 
analysis which could be done on the administrative data that 
we are collecting and intend to collect. We simply do not 
have the research manpower necessary to assume such 
responsibility.674
The second prerequisite identified by Dr. Bawden was that "the 
Project Director and the relevant federal officials be convinced of 
the desirability of administrative research and possess the enthusiasm 
of conducting it within the context of the Mincome Manitoba 
Project".675 By this time the experiment was suffering from very 
serious personnel and morale problems. Part of the reason may have 
been that "though unsaid, the experiment's senior people knew that 
interest and political support for the guaranteed income concept was 
waning".676 It had become clear that the experiment was in need of 
some major changes that would deal with these problems.
673 D. Lee Bawden, memorandum to the Executive Director, Mincome
Manitoba, 'Future Direction and Scope of the Mincome Manitoba 
Project', July 24, 1976.
674 Scott Bennett, 'A Brief Overview of Current Intentions and 
Interests in the Area of Administrative Research', January, 27, 
1975, p. 1.
675 D. Lee Bawden, memorandum to the Executive Director, Mincome
Manitoba, 'Future Direction and Scope of the Mincome Manitoba 
Project', July 24, 1976.
676 Hum and Simpson, p. 46.
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In July, 1976, the new Executive Director attempted to address some 
of the more serious management problems. The following priorities 
were identified:
(i) to improve substantially the Executive Director's 
capacity to monitor and control research operations and work 
flows;
(ii) to introduce sound management practices;
(iii) to improve the effectiveness of decision-making 
practices;
(iv) to improve the planning, development, 
operationalization and problem-solving capacity of the 
organization through a greater functional focus on Project 
objectives and priority problems;
(v) to increase substantially the integration and 
coordination between research and operations, and between 
the various operating divisions; and
(vi) to facilitate the effective introduction of additional 
leadership and support to the Project.677
At the same time the operational side of the experiment was brought
under the direct control of the Manitoba government. The Executive
Director was to report and be subject to the direction and authority
of the Secretary of the Management Committee of Cabinet. The
Secretary of the Management Committee, in turn, was to report directly
to and be subject to the direction and authority of the Minister of
Health and Development. Any pretence that may have existed that the
operational aspects of the experiment had been independent of
political control were now completely discarded.
In November, 1977, it was noted that the governments of Canada and 
Manitoba had "recognized for sometime that the premature loss of 
project personnel represents the most serious threat to their
677 Third Meeting of the Mincome Manitoba Steering Committee, July 28, 
1976.
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multi-million dollar investment in the Mincome phase of the basic 
annual experiment and the related future research".678 In May, 1978, 
the Executive Director reported that although Mincome Manitoba was 
managing to maintain reasonable adherence to target dates, it was 
operating under increasingly difficult circumstances and no one should 
be lulled into a false sense of security as the situation was still 
very fragile.679 Hum and Simpson note that the "question of an 
effective organizational structure for Mincome [Manitoba] was never 
satisfactorily or directly resolved".680
5.4 CANADA-MANITOBA RELATIONS
From the beginning it was apparent that the establishment of a 
satisfactory working relationship between federal and provincial 
officials was not going to be easy. This could have been expected 
given the history of federal-provincial relations in the area of 
social policy. The problem, however, was that with respect to an 
undertaking as large and complex as the Mincome Manitoba experiment, a 
maximum degree of co-operation was not only desirable but essential. 
In fact, this was not to be the case - there were problems from the 
beginning.
678 Manitoba Department of Health and Social Development, submission 
to the Management Committee of the Manitoba Cabinet, 'Mincome 
Manitoba Personnel Termination Plans', November 22, 1977.
679 Executive Director, Mincome Manitoba, letter to G. Clarkson, B. 
Rawson, and H. Schneider, May 11 , 1978.
680 Hum and Simpson, p. 46.
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As early as in October, 1972, there was a major misunderstanding 
when the Director of the Manitoba Guaranteed Annual Income Project 
complained that after a long series of meetings spent redesigning 
Manitoba's proposal to bring it in line with federal preferences, the 
project was being aborted by federal officials without notice.681 In 
April, 1973, the Director of the Experimental Research Unit, National 
Health and Welfare observed that rushed and tense meetings had damaged 
the working relationship between Canada and Manitoba.682 In August, 
1973, federal officials expressed apprehension over the working 
relationship that was developing with the Executive Director, 
especially with regard to Manitoba's willingness to report and 
document budgetary matters.683
It was not long before tempers began to flare. In March, 1974, the 
Assistant Deputy Minister, National Health and Welfare in a letter to 
the Mincome Manitoba Executive Director stated that although the 
nature and management of the federal role in the experiment warranted 
examination:
This leads me now to your comments on the "disruptive”
effect certain interventions by the federal government may
have had. On this, let me offer the following points: (a)
Yes, our participation has sometimes been disruptive; (b)
The leaders in our group must share the blame; and (c)
Things must in the future be handled more efficiently and
with more attention to an orderly, structured process. It
681 Director, Guaranteed Annual Income Project, memorandum to the 
Secretary, Planning and Priorities Committee of Cabinet, October 
20, 1972.
682 Head of the Division, Experimental Research Unit, National Health 
and Welfare, letter to the Director, Manitoba Guaranteed Annual 
Income Project, April 30, 1973.
683 Director, Experimental Research Unit, National Health and Welfare, 
memorandum to the Head, Guaranteed Annual Income Division, August 
30, 1973.
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is ridiculous, however, to pursue such a line of argument to 
some conclusion without reference to your own project's 
handling of its organization, the planning function, and the 
substantive issues involved in certain "disruptive" events .
. . .  It is too easy to conduct or evaluate events in a way 
that renders our role an external "disruption" and to use 
that view as an excuse for difficulties. That sword cuts 
both ways, and I'm sure we both have our lists of "gremlins" 
that could easily be blamed on the "other guys".684
The letter concluded with the suggestion that an effort should be made
to establish a more structured and professional relationship.
In June, 1976, the Mincome Manitoba Executive Director noted that
there had been some genuine misunderstandings between Manitoba and
Canada over the development of research objectives. He further stated
that federal-provincial consultation,
has been an extremely distressing aspect of the project's 
history. There is a major job to be undertaken in
rebuilding a relationship based on trust, integrity and a 
clear sense of respective roles and responsibilities.685
The Director of the Experimental Research Unit, National Health and
Welfare concurred with the comment that the observation was almost
"British" in its understatement.686
The problem was that dual responsibility for the experiment by the 
two levels of government had created many difficulties not the least 
of which "was distinguishing between research issues, which were to be 
resolved jointly, and operational concerns, which were a provincial
684 Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy Research and Long Range 
Planning, Department of National Health and Welfare, letter to the 
Director, Minimum Annual Income Project, March 13, 1974.
685 Executive Director, Mincome Manitoba, Report to the Steering 
Committee, June 21, 1976.
686 Director, Experimental Research Unit, National Health and Welfare, 
letter to Dr. R.B. Splane and Mr. R.A. Draper, July 7, 1976.
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responsibility”.687 Very early in the experiment Canada came to the 
conclusion that its role of being jointly responsible for research
while being unable to control essential related operations was less 
than ideal. Indeed, as early as October, 1975, Canada had formed the 
opinion that the separation of federal researchers from related 
operational activities such as data processing and surveys was 
untenable.688 Hence Canada began to consider the means by which it 
might increase its role and influence in the experiment. In fact, the 
problems were so severe that at one point more than half way through 
the experiment consideration was given to radically altering the 
arrangements by setting up a "Crown corporation" or "independent
institute" to run the experiment.689 However, this option was not 
pursued.
Provisions in the Amending Agreement of April, 1976, sought to
clarify and improve the relationship between Canada and Manitoba.
Under the terms of the Amending Agreement. Canada considerably
strengthened its monitoring and approval prerogatives respecting 
future research. All actions taken by Mincome Manitoba now had to 
fall within the terms of the Amending Agreement and if any research
activity continued which was not specifically included in the Amending 
Agreement it could be considered contrary to and in breach of the 
agreement.690 Manitoba was required to submit to Canada the research
687 Hum and Simpson, p. 46.
688 Director, Experimental Research Unit, National Health and Welfare, 
memorandum to the Deputy Minister, October 10, 1975.
689 Hum and Simpson, p. 46.
690 Mincome Manitoba Steering Committee, 'Minutes', May 10, 1976, p.
3.
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objectives to be pursued, proposed methodology, data requirements, 
proposed budget, identification of the researchers and consultants 
involved in each undertaking, proposed reporting schedule and research 
completion dates, and security procedures. As well, Manitoba was 
required to report and review its research activities with Canada 
every six months.
Moreover, to provide for a mechanism that would ensure a third 
opinion in the event of major disagreements, the Experiment Committee 
was replaced by a high level Steering Committee to be comprised of a 
chairman (appointed by mutual agreement by Canada and Manitoba) and 
two members appointed separately by Canada and Manitoba.691 The role 
of the Steering Committee was to advise the Minister responsible for 
the experiment in each government on policy and budgetary matters.692 
It was clarified at the first meeting of the Steering Committee that 
it was not an executive committee but, rather, a monitoring 
committee.693 Finally, the establishment of a Research Working Group 
(to include Drs. Bawden and Kurz) was expected to improve the 
relationship between Mincome Manitoba staff and the research staff at 
National Health and Welfare.694
691 Amending Agreement. April 28, 1976, p. 2.
692 Director, Experimental Research Unit, National Health and Welfare, 
memorandum to the Deputy Minister, November 10, 1976.
693 Mincome Manitoba Steering Committee, 'Minutes', May 10, 1976, p. 
3.
694 Steering Committee, Mincome Manitoba, 'First Report', July 28,
1976.
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Despite the fact that the April 28, 1976, amendments to the
original agreement had sought to clarify the relationship between
Canada and Manitoba, tensions and frustrations became public in 
November, 1976. In an uncharacteristically tough attack on the
federal government, the Premier of Manitoba accused it of terminating 
the experiment prematurely.695 Before the political situation 
completely deteriorated, the Premier was assured that the experiment, 
although significantly altered, would continue.
There were further amendments on May 2, 1977, which provided for a 
Coordinator (to be appointed by mutual agreement by Canada and 
Manitoba) to replace the Steering Committee. The Coordinator was 
mandated to:
(i) monitor the annual budget and all expenditures of
Mincome Manitoba;
(ii) monitor any special matters related to Mincome Manitoba 
referred to him by Manitoba or Canada;
(iii) rule on any matters arising out of the agreement where 
there was difference of opinion between the parties;
(iv) review any other matters that the Coordinator regarded 
as relevant to the administration and financing of the 
experiment; and
(v) report to Canada and Manitoba from time to time, and at 
the request of either Canada or Manitoba.696
In August, 1977, continuing uncertainty about major tasks remained 
and in January, 1978, the relationship between Canada and Manitoba was 
still fragile. In May, 1978, the Executive Director reported that the 
continuing delay in approval of a Canada/Manitoba personnel agreement
695 Winnipeg Free Press, 'Ottawa uses us: Premier', November 6, 1976.
696 Amending Agreement. May 2, 1977.
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and the absence of concrete plans for future research were 
exacerbating problems of staff retention and motivation which could 
result in significant changes in what the project could be expected to 
deliver.697 By July, however, it appeared as if the working 
relationship was improving. In a letter to the two Ministers 
responsible, the Coordinator was able to say that he was impressed by 
the improvement in the relationship between Mincome Manitoba and the 
Experimental Research and Special Projects Unit in National Health and 
Welfare Canada.698
5.5 ENDING THE EXPERIMENT
When the Mincome Manitoba experiment was started no one envisaged 
that the management of the experiment would be transferred from 
Mincome Manitoba prior to analysis of the data respecting the labour 
supply response being undertaken.699 Nevertheless, in September, 1977, 
Canada agreed to maintain and operate the data base after the 
completion of the field work of the experiment.700 It was agreed by 
Canada and Manitoba that by March 31, 1979, Manitoba was to have
completed the construction of the data base containing all the 
information gathered from participants during the experiment. In
697 Mincome Executive Director, letter to G. Clarkson, B. Rawson, and 
H. Schneider, May 11, 1978.
698 Mincome Manitoba Coordinator, letter to the Minister of National 
Health and Welfare, and the Minister of Manitoba Health and Social 
Development, July 5, 1978.
699 Mincome Coordinator, letter to the Deputy Minister, National 
Health and Welfare, January 16, 1978.
700 Director, Policy Research & Strategic Planning Branch, National 
Health and Welfare, memorandum to the Deputy Minister, August 24,
1978.
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addition, Manitoba committed itself to producing a series of research 
papers covering administrative, operational, and scientific issues.
Canada made the decision to assume responsibility of the data base 
and further research after the end of the experiment in light of the 
following considerations:
(i) since the establishment of the experimentation fund in 
1971 and the experiment in 1975 considerable public 
expectation had been generated concerning the conduct of the 
research and the production of findings, 01
(ii) other government departments, both federal and 
provincial, and other research organizations expected the 
data to be available generally,702 and
(iii) in view of the nature of the press coverage over the 
years, it was concluded that the expense and uniqueness of 
the experiment had not been lost on the public.
The concern with respect to negative publicity and potential political
embarrassment was well founded. In February, 1978, Mincome Manitoba
reported that: "The termination of the main sample of participants
has raised a great deal of press attention right across the country
with questions focussing on when research results could be
expected."703 On January 4, 1979, the Winnipeg Tribune (the daily
newspaper with the second-largest circulation in the City of Winnipeg)
concluded an editorial with the message: "And, in the grand tradition
of Canadian shared-services programs, Mincome has cost the taxpayers
701 ". . . there is no doubt that the Canadian research community is 
anxiously waiting for this unique data base (the only one of its 
kind in Canada)." Mincome Manitoba, 'Briefing Note for The Hon. 
Laurent L. Desjardins Minister of Health and Social Development', 
April 15, 1977.
702 Mincome Manitoba, 'Briefing Note for The Hon. Laurent L. 
Desjardins Minister of Health and Social Development', April 15,
1977.
703 Mincome Manitoba Report to Canada and Manitoba, February 6, 1978.
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$17.5 million - without even a glossy report to show for it, and to be 
thoughtfully filed away, to gather dust".704 On January 8, 1979, the
Winnipeg Free Press (the daily with the largest circulation in the 
City of Winnipeg) commented in an editorial: "One thing is certain.
A considerable amount of money was spent on the experiment. Perhaps, 
if taxpayers are lucky, some future government will not consider it 
necessary to repeat the procedure".705
Canada committed itself to placing a high priority on generating 
analysis related to the labour supply response after the termination 
of the experiment.706 The transfer of the data base, however, was 
expected to be a difficult and delicate operation.707 (The data base 
held an estimated 12 million bits of data that were to be 
computerized.)708 The period of August-September, 1978, through
March-April, 1979, was designated by Canada as a "transition period" 
which was to consist primarily of a vigorous and continuous effort to 
plan for labour supply response research after the end of the 
experiment.709
704 Winnipeg Tribune, 'End of Mincome: Nothing tangible for the
effort', January 4, 1979.
705 Winnipeg Free Press, 'Mincome Manitoba ends', January 8, 1979.
706 Winnipeg Tribune, 'Gov't pledges to finish job', January 11, 1979.
707 Mincome Coordinator, letter to the Deputy Minister, National 
Health and Welfare, January 16, 1978.
708 Estimated by the Director, Special Research and Special Projects, 
National Health and Welfare, Ottawa Citizen, 'While social 
scientists argue: Poor must remain poor', January 13, 1979.
709 Ketchum, E.J.D. 'Planning for Post-Experiment Research', draft of 
an internal paper, July 25, 1978.
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Mathematica Policy Research, an American group having extensive 
experience with the U.S. income maintenance experiments, provided cost 
estimates to National Health and Welfare for a broad range of possible 
research topics. The estimates ranged (in 1977 dollars) from $323 
thousand for a small initial findings study aimed primarily at 
determining the quality of the data base to $3.3 million for a full 
set of studies which would more than fulfill the original objectives 
of the experiment.7 10 A major constraint, however, was the federal
government's recent commitment to a policy of fiscal restraint which
was intended to curtail severely any growth in departmental spending, 
especially with regard to staffing. Furthermore, consultations with a 
variety of individuals representing institutions with expertise in the 
area of social experimentation determined that the history of the U.S. 
experiments indicated that much of the research could be conducted 
outside of government in a more academic environment.711 This
suggested the possibility of separating the data base management
function from the proposed analysis.
Four options for dealing with the data base were examined:
(i) postponing all activity which was thought to have 
considerable political costs;
(ii) postponement after an initial and cursory report;
(iii) maintenance of the data base under a partnership 
arrangement whereby someone other than Canada or Manitoba 
would pay the research cost; and
710 National Health and Welfare, 'Discussion Paper - Post-Experiment 
Activities', (no date).
711 An independent research institute or an institute attached to a 
university were always the vehicles used by the U.S. government 
in such endeavours.
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(iv) initiation of a full research program.712 
Funding a complete set of studies was rejected for reasons of cost. 
Proceeding with only a cursory report was also rejected as it would 
utilize only a very small portion of the data base which would mean 
that Canada's commitment to analyzing the whole of the data base would 
not be fulfilled. Postponement of all activities for several years 
was rejected as it would be viewed by Manitoba (and others) as 
Canada's reneging on firm promises made earlier. Furthermore, it 
would almost certainly have resulted in irretrievable loss of some of 
the data and therefore have created a high risk that the research 
potential of the experiment would never be realized leading to charges 
that the two governments had wasted over $17 million. It was 
concluded, therefore, that the choices were limited to two basic 
strategies. Either limit departmental activity to receiving, 
completing, enhancing, and operating the data base or search out a 
partnership arrangement whereby some other organization would use the 
data base but finance its own research.
Canada decided to pursue the latter strategy. It was felt that the 
completion of the data base, coupled with the development of a 
research partnership, provided the best solution to the problem of 
fulfilling earlier commitments within the context of fiscal 
constraint. It was believed that this strategy provided both a clear 
demonstration of the value of the expenditures already incurred and a 
realistic reflection of the fiscal constraints that had been imposed 
by the government. Indeed, in 1979 Canada was still insisting that it
712 Director, Survey Research & Special Projects Directorate, Policy 
Research & Strategic Planning Branch, National Health and Welfare, 
memorandum to the Deputy Minister, August 24, 1978.
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was "committed to completing all the research required for the Mincome 
experiment" and definitely intended "to look at the basic question of 
the experiment concerning the work ethic".713
Discussions were held with the Institute for Research on Public 
Policy, the Institute for Quantitative Analysis, and the Economic
Council of Canada but no agreement could be reached with them.
Discussions with most external agencies such as the Institute for 
Research on Public Policy and the Institute for Quantitative Analysis 
generated a great deal of interest provided that the Department of
National Health and Welfare would not only provide the infrastructure
(that is manage the data base and provide retrieval tapes) but also 
fund part of the research. Only the Economic Council of Canada 
indicated an interest in funding the research independently.714 The 
discussions with the Economic Council did not, however, result in an 
agreement.
In the spring of 1979 exploratory discussions took place between 
representatives of Canada, Manitoba, and the University of Manitoba 
concerning the disposition and analysis of the data. The University 
proposed that a centre or institute focussing on data collection and 
research related to social, income, and policy studies be established 
which would take charge of the data base. This would mean bringing 
the Mincome Manitoba experiment within the ambit of the University’s 
research interests whereby the institute's initial contract would be
713 Winnipeg Tribune, 'Gov't pledges to finish job', January 11, 1979.
714 Director, Survey Research & Special Projects Directorate, Policy 
Research & Strategic Planning Branch, National Health and Welfare, 
memorandum to the Deputy Minister, August 24, 1978.
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to complete the experiment.715 The University was not, however, 
prepared to commit money to the establishment or maintenance of the 
proposed institute.
In June, 1979, the President of the University of Manitoba reported 
that a good deal of support existed in the University (including the 
Executive Committee of the Board of Governors) for the establishment 
of such an institute.716 The President also expressed the view that 
reasonable financial assurances had to be given to the University if 
the project was to be at all viable. The critical factor, in the 
President’s view, was federal support for the Mincome Manitoba data 
base and the associated research.
Federal officials, however, were of the opinion that financial 
discussions in the past had reflected "soft commitments" and that 
federal financial assistance should not be considered to be 
automatic.7 17 The University then made it clear that they could not 
proceed without a firm understanding of Canada's commitment. It was 
therefore agreed that a Steering Committee (established on April 1, 
1979, to oversee the transition of the experiment) and the President 
of the University of Manitoba would request confirmation of Canada's 
intentions from the Minister of National Health and Welfare.
7 15 vice-President, University of Manitoba (D.J. Lawless), 'University 
of Manitoba - Mincome Discussions', (briefing note), April 12,
1979.
716 Minutes of the Experiment Steering Committee, June 22, 1979.
717 Ibid.
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On April 30, 1979, the Minister of Manitoba Health and Community
Services stated in a letter to the Minister of National Health and 
Welfare that he felt that any research activity involving the Mincome 
Manitoba data base should be conducted in an environment other than 
government, and that he was pleased that discussions with the 
University on the creation of an independent institute to house the 
experiment were proceeding well.718 On July 24, 1979, Canada expressed 
its support for the creation of an institute for economic and social
research at the University of Manitoba.
The Minister of National Health and Welfare did not, however, wish
to see the proposed institute committed to "a very sophisticated, time
consuming and expensive program of research on labour supply in 
response to a full scale guaranteed annual income".719 Two reasons 
were given. First, the department's policy research needs could be 
met adequately by using the Mincome Manitoba data base as it existed. 
Second, the University should not be tied to a massive project that 
would occupy all of the resources committed to the institute for a 
period of up to 18 months before any research product would appear.
A third reason may be that the federal government was no longer 
interested in the labour supply information and, in fact, did not wish 
to have the analysis undertaken because it might have shown that there 
was little negative labour supply response to a system of guaranteed 
annual income payments. Hum and Simpson, however, are of the opinion
718 Minister, Manitoba Health and Community Services, letter to the 
Minister, National Health and Welfare, April 30, 1979.
719 Minister, National Health and Welfare, letter to the Manitoba 
Minister, Health and Community Services, July 24, 1979.
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that "there were no villains in the piece, that the project was not 
shut down for purely political considerations, and that research 
activities were not 'cut off' because any party feared their expected 
conclusions".720 While it may be true that there were no villains and 
that no party feared the expected conclusions of the labour supply 
response research, it certainly is possible that the federal
government decidely was no longer interested in conclusions that would 
have shown insignificant labour supply response and may even have been 
annoyed at such results.
On August 1, 1979, the Mincome Manitoba data base was transferred
to the University of Manitoba. In 1981, with funding provided by
National Health and Welfare Canada, the Institute for Social and
Economic Research was created at the University "with a major
responsibility to execute a feasibility study of the data, and to
prepare it for analysis by qualified researchers".721 Hum has made the
following comment on the transfer of the data:
Indeed, the manner in which the data was archived 
(unpublicized location, unknown means of access, and so on) 
stirs the imagination to wonder whether those who were 
arranging its sequestering from the research community were 
possibly the same individuals who arranged sites for the 
safe disposal of radioactive waste products.722
In 1983, the Institute reported that the feasibility stage was well
under way, and research using most of the data was now possible.723
720 Hum and Simpson, p. 47.
721 Institute for Social and Economic Research, 'Mincome User Manual, 
February, 1983, p. 1.
722 Hum, 'Social Security Reform during the 1970s1, p. 43.
723 Institute for Social and Economic Research, 'Mincome User Manual, 
February, 1983, p. 1.
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Finally in 1987 and again in 1991 the experimental data were analyzed 
in an attempt to generate information respecting the labour supply 
response of the participants in the Mincome Manitoba experiment who 
were in receipt of guaranteed annual income payments.724
724 see Chapter 1, section 1.2.
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Chapter VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Manitoba Basic Annual Income Experiment is an example of a costly 
and complex piece of social science research concerning a relevant 
policy option that did not play a role in the policy formulation 
process. This is especially surprising given that the experiment was 
initiated, funded, and essentially conducted by government, concerned 
a highly prominent and probable policy option, and was the subject of 
considerable public interest.
Indeed, at the time, it was believed by many both inside and 
outside government that the research interest of the experiment and 
the policy interest in the idea of a guaranteed annual income had 
coincided in truly compatible and complementary circumstances. That 
some form of a guaranteed annual income would become part of Canada's 
income security system seemed almost a foregone conclusion. That 
research which would provide factual and precise information regarding 
the behavioural effect of such a policy was both necessary and 
desirable seemed obvious.
This chapter provides a summary and two major conclusions. The 
first conclusion is that the federal government had decided shortly 
after the Mincome Manitoba experiment had begun that it would not 
support the introduction of a universal, one-tiered guaranteed annual
- 229 -
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income program such as was being tested by the experiment. This turn 
of events virtually guaranteed that the Mincome Manitoba experiment 
would be doomed to irrelevancy with respect to the review of income 
security policy being conducted through the Social Security Review.
The second conclusion is that policy research that is costly, is 
based on the principles of social science research, and concerns a 
controversial policy proposal should be considered part of the normal
policy-making process, but should be conducted by a body that is
independent of the initiating government(s). The aim would be to 
enhance the stature of social science based policy research while at 
the same time shielding such research, as much as possible, from 
political interference that might critically impair its claim to
objectivity and relevance. This conclusion assumes that the 
policy-making process (thought of in the broadest terms) should
attempt to "avoid monopolies of knowledge, and seek instead to broaden 
the social and political process dealing with public problems".725
6.1 SUMMARY
6.1.1 The Experiment
As a piece of methodologically defensible research the Manitoba 
Basic Annual Income Experiment was a qualified success. Despite 
numerous and serious organizational, operational, and technical 
difficulties the experiment did manage to generate a data base from 
which some research concerning the labour supply response of the 
recipients of a system of guaranteed annual income payments could be
725 Pal, p. xi.
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derived. The experiment also resulted in a number of reports 
concerning the administrative difficulties of making operational a 
system of guaranteed annual income payments fashioned on the negative 
income tax model. These achievements should not be undervalued given 
the complexity of the research undertaking, the ongoing managerial and 
staffing problems, the difficult federal-provincial relationship that 
pervaded the whole of the research endeavour, and the fact that this 
was the first ever social experiment conducted in Canada.
There were two major factors which should be highlighted as they 
especially inhibited early and satisfactory resolution of the many 
problems encountered by the experiment. The first factor was that 
both Manitoba and Canada, but especially Manitoba, seriously 
underestimated the complexity of the experimental undertaking. From 
the conception of the experiment through its planning and 
implementation, Manitoba did not seem to appreciate the degree of 
organizational and technical expertise required to conduct such a 
complex piece of social science research. As a result, the experiment 
suffered throughout from a lack of senior researchers and 
administrators who adequately understood the nature and requirements 
of the project. This situation contributed to the long period of 
planning, management and organizational difficulties, and resulted in 
the contracting of expert assistance from the United States at a 
critical juncture in the experiment.
The second factor was the continuously difficult relationship that 
existed between some senior Mincome Manitoba staff (particularly the 
first executive director) and officials in National Health and
232
Welfare, especially in the early stages of the experiment. The 
relationship was made difficult from the beginning as both governments 
harboured suspicions that the other was involved in the experiment for 
unstated reasons. A review of the planning phase of the experiment, 
which was essentially an effort to reconcile the divergent interests 
of the two governments, supports this contention. That the Experiment 
Committee was replaced by a Steering Committee which was eventually 
replaced by a Co-ordinator indicates the extent and ongoing nature of 
the problem that required three different structures be instituted to 
try and address the problems in the relationship. Indeed, 
conversations in 1988 with the National Health and Welfare official 
responsible for Canada's remaining interest in the experiment, and 
with the first executive director of the experiment, indicated that 
such attitudes and even bitterness still existed.
The serious organizational, operational, and technical problems 
which beset the experiment caused the question of the credibility of 
the research effort, and at times even the merits of continuing with 
the project to be raised. It is not difficult to conclude, therefore, 
that this would have made it problematic for officials and politicians 
in the Manitoba government to argue for the relevance or the 
significance of the research. If the experiment had not experienced 
the many serious difficulties it did, officials in the Manitoba 
government may have been in a position to have made the argument more 
forcefully that policy decisions concerning income security stemming 
from the Social Security Review should be delayed until the results of 
the experiment could be made available.
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In the case of most social experiments it is usually very difficult 
for the research to be integrated with the policy process in a timely 
fashion because social experiments take a much longer time to complete 
than can usually be tolerated by the political and policy-making 
process. There is no question that the Social Security Review was 
subject to more than its share of political pressures as will always 
be the case in a federal system with jurisdictions that exhibit 
competing and often conflicting priorities and preferences. There 
was, however, an opportunity with respect to the Mincome Manitoba 
experiment and the Social Security Review to argue that the time frame 
of the policy review process should have been adjusted to accommodate 
the research requirements of the experiment.
Two points can be made in support of this contention. First, it 
was stated by the federal government that the Social Security Review 
was to be a comprehensive and "imaginative" process. This provided an 
opening to structure the Review as a lengthy process that, given the 
comprehensive objectives and the anticipation of fundamental change, 
could logically have been expected to take a number of years to 
complete. The argument could have been made by the federal government 
that to incorporate the experiment in the review process was part of 
the comprehensive and imaginative policy review process it had in 
mind. Second, a major focus of the Review was income security through 
a guaranteed annual income about which basic information was 
unavailable. The argument could have been made that it was important 
to wait upon the availability of the required information before any 
firm policy decisions could be made. In short, a commitment to social
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science research and a policy formulation process based on the 
precepts of a "rationalistic" model should have facilitated the 
integration of the experiment within the policy review process. This, 
however, did not happen.
6.1.2 The Policy Research Environment
At the time the Mincome Manitoba experiment was proposed there was 
considerable interest in the United States in social experimentation 
in general and in income maintenance experiments in particular. The 
New Jersey income maintenance experiment was winding down and a number 
of other income maintenance experiments were underway or being 
planned. As well, there was considerable academic and government 
interest in the possibilities of social experimentation as a social 
policy research tool.
The interest in social experimentation was only part of the broader 
concern at the time with finding better ways to utilize social science 
research tools and information in the policy process. Disappointment 
with the effect of many of the programs established with enthusiasm in 
the 1960s had precipitated a search for policy research tools which 
would more precisely model and predict the effects of policy measures. 
Social experiments seemed to be the essence of such an objective and 
methodologically defensible policy research tool. Thus the technique 
of social experimentation, which promised to deliver empirically-based 
analysis, seemed to be an essential tool in the search for a rational 
decision-making process, the essence of which is the utilization of
factual and objective information.726
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Canadian researchers, academics, and government officials were, of 
course, well aware of the interest in the United States in more 
empirical and predictive policy research tools. Furthermore, they 
were well aware of the growing interest and utilization of social 
experiments especially with respect to income maintenance proposals. 
As the nature and causes of poverty became a public policy issue in 
Canada after the "War on Poverty" programs were initiated in the 
United States, so too did social experimentation become of interest in 
Canada after it had been widely discussed and attempted in the United 
States.
In addition to the general interest in a more empirically-based, 
social scientific approach to policy research fueled by developments 
in the United States, there was the more specific interest in rational 
decision-making by then Prime Minister Trudeau. Trudeau came to 
office in 1968 determined to introduce decision-making processes that 
would require more planning, evaluation, and policy research. To this 
end he elevated officials and Cabinet ministers who shared this 
perspective and would attempt to implement his ideas concerning 
rational decision-making. It is not surprising, therefore, to find 
that the Minister of National Health and Welfare introduced the Social 
Security Review with the statement that: "We have sought, in
726 A "rational" and "scientific" approach to problem solving is 
considered by many to be inexorably linked (and highly regarded) 
by most people in the "modern" world. Russell L. Ackoff, The 
Design of Social Research. (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1953).
Harvey Seigel, 'What is the Question Concerning the Rationality of 
Science1, Philosophy of Science. (December 1985).
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developing our proposals, to comprehend the whole sweep of social 
security policy and to develop a comprehensive, logical, and hopefully 
imaginative approach to this field”.727 This was certainly the 
language one would associate with a description of a "rationalistic" 
decision-making process.
Hence it is not unreasonable to suggest that the technique of 
social experimentation (understood as an obvious and unrefuteable 
social scientific tool of policy research) would have appealed to 
federal government senior officials and politicians irrespective of 
the policy issue. It can be suggested, therefore, that the experiment 
may have been undertaken in large part because of the prevailing 
belief that the development of social science based policy research 
tools was desirable in and of itself. The issue of a guaranteed 
annual income was, in some respects, merely incidental in that it 
offered just such an opportunity. In other words, Canada became 
involved in the Mincome Manitoba experiment in large measure because 
of its interest in developing and promoting social science research 
techniques as part of the policy formulation process. In the end, 
however, and despite the intense interest in social science based 
policy research and a more "rational" policy process, incrementalism 
prevailed.
727 Canada, 'Working Paper on Social Security in Canada', p. 2.
237
6.1,3 The Political Context
In the early 1970s there were a number of political factors at work 
which forced the issue of a guaranteed annual income onto the 
political agenda. First, there was a growing public interest in the 
idea of a guaranteed annual income. Many of the provinces were 
advocating the exploration of a guaranteed annual income policy as an 
alternative to the existing system of income support and 
supplementation as were a number of influential private and public 
organizations. Furthermore, interest at official and political levels 
fueled the interest and awareness of the general public in the
possibilities of a guaranteed annual income program. Thus the issue
was being widely discussed and debated.
Second, there was the publication of the highly innovative 
Castonguay-Nepveu report which left social-policy initiative in Canada 
squarely with the Government of Quebec, a situation that was difficult 
for members of the federal government to countenance.728 One of the
central pieces of the Castonguay-Nepveu report was the two-tiered
income support and supplementation plan which, contrary to the
authors' assertions, looked a lot like a guaranteed income plan.
Banting argues that the report put the federal government on the
defensive and forced it to respond ambitiously if only to demonstrate 
that federalism did not inevitably doom progress in the field of
income security.729 The Government of Canada, as the senior level of 
government and with a Prime Minister profoundly commited to preserving
728 Van Loon, p. 475.
729 Banting, p. 75.
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federal prerogative, and given the failure of the Victoria Charter 
over the issue of jurisdiction with respect to social policy, had to 
respond. The response came in the form of a Social Security Review 
and a commitment to conduct an experiment on the question of a 
guaranteed annual income.
Third, from 1972 to 1974, the New Democratic Party held the balance 
of power in a minority government situation and insisted that the 
federal government reconsider social programs in return for continued 
support. Of the three national parties it was the NDP that was the 
most commited to the idea of a guaranteed annual income730 and, as 
well, the three provincial governments most commited were also NDP. 
Furthermore, at the time the NDP was using its position on matters 
concerning social policy as a means of differentiating itself from the 
Liberal Party, which the NDP wished to portray as being 
indistinguishable from the Progressive Conservative Party. During the 
1972 general election, for example, the New Democratic Party leader
attacked Prime Minister Trudeau "for 'fueling backlash and prejudice'
against welfare recipients".731 Hence the NDP took every opportunity
to make social policy a prominent item on the political agenda with a
guaranteed annual income highlighted as a favoured option.
These factors - government and public interest in a guaranteed 
annual income, the income support and supplementation proposal in the 
Castonguay-Nepveu report, and pressure from the federal NDP - were all 
instrumental in forcing the Government of Canada in 1973 to revisit
730 Hum, 'Social Security Reform during the 1970s', p. 31.
731 Leman, p. 65.
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the idea of a guaranteed annual income which it had rejected three
years earlier. Hence there was considerable political pressure on the
federal government in the early 1970s to respond in some fashion to
the idea of a guaranteed annual income. Or, as Leman puts it:
Proposals for a guaranteed income sprang quickly to the 
agenda because they became the answer to independent and 
relentless trains of events: commitment by elites to the
proposal and deadly serious constitutional debate. After 
1974 these separate processes began to work at cross 
purposes, but between 1968 and 1973 they acted in 
conjunction to place guaranteed income squarely at the 
center of debate.732
Conducting a long and involved experiment was one means by which the
federal government could respond and participate in the debate but not
commit itself.
By 1974, however, all governments in Canada were beginning to 
express a growing concern about the share of social programs in 
overall public expenditures. In fact a major issue in the 1974 
election was Canada's faltering economy in which inflation raged and 
unemployment reached recession levels.733 This resulted in almost all 
levels of government in Canada adopting policies of fiscal restraint. 
Thus the environment that had been supportive of social welfare reform 
and of major new spending programs began to become hostile to new
policy initiatives.734 By the end of the seventies "there was no
political support in the country for sweeping reforms of the type 
promised by a guaranteed annual income; the GAI concept itself had 
lost its fashionable patina."735
732 Ibid., p. 58.
733 Ibid., p. 122.
7 3 4 Van Loon, p. 495.
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Considering the change in the political and economic atmosphere by 
the mid-1970s, it is not surprising that the interest of both Manitoba 
and Canada in the idea of a guaranteed annual income began to wane. 
Indeed, by 1976 it was evident that Canada was no longer interested in 
a guaranteed annual income of any type. In 1977, the election in 
Manitoba of a Progressive Conservative government that had campaigned 
on a platform of less government made it clear that Manitoba too was 
no longer interested. A breakdown in the consensus that had sustained 
the growth of the welfare state since World War II was clearly evident 
in Canada by this time.
6.2 CONCLUSIONS
6.2.1 Canada1s Commitment
Large-scale research projects conducted or funded by government are 
by the very fact of government involvement undertaken within a 
political context. It would seem reasonable, therefore, to expect 
that any attempt at research endeavours in the area of policy 
decisions and actions necessarily would be based on the assumption 
that such efforts would make an important contribution to the policy 
process.736 It could be expected that this would be even more the case 
with regard to research undertaken through the technique of social
735 Hum, 'Social Security Reform during the 1970s', p. 43.
In 1977, after eight years of administration by the New Democratic 
Party in Manitoba, the Progressive Conservative Party came to 
power determined to reduce the size and role of the state in 
Manitoba's economy. Harold Chorney and Phillip Hansen, 
'Neo-conservatism, social democracy and 'province building': the
Manitoba experience', The Canadian Review of Sociology and
Anthropology. (February 1985), p. 10.
736 Fairweather and Tornatzky, p. 1.
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experimentation which is usually a costly and complex endeavour.
Because of the cost and complexity of undertaking a social
experiment, Riecken and Boruch suggest that social experiments should 
be initiated only after "considering their political impact and making 
a conscious determination that, on balance, the experiment seems 
feasible and likely to produce usable information that can be brought 
to bear upon social policy decisions".737 They list what they consider 
to be three important preconditions that should be met prior to the 
undertaking of a social experiment:738
(i) if the experiment may influence the fact, form, or 
substance of the proposed intervention;
(ii) if the proposed intervention is expected to be
something of sufficient importance in the life of the 
individuals affected to justify the investment of 
considerable resources, both human and financial; and
(iii) if the cost of delaying the introduction of a solution 
to a social question would be small relative to the cost of 
proceeding with an intervention based on less information.
There is, however, another precondition that must exist if the cost 
and risk are to be justified - a precondition which at first glance
would seem to be so obvious as not to require discussion but which in
the case of the Mincome Manitoba experiment was nonetheless absent. 
This precondition is that the government(s) initiating the social 
experiment must be committed to a policy process and time frame that 
will accommodate the methodology of the research. The conclusion of 
this research is that a major reason was that there was never a 
genuine interest on the part of the federal government in a guaranteed
737 Riecken and Boruch, p. 203.
738 Ibid., pp. 29-31.
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annual income program such as was tested by the Mincome Manitoba 
experiment. The following is offered as evidence of this conclusion.
First, there is the question of the timing of the experiment in 
relation to the Social Security Review. As was pointed out earlier, 
the timing of the policy decisions to be taken as part of the Social 
Security Review made it impossible for the results of the Mincome 
Manitoba experiment to be ready for consideration. Manitoba 
anticipated this problem but was unable to either shorten the time 
frame of the experiment or lengthen the policy review process. Canada 
was not the least interested in either possibility in spite of the 
obvious relevance and significance of the experiment if a guaranteed 
annual income was going to be considered as a policy option by the 
Social Security Review. As the major partner in both the experiment 
and the Review, and given the emphasis placed on comprehensive and 
rationalistic policy-making processes, the opportunity existed for 
either extending the time frame of the Review or shortening the 
experiment (at the risk of compromising some of the experimental 
aspects of the project). In fact, the federal government put as much 
distance as possible between the experiment and the Review and 
participated in each as if the other did not exist.
Second, there was the ongoing insistence on the part of the federal 
government that a one-tiered, universal guaranteed annual income which 
did not discriminate between the employable and unemployable was 
inconsistent with the work ethic. Throughout the Social Security 
Review the Minister of National Health and Welfare continually 
suggested that a one-tiered guaranteed annual income program (such as
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that being tested by Mincome Manitoba) would be incompatible with the 
values of most Canadians. It was for this reason, and in response to 
the recommendations in the Castonguay-Nepveu Report, that the 
two-tiered option was favoured by Canada. It would seem clear that 
political calculation and personal values dictated the policy choice 
before there was any possibility of what essential empirical 
information could have become available.
The third reason has to with the potential cost of a one-tiered 
guaranteed annual income. There was, in Canada as in the United 
States, a burgeoning belief that social welfare expenditures were 
growing out of control. Trudeau's government shared the broad concern 
that had emerged in most Western countries in the late 1960s regarding 
the general effectiveness of the welfare state apparatus.739 From the 
time Trudeau took office, he and his advisors had been concerned about 
the increasing costs of programs created in the mid-1960's. In fact, 
by 1965 the Pearson Liberal government was feeling that it was 
financially overcommitted to new social security schemes; the Canada 
Pension Plan, the Canada Assistance Plan, and the Health Resources 
Fund and Medicare were all in the works and the costs were climbing to 
more than one billion dollars a year.740 By 1968 the government had 
become convinced that the taxpayers in Canada were becoming restive 
and the government had begun looking for ways to restrain further cost 
increases.
739 Doern, p. 192.
740 Anthony Westall, Paradox: Trudeau as Prime Minister. (Scarborough: 
Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 167.
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Fourth, what little interest there might have been initially on the 
part of the federal government in a guaranteed annual income program 
was soon challenged by a changing consensus in the country and, more 
importantly, in the Liberal Party. In 1973 delegates to the Liberal 
Party of Canada's convention repeatedly rejected proposals for new 
welfare measures whereas only two years earlier Party delegates had 
called for the development of a comprehensive guaranteed annual income 
policy. When asked why the government could not do more for the poor, 
Prime Minister Trudeau cited middle-class backlash at the prospect of 
higher taxes as being the major constraint.741
These concerns were reflected in disagreements around the Cabinet 
table. In 1975 the idea of income supplementation for the employed 
went to Cabinet for consideration but was vigorously opposed by those 
Cabinet members opposed to further social spending led by the Minister 
of Finance742 who was very much against introducing a potentially very 
costly income security program of any type and who, as the debate went 
on, made his views increasingly public.743 In the end those in the 
Cabinet opposed to further social spending prevailed (Prime Minister 
Trudeau chose not to take sides)744 and the idea of implementing a 
one-tiered guaranteed annual income program was shelved. In fact, the 
Finance Minister's deputy specifically has been credited with having 
defeated the attempt to introduce a guaranteed annual income.745
741 Toronto Star, 'Liberals ignore poor's plight: Croll', September 
15, 1973.
742 Doern and Phidd, p. 371.
743 Van Loon, p. 496.
744 Doern and Phidd, p. 371.
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Thus there is significant circumstantial evidence to support the 
view that there was little likelihood that the federal government 
would have supported the introduction of a one-tiered guaranteed 
annual income such as was tested by the Mincome Manitoba experiment 
regardless of the outcome of the experiment. In fact, in September, 
1975, a former management consultant to the Manitoba New Democratic 
government and past president of the Social Planning Council of 
Winnipeg, who had participated in preparing Manitoba's brief to the 
Senate Committee on Poverty, criticized the Mincome Manitoba 
experiment calling it a "cop-out" for the federal government and a 
"fraud" because it was testing what had already been tested in the 
United States.746 Indeed, in May, 1976, it was reported that the 
Minister of National Health and Welfare had stated that because 
economic conditions had changed from the time the experiment had been 
started, Canada was not prepared to support a guaranteed annual income 
program regardless of the results of the experiment.747
6.2.2 Social Policy Research
Not all policy research can or should be used in the policy-making 
process. Nor is it reasonable or politically realistic to expect all 
policy decisions to wait on the availability of all the information 
that can be generated.748 Watts, for example, has observed that "one
745 Christina McCall-Newman, Grits: An Intimate Portrait of The 
Liberal Party. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1982), p. 223.
746 Winnipeg Free Press, 'Rehabilitation Needed in Welfare: Realtor', 
September 11, 1975.
747 Winnipeg Tribune, 'Mincome plan 'may be futile'', May 28, 1976.
748 Aaron Wildavsky, Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of
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cannot expect the process of public policy formulation to wait upon
the completion of scientific studies".749 Furthermore, there is no
intrinsic reason why empirically-based specialized policy research
generally should be considered any more important than other kinds of
information and analysis.750 Indeed,
it should be clear that persuasive policy arguments and good 
policy analysis are never enough to carry the day, partly 
because it is rarely possible to arrive at incontestable 
conclusions, but more importantly because the policy 
process, as a political process, rests on power and
interests.751
Nevertheless, it is vitally important that governments undertake 
policy analysis and evaluation that attempt to assess in an objective 
and disinterested fashion the effect of proposed and existing
policies. Such analysis must, however, be distinguishable from other 
information which has as its objective the generation of support for a 
policy on ideological, political, or personal grounds. Social science 
research can play an important and, indeed, crucial role in this 
endeavour for it is the methodology of the social science enterprise 
which sets it apart as nonpartisan, disinterested, and objective.
The problem, as Boeckmann pointed out in her study of the New 
Jersey income maintenance experiment, is that decision-makers and 
vested interests will often ignore social science research that does 
not support their preferred policy option and, alternatively, will
Policy Analysis. (Toronto: Little Brown & Co., 1979).
749 Watts, p. 17.
750 Charles E. Lindblom and David K. Cohen, Usable Knowledge. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).
751 Pal, p. 19.
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promote research that does. Furthermore, decision-makers and 
interests will attack the credibility of the researchers if this will 
support their position.
Considerations of purpose and cost suggest that not all policy 
research should be treated the same in the policy-making process. In 
the case of policy research that is costly, concerns a controversial 
policy proposal, and claims to be able to provide objective and 
factual information, there must be a clear commitment to attempt to 
accommodate and integrate the research, as far as possible, within the 
normal policy-making process. Recognition of social science based 
policy research as an important and necessary part of the policy 
process would give what is supposed to be factual and objective 
information added stature and legitimacy thus enabling it better to 
compete with other types of information in the policy process. Policy 
decision-makers would then endeavour to state their commitment to such 
research in spite of the fact that the policy process in pluralistic 
and democratic political systems will be (and should be) preoccupied 
by compelling and often competing political considerations and 
personal values.
To maximize the credibility of social science based policy research 
it may be important that such research (whenever possible) be 
conducted by a body that is independent of the initiating 
government(s). The major advantage is that policy research conducted 
by an independent body will more likely be, and be perceived to be, 
more objective than if undertaken directly by government.752
752 Pal, p. 113.
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With respect to the Mincome Manitoba experiment there was a 
deliberate decision to conduct the experiment under legislation rather 
than incorporate Mincome Manitoba as a non-profit corporation in order 
to show that this type of experimentation could be conducted under the 
auspices of government.753 Hum and Simpson argue that there is much to 
be said for the organizational structure under which the experiment 
was conducted:
The joint effort would set a precedent for future endeavours 
of this type, both governments would receive any credit due, 
both bureaucracies would become equally committed to the 
project, both governments would determine the "political" 
matters, and both administrations would gain expertise and 
experience.7 54
They also note the disadvantages:
Decision making might be hesitant or slow. Deadlock between 
two bureaucracies was a possibility, and opportunities for 
political interference would be maximized since both levels 
of governments were involved; conflicts concerning unrelated 
matters might show up in discussion of experimental 
decisions. The potential for conflict and confrontation was 
therefore great.755
They conclude, however, that there really was no alternative to "dual"
control as neither government could have conducted the experiment
alone. (Canada required provincial co-operation to deliver the
"treatment" program and Manitoba could not have afforded such an
undertaking).756 Moreover, in their opinion, the setting up of an
753 Deputy Director, Mincome Manitoba, memorandum to the Secretary of 
the Planning Secretariat of Cabinet, 'The Authority of Mincome 
Manitoba to make Experimental Income Maintenance Payments to 
Participants', January 7, 1974.
Also, 'Notes Concerning the Proposed Amendment to the Welfare Act 
to Authorize The Manitoba Basic Annual Income Experiment', Deputy 
Director, Mincome Manitoba.
754 Hum and Simpson, p. 45.
755 Ibid., p. 45.
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independent Crown corporation was not a good idea as "social 
experimentation is the kind of research that necessitates direct 
government involvement at times".757
Government involvement (especially two governments), however, may 
have been a large part of the problem. There is no direct evidence to 
suggest that the Mincome Manitoba experiment would have been more 
successful had the enterprise been less subject to government 
influence and direction, but it does appear as though much of the 
focus of the management of the experiment was concerned with the 
political implications of their decisions. Indeed, during the course 
of the experiment "the experiment's senior people knew that interest 
and political support for the guaranteed income concept was waning"758 
which suggests a preoccupation with the "politics" of the experiment. 
This is not to suggest that political factors can or should be ignored 
when initiating such research but, rather, that such factors should be 
taken into account during the planning phase to ensure the policy 
relevance of the research and that thereafter an attempt should be 
made to minimize political influence through organizational and 
structural means.
Objective and factual research that has credibility is critical to 
social policy formulation in Canada for two reasons. First, the 
formulation of social policy in Canada is made extremely difficult due 
to the fact of jurisdiction disputes between Canada and the provinces.
756 Ibid., p. 46.
757 Ibid., p. 46.
758 Ibid., p. 46.
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The problem is that in a federal arrangement "divided jurisdiction 
raises the level of consensus required for innovation, and thereby 
complicates the process of introducing new programs".759 Political 
pressures emanating from conflicts arising as a consequence of 
jurisdictional differences over priorities and preferences can easily 
override all other considerations. Adie and Thomas suggest that the 
factor of federal-provincial negotiation pervading the policy process 
in Canada makes the idea of a coherent, national blueprint for action 
in any policy field seem almost utopian.760 Smiley has stated:
"Federal-provincial relations are the despair of those who accept the 
desirability of rationality in the devising and implementing of public 
policy".761 Banting, in fact, concluded that federal-provincial 
conflict was one of the elements that doomed proposals for the 
restructuring of the income security system during the Social Security 
Review.762 In the highly charged political and partisan circumstances 
that usually characterize social policy debate in Canada it may be 
desirable to have an independent and credible source of factual,
non-partisan information.
Second, governments in Canada have traditionally operated on the 
principle that all government information is secret unless the 
government decides to release it.763 Only in the last ten years with
759 Banting, p. 174.
760 Aide and Thomas, p. 113.
761 Smiley, p. 74.
762 Banting, p. 211.
763 Kenneth Kernaghan, 'Freedom of Information in Canada1, in Public
Administration in Canada. ed., Kenneth Kernaghan, (Toronto:
Nelson, 1988,) p. 380.
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the introduction of freedom of information legislation (by both 
provincial governments and the federal government) has the heavy 
curtain of government secrecy been raised somewhat. This is indeed a 
concern if, as Banting states, the complexity of the political system 
in Canada insulates decision-makers from public opinion.764 Leman, in 
fact, suggests that the policy-making process in Canada is 
characterized by high-level negotiations among competing bureaucracies 
and between federal and provincial authorities in which public debates 
have little impact.765
Indeed, Paul Lamy has observed that the federal and provincial 
governments publish the results of some of the applied social research 
which they commission, however, political considerations are paramount 
with respect to the decision.766 Hence those outside of government 
need assurance that they will have access to factual, objective, and 
credible information concerning controversial policy options. 
Conducting social science based policy research through independent 
research bodies should help to ensure that this happens.
Thus it is important that there be as many avenues as possible by 
which policy research that claims to be factual and objective is made 
available and accessible to all those with an interest in the policy
764 Banting, p. 43.
The failed attempt at constitutional change through the
ratification process of the Meech Lake Accord would seem to bear 
this out.
765 Leman, p. 199.
766 Paul Lamy, 'Applied Social Research and Canadian Public Policy', 
in The Social Sciences and Public Policy in Canada. ed. A.W. 
Rasporich, (Calgary: University of Calgary, 1979), p. 37.
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debate. It is important because the participants in the policy 
process will tend to define the issues in terms of their interests and 
values, and therefore advance different interpretations about what are 
"the facts" and how they may be linked.767 Hence it is desirable that 
a means be found whereby the facts can be established and agreed upon. 
If common ground can be found with respect to the facts then further 
discussion concerning values, priorities, and assumptions can proceed 
in an informed manner. Independent social science research should, at 
the very least, help to clarify and establish what are the facts. 
Greater use of social science research in the policy process should 
help to ensure that the facts are not ignored by politicians and 
officials even when they fail to support the particular policy they 
prefer.
767 Pal, p. 116.
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